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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to explore how key ‘ecological’ or ‘systems integration’ technical pressures such 
as the co–production of technology, the emergence of new “collaborative intellectual property (IP) 
mechanisms”, and the increasing use of collaborative alliances for market and product development 
are impacting on and shaping the socio–technical policy directives of Chinese state leaders and the 
strategic behaviour of key Chinese high–technology firms operating in the global wireless sector. 
The central theoretical focus of this thesis is the emergence of alliance capitalism as an important 
new form of economic organisation with specific theoretical focus on the role of governmental 
authorities in both facilitating and governing the parameters of global technological alliances and 
market construction. The value of this thesis is that it highlights how the government of China and 
its domestic firms have recently adjusted to socio–technological systems change and the changing 
nature of the global technological environment and revised their technological development 
strategies to incorporate the notion of alliance capitalism. It will highlight how alliance capitalism is 
built around reciprocal interdependence and signifies a fundamental shift in the organisational 
behaviour of the Chinese government and its domestic firms. 
Beyond China’s earlier FDI and techno–nationalist strategies, this new development strategy can be 
seen as the third major attempt to mount an effective industrial strategy in China. Specifically, it 
responds to socio–technological systems change in a way that seeks to reconcile the New Left’s 
techno–nationalistic ambition to build an indigenous technology base characterised by the creation 
and ownership of technological standards and proprietorial ideas with the liberal desire to utilise the 
contemporary globalisation process as a mechanism to facilitate economic growth and technological 
up–scaling. It is essentially a third way whereby the state’s strategic control over the globalisation 
process is modified in a way that still allows it a certain degree of control over the developmental 
process itself, but in which the existence of critical globalised ecosystem dependencies and the 
interests of global firms are actually integrated into the Chinese developmental strategy. 
 
 
  
ii 
DECLARATION BY AUTHOR 
This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or 
written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly 
stated the contribution by others to jointly–authored works that I have included in my thesis. 
I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical 
assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial 
advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis 
is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree 
candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for 
the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have 
clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award. 
I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University Library and, 
subject to the General Award Rules of The University of Queensland, immediately made available 
for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968. 
I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copyright 
holder(s) of that material. Where appropriate I have obtained copyright permission from the 
copyright holder to reproduce material in this thesis.  
 
  
iii 
Publications during Candidature 
Higgins, V. (2011). ‘China’s evolving third way: market construction, alliance capitalism and 
Chinese strategic policy, the case of the wireless communication sector’, China Goes Global 
Conference, Harvard University, Cambridge USA. 
Higgins, V. (2013). ‘An introduction to China’s third way: the emergence of alliance capitalism in 
China’, Collected Lectures on Development Studies of Beijing Normal University, Shanxi 
Economic Publishing House.  
Publications Included in this Thesis 
 None. 
Contributions of Others to the Thesis 
None. 
Statement of Parts of the Thesis Submitted to Qualify for the Award of Another Degree 
None. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
“Never regard study as a duty but as an enviable opportunity to learn to know the liberating 
influence of beauty in the realm of the spirit for your own personal joy and to the profit of the 
community to which your later works belong." 
 
(Albert Einstein 1879) 
  
 
I would like to begin by thanking my two supervisors, Professors Stephen Bell and David Jones. 
Without their guidance, support and breadth of knowledge this thesis would never off been written. 
In particular Professor Stephen Bell, who acted as my primary supervisor has gone beyond the 
requirements expected of a supervisor and read each line of the manuscript with detail. He has sent 
revised drafts in weekends, and proved to be a most astute and knowledgeable mentor. For this I am 
truly grateful. I would also like to thank my friends Cazzandra Bell and Farida Azami. Our giggly 
girl time and nights of wine and dancing in Melbourne provided some much needed release from 
the serious and arduous nature of thesis writing. To my parents and my children I thank you for 
your love and support. Above all I would like to thank my partner Gordon McLaren for his love and 
unwavering support. You are indeed the kindest most thoughtful man I have ever met. Finally, I 
would like to acknowledge the facilities, academic support and travel funding provided by the 
School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland.
v 
Keywords 
Alliance Capitalism, Collaborative Innovation, Critical Ecosystem Dependencies, Globalisation, 
Co–development, State–Capitalism, Socio–technological Ecosystem, Technological Development, 
Chinese Politics, State–directed Capitalism. 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classifications 
160603 Comparative Politics and Governance 80%, 160607 International Relations 20% 
Fields of Research (For) Classification 
1606 Political Science 50%, 160599 Policy and Administration 50% 
  
vi 
 
 
DEDICATION  
 
To my partner Gordon McLaren, who gave up his dream of a nautical sailing adventure to support 
my academic one. Without you this thesis would not have been possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ................................................................................................. X 
Figures ........................................................................................................................................................................................... x 
Tables ............................................................................................................................................................................................. x 
ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................... XI 
CHAPTER 1 ............................................................................................................................. 1 
CHINA’S NEW ALLIANCE CAPITALISM AND THE CASE OF THE WIRELESS 
COMMUNICATION SECTOR .............................................................................................. 1 
A Statement of the Overall Research Question ............................................................................................................. 4 
Critical Ecosystem Dependencies and the Global Knowledge Economy ........................................................... 7 
Alliance Capitalism ................................................................................................................................................................ 10 
Structure and Agency in the Global Collaborative Economy ............................................................................... 11 
State Capitalism and Innovation ...................................................................................................................................... 13 
The Global Network State as a Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................ 16 
Analytical Framework and Key Concepts .................................................................................................................... 21 
Methodology and Data Collection ................................................................................................................................... 24 
Organisation of the Thesis .................................................................................................................................................. 26 
CHAPTER 2 THE PERILS OF STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY: TWO 
FAILED CHINESE ATTEMPTS, FDI AND TECHNO-NATIONALISM ............................................ 29 
FDI: Trading Market Access for Technology ............................................................................................................... 30 
Shallow Integration and the Liberal Critique ............................................................................................................. 33 
Indigenous Development/Techno–nationalism ....................................................................................................... 41 
Standards Development as Competitive Strategy .................................................................................................... 43 
WAPI ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 46 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................. 50 
CHAPTER 3 COMPLEX GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND THE CHINESE STATE: 
FROM NATIONAL INDIGENOUS INNOVATION TO GLOBALISED ADAPTIVE ECOLOGY.............. 52 
Ecological and Socio–Technological Systems Integration .................................................................................... 55 
Complex Adaptive Systems and Technological Evolution .................................................................................... 58 
Structure, Agency and Globalised Adaptive Ecology ............................................................................................... 62 
Strategic Niches and Technological Development ................................................................................................... 64 
System Integrators and Network Organisers ............................................................................................................. 66 
Intellectual Property and the Collaborative Economy ........................................................................................... 68 
  
viii 
Open Innovation, Patent Tradability and the China's Weak Intellectual Property Regime .................... 73 
Alliance Capitalism, Resource Sharing and Relational Ties.................................................................................. 76 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................. 81 
CHAPTER 4 TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT, ALLIANCE CAPITALISM AND CHINESE STATE 
CAPACITY ............................................................................................................................... 83 
The Developmental State .................................................................................................................................................... 84 
The Chinese Developmental State................................................................................................................................... 86 
Chinese State Capacity and High–technology Innovation ..................................................................................... 93 
National Innovation and Science and Technology Policy Objectives and Reforms .................................... 97 
Key Policy Directives and Innovation Indicators ...................................................................................................... 99 
The Collaborative Economy, Alliance Capitalism and the Chinese Government ...................................... 104 
CHAPTER 5 BEYOND NEO–TECHNO–NATIONALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINA’S 
EMERGENT THIRD WAY: GLOBALISED ADAPTIVE ECOLOGY, EMERGENT CAPABILITIES AND 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS .......................................................................................................... 111 
Foreign Domestic Investment and Shallow Industrialisation .......................................................................... 114 
Chinese Strategic Policy and the Case of the Wireless Telecommunication Sector ................................ 115 
Competition, Compromise and Alliance Capitalism ............................................................................................. 117 
The Chinese State and the Wireless Communication Sector ............................................................................ 118 
4G: From Neo–techno–nationalism to Global Ecosystem Development ...................................................... 121 
Go Global Policy ................................................................................................................................................................... 125 
Chinese Government Funding for Domestic Firms ............................................................................................... 126 
Public Procurement and Trading Technology for Market Access  .................................................................. 129 
Relational Legitimacy Versus Forced Technology Transfers ........................................................................... 130 
Alliance Capitalism and the Chinese Global Wireless Sector ............................................................................ 132 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................................................. 137 
CHAPTER 6 GLOBAL WIRELESS SECTOR ........................................................................... 140 
Methodology ......................................................................................................................................................................... 140 
The Chinese Government: Learning from the Failure of TD–SCDMA ........................................................... 143 
4G ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 145 
China’s Domestic Firms and Evidence of Innovation Capability ..................................................................... 148 
Alliance Data and R&D Expenditure ........................................................................................................................... 149 
China Mobile ......................................................................................................................................................................... 149 
Huawei ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 152 
ZTE ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 153 
R&D Expenditure ................................................................................................................................................................ 155 
  
ix 
Foreign Firms as Strategic Insiders ............................................................................................................................. 156 
Patent Data ............................................................................................................................................................................ 157 
Market Share ......................................................................................................................................................................... 161 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................................................. 169 
CHAPTER 7  CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 170 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................... 177 
APPENDICES .......................................................................................................................... 217 
Appendix A – Chinese Firm Questions ....................................................................................................................... 217 
Appendix B – Firm Questions Foreign ........................................................................................................................ 219 
Appendix C – Government/Ministerial/Academic Questions .......................................................................... 222 
  
x 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figures    
Figure 3.1  Wireless Value Network Structure 3G ............................................................................ 62 
Figure 6.1  LTE Essential patent Ownership 2010 .......................................................................... 159 
Figure 6.2  Leading Corporate Patent Filers 2010........................................................................... 161 
Figure 6.3  Huawei and ZTE US Patent Application Filings Since 2001…………………………169 
Tables 
Table 3.1 Wireless Business: Three Eras. ....................................................................................... 71 
Table 5.1  List of the Key Participants in 4G - TDE Mobile Telecommunication  
     Alliances in China ......................................................................................................... 135 
Table 6.1 Categorisation of Wireless Communications Sector Ecosystem Members .................. 142 
Table 6.2 Comparison of the Telecom Regime ............................................................................. 144 
Table 6.3 Top 10 Global Telecommunications Firms in the World 2011 by Revenue ................ 150 
Table 6.4 R&D Expenditure of Selected Companies 2010 ........................................................... 156 
Table 6.5 Top 5 Communications Equipment and Systems Firms 2011 by Revenue .................. 165 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
xi 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
APS   Application Providers  
BWA   Broadband Wireless Access  
BPO   Business Process Outsourcing 
CASS   Chinese Academy of Social Science 
CCSA                         China Communications Standardization Association 
CIC   China Investment Corporation 
CCP    Communist Party of China 
CGINs   Collaborative Global Innovation Networks  
C & D   Concept and Develop 
CDMA  Code division multiple access 
CIT   Corporate Income Tax  
CPs   Content Providers 
DCI   Digital Cinema Initiative 
DIJA   Dow Jones Industrial Average  
EDA   Electronic Design Automation 
EMS   Electronic Manufacturing Services  
EPs    Equipment Providers  
ETSI   European Telecommunications Standards Institute    
  
xii 
EPC   Evolved Packet Core  
ETDZ                          Economic and Technological Development Zones 
FDD   Frequency–division duplexing  
FDI    Foreign development investment 
FIE   Foreign–invested Enterprise Sector  
FFEs   Foreign funded enterprises 
FRAND  Fair and Reasonable Terms 
FYP                             Five Year Plan 
GDP   Gross Domestic Profit 
GFC   Global Financial Crisis 
GIPN   Global Innovation Production Networks 
GPN   Global Production Networks 
GSM   Global System for Mobile Communications 
GTI    Global TD–LTE Initiative  
HDTV   High–definition Television Sets 
HSPA   High Speed Packet Access  
3G   Third Generation Mobile Telecommunications Technology Standards 
3GPP   3rd Generation Partnership Project 
4G    Fourth Generation Mobile Telecommunications Technology Standards 
  
xiii 
IEEE   Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers  
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IMS   IP Multimedia Subsystem 
IO                               International Organisations  
IPO   Initial Public Offerings 
IPR   Intellectual Property Rights 
ISO   International Organisation for Standardisation 
ITO   Information Technology Outsourcing 
ITU   International Telecommunication Union 
JVs   Joint Ventures  
KPO   Knowledge process outsourcing  
LTE   Long Term Evolution 
TD–LTE  Time–Division Long–Term Evolution 
LSTI   LTE/SAI Trailiniative  
MII   Ministry for Industry and Information 
MOF   Ministry of Finance 
MOFCOM   Ministry of Commerce 
MOFTEC   Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
MOST   Ministry of Science and Technology 
  
xiv 
MNE   Multinational Enterprise 
MPT   Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications 
MPS   Megabits Per Second  
NGMN  Next Generation Mobile Networks 
NDRC   National Development and Reform Commission 
NPC   National People's Congress 
NSN   Nokia Siemens 
NVCA   National Venture Capital Association 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OEM   Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OFDI   Outbound Foreign Direct Investment 
OMA   Open Mobile Alliance 
OPA   Open Patent Alliance 
PC                               Peoples Congress 
PCT   Patent Cooperation Treaty 
PE                               Private Equity 
PHS   Personal Handy–phone System 
P & G   Procter and Gamble  
PRC   People’s Republic of China  
  
xv 
PPF                             Partially Privatised Firm 
PTTS   Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone Service 
SAAC                        State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
SAE   System Architecture Evolution  
SDPC   State Development Planning Commission 
SEZs   Special Economic Zones 
SIPO                           State Intellectual Property Office 
SKT   SK Telecom 
SOE   State Owned Enterprise 
SPs   Service Providers  
SOHC                         State Owned Holding Company 
STI   Science, Technology and Innovation 
SWF                           Sovereign Wealth Fund 
TBT   Technical Barriers to Trade 
TDIA   TD Industry Alliance 
TD–LTE  Time–Division Long–Term Evolution  
TD–SCDMA  Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access  
TM   TeleManagement Forum 
TNC    Transnational corporations 
  
xvi 
TSMC   Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company  
UMTS   Universal Mobile Telecommunications System  
VC                              Venture Capital 
WAPI   Wireless LAN Authentication and Privacy infrastructure 
WCDMA  Wideband Code Division Multiple Access 
WFOE   Wholly foreign–owned enterprises 
WiMAX  Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
WIP   Wireless Industry Partnership 
WIPO                         World Intellectual Property office 
WTO   World Trade Organisation 
WWRF  Wireless World Research Forum 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
CHINA’S NEW ALLIANCE CAPITALISM AND THE 
CASE OF THE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION 
SECTOR 
Hailed as an economic miracle, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become a key example 
of state–led, market–oriented global economic reform (Enright and Scott and Chang, 2005:1). The 
virtues and shortcomings of China's economic rise are touted by economists and policymakers 
worldwide. For some the economic re–emergence of the Chinese nation is one of the most 
significant events to occur in modern history (OECD, 2006). For others: “China is an object lesson 
in the threat that centralised, authoritarian states pose to revolutionary technological development” 
(Freeland, 2010).  
It is certainly undeniable that since the inauguration of economic reforms in 1978, with Deng 
Xiaoping’s “Open Door Policy” China’s economic performance has been unprecedented in, “speed, 
scale and scope” (Pei, 2006:143). This policy has been a pragmatic economic reform program, 
revolving around the need to generate surplus value to finance the modernisation of the Chinese 
economy. It encouraged the formulation of rural enterprises and private businesses, liberalised 
foreign trade and investment, relaxed state controls over some prices and invested in industrial 
production and the education of its workforce (Pei, 2006:2). 
Three principal factors have influenced the process of post–Mao economic reform in China. These 
are its focus on path dependency, developmental style state–led industrialisation, and the 
reinvention of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its monopolistic hold on power. Piecemeal 
social engineering in the formative stages of market transition led the central state inexorably to 
oversee institutional changes to establish a modern legal–rational bureaucracy. Although the state 
remains structurally vulnerable to rent seeking, it gained the organisational capacity to institute and 
enforce rules critical to the emergence of a hybrid market economy (Enright and Scott and Chang, 
2005:1). 
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The growth of the Chinese economy since the onset of reform has averaged 9.1% per annum and 
income has quadrupled in the last 15 years (Enright and Scott and Chang, 2005:1). China’s 
economic development has lifted more people out of poverty than in any other nation in a 
comparable time–frame (Enright and Scott and Chang, 2005:1). This impressive growth is a direct 
product of a flourishing labor–intensive domestic manufacturing industry, which has made China: 
“a world factory of low cost goods” (Bell and Feng, 2006:53).  
However, it is not the objective of Chinese state leaders to build just another workshop to fulfil the 
consumption aspirations of the developed world. To the contrary, China’s leaders are intent on 
flying aero–planes made in Shanghai, using computers designed and built in Beijing and driving 
automobiles that have been manufactured in Guangzhou (Thun, 2006:3). Indeed, an elite consensus, 
it seems, has crystallised around the full–scale mobilisation of resources for technological catch up 
and for architectural platform leadership in the next generation of high technologies. Hence, 
“Innovation with Chinese Characteristics” has become a new mantra that serves to frame the 
science and technology policymaking directives of government authorities in the twenty–first 
century.   
It is important to note here that the exact tenants of this ‘grand innovation’ and ‘high–technological 
development strategy’, specifically, it’s ‘go-it-alone’ technological development strands have been 
the subject of significant revision since its initiation in 2006 as the government of China adapts to 
both socio–technological systems change and geopolitical bargaining processes. For instance, early 
versions of the Chinese government's innovation development plan were issued in 2006 and 
primarily operated from the assertion that the ability of the Chinese nation to transcend its position 
as a low cost producer of modular, undifferentiated manufactured goods in the global economy and 
become a high–tech innovative knowledge economy required the construction of a sophisticated 
indigenous technology base, capable of challenging the economic and technological supremacy of 
foreign multinational companies (MNCs). This policy direction can be seen exemplified by the 
launch of the January 2006 “National Medium and Long Term Program (MLP) for Scientific and 
Technological Development” (S & T) (2006–20). The MLP (2006–20) called for China to become 
an “innovation– oriented society” by the year 2020 and a world leader in S&T by 2050. It 
committed China to developing capabilities for “indigenous innovation” (zizhu chuangxin) and to 
leapfrog into leading positions in new science–based industries by the end of the plan period.  
However, whilst it is unarguable that the plan contained a distinctive techno-nationalistic thrust it 
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was also defined by concern about the ability of the Chinese nation to accomplish its key 
technological development goals on its own. For example, the plan acknowledged that the Chinese 
S&T system was defined by a number of shortcomings. Specifically, it was asserted that the 
innovative capability of Chinese enterprises was ‘‘weak’’, the S&T sector too compartmentalised, 
and management of the S&T system was “terribly uncoordinated”. It also conjectured that the 
system failed to award high achievers or encourage innovation more generally. Hence, the plan 
concluded that China’s indigenous innovation and technological development process would need 
to be supplemented with international cooperation (Kennedy, 2013). Indeed, as this thesis will 
highlight, due to domestic and international political lobbying, the complexity and cost of 
technological innovation and the increasingly networked and relational nature of contemporary 
global innovation and production networks, technological development programs in the global 
wireless sector launched by the Chinese government that were overtly “go-it-alone” and “techno-
nationalistic” have essentially failed.  
Indeed, it is becoming increasing clear that in this next round of technological development the 
existence of critical ecosystem dependencies in many high–technology sectors is facilitating a shift 
towards  more collaborative, alliance based socio–technological development paradigm. As a direct 
consequence, the strategic behaviour of high–technology actors, including firms and governmental 
policy actors, is currently being reframed from a ‘go it alone techno–nationalistic’ policy agendas to 
more ‘open globalised co–development models’. This is because in the contemporary socio–
technological environment ‘go it alone’ and ‘indigenous development agendas’ with a techno–
nationalistic orientation are unable to develop the necessary relational ties and ecosystem 
embeddedness necessary for the development and commercialisation of high–technology assets. 
Certainly, as this thesis will highlight, the rapid pace of technological change and the increasing 
organisational and relational complexity of doing business in these high–technology sectors make it 
impossible for a single company–or even a single nation–to compete without technological, 
financial and organisational collaboration. What I want to emphasise here is that the ways in which 
contemporary high–technology sectors are both nested within and are highly dependent on complex 
crisscrossing infrastructures, combined with the rapidly accelerating pace of technological change 
at multiple levels indicates that ‘technology’ itself is a ‘major agent’ of both ‘system change’ and 
‘structuring’ in the contemporary socio–technical system. Specifically, the concepts of 
‘convergence’ and ‘interoperability’ are ‘key structural change drivers’ that facilitate the 
development of these critical ecosystem dependencies and play a fundamental role in shaping the 
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behaviour of system actors and hence need to be accounted for in theoretical and empirical 
modelling. This is because in order to participate in the global networks and sectoral systems that 
comprise the contemporary socio–technical system, actors need to develop technological 
innovations that possess the ability to converge or interact with other firms products. Furthermore, 
the ability to ensure ‘convergence’ and ‘interoperability’ is highly dependent on the capacity of 
firms to access globally dispersed scientific and technical knowledge sources and generate long–
term networked relational ties with other system actors.   
However, this does not mean that actors are unable to shape their environment in order to develop 
or appropriate high–technology assets. To the contrary, the need for technical infrastructure and 
products that are designed to ensure system ‘convergence’ and ‘interoperability’ means that 
innovative technological development is defined not just by spontaneous evolution and organisation 
but also by directed and coordinated organisation by goal orientated system actors. That is 
technological sectors, their supportive structures, technology–specific institutions and 
corresponding ecosystems are primarily the result of deliberate actions and policy choices made by 
innovating system actors. Moreover, because the contemporary socio–technological environment is 
defined by the need for ‘interoperability’ and ‘ecosystem embeddedness’ the sets of policy choices 
open to innovating system actors are framed by the need to ensure the development of both 
relational assets and collaborative technological development at multiple levels and with multiple 
actors. 
As a consequence, the outline of a policy shift towards a more collaborative, innovation based 
high–technology development plan is emerging in China. Whilst the exact parameters of this policy 
framework are in its early stages, its overarching thrust is structured around the need to develop the 
necessary institutional, organisational, relational and research and development (R&D) capabilities 
in order to facilitate the access of Chinese firms to the contemporary global economies horizontally 
networked, geographically dispersed and increasingly partnered innovation networks and processes. 
A Statement of the Overall Research Question 
 
The primary goal of this thesis is to highlight how technological change and global systems 
integration via the development and proliferation of scientific and organisational innovation 
networks, the occurrence of critical ecosystem dependencies and the emergence of new forms of 
collaborative architecture is generating a fundamental shift towards a more alliance based model of 
capitalist organisation.  
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In this thesis the strategic response of the Chinese government and it key domestic firms to the 
emergence of this more collaborative alliance–based socio–technological economic system will be 
examined. The empirical focus here will be on the 3G and 4G wireless technology sector. It is 
important to note here that whilst it can be argued that this more alliance based form of capitalism is 
also evident in a number of other sectors such as aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, the 
automobile sector, and the information and computer technology sector (ICT), the focus of this 
thesis is confined to the global wireless sector. Specifically, this thesis will highlight how in order 
to participate in the development of the 3G and 4G wireless ecosystem and gain core technology 
and market share the Chinese government has undergone a shift in its political agenda, 
technological focus and R&D expenditure allocations. I will highlight how the government of 
China has changed its technological development approach and moved away from its earlier 
techno–nationalistic indigenous innovation development agenda in the sector and sought to forge 
and reinforce far–reaching global alliances with foreign and domestic multinationals.  
Beyond the earlier foreign direct investment (FDI) and techno–nationalist strategies, this new 
development strategy can be conceptualised as the ‘third major attempt’ by the Chinese government 
to employ an effective technology development strategy in China. The new strategies key strength 
is the way in which it endeavors to reconcile the New Left’s techno–nationalistic ambitions, with 
the liberal desire to utilise the contemporary globalisation process as a mechanism to facilitate 
growth and technological innovation–orientated up–scaling. It is essentially a 'third way' whereby 
the state’s strategic control over the globalisation process is modified in a way that utilises socio–
technological systems change to ensure that the interests of global firms are actually integrated and 
embedded into the Chinese high–technology developmental strategy. In this thesis, I will term this 
'third strategic attempt' to achieve high–technology–based development 'globalised adaptive 
ecology'. By this I mean that Chinese policy–makers have adopted a globalised adaptive approach 
to high–technology up–scaling that is both responsive to the fact that contemporary technological 
knowledge is located in multiple knowledge zones and technical ecosystems and the fact that these 
are highly changeable and can be shaped and structured by goal directed system actors. By seeking 
to exploit the way in which globalised technological ecosystems adapt and change over time, with 
their continuous shedding and need for new participants, Chinese policymakers for the first time 
have been able to create a platform for the nation to achieve high–technology up–scaling and 
innovative product development on a global scale. 
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In this new model of Chinese technological development a dynamic model of market competition 
and cooperation directs firms towards more flexible quasi–market cooperation models that are 
designed to enable them to experiment with new ideas, pre–competitive market construction and 
product markets in a lower risk regime. The parameters of this new technological policy program is 
its emphasis on a hybrid mixture of ownership and corporate governance patterns as well as a set of 
aggressive policies designed to foster alliances and co–development platforms with global leaders 
in industry and research and development (Naughton and Ernst, 2008:40). 
The overarching result has been the increasing internationalisation of the Chinese state and its 
domestic firms into trans–territorial technological ecosystems and knowledge zones. The success of 
this strategy, has been highly dependent on the ability of state leaders to move beyond contentious 
bargaining frameworks where the overarching goal was to secure respective sectoral and industry 
concessions for Chinese domestic firms and its replacement with a more collaboratively oriented 
model of co–development, that focuses on achieving win–win scenarios for both foreign MNCs 
operating in China, and for domestic firms wishing to embed themselves in global production and 
innovation networks.   
The emergence of more collaborative alliance–based global economy and its impact on Chinese 
high–technology developmental policy has yet to be addressed in a comprehensive fashion by the 
international development and globalisation literature. This thesis will attempt to address this gap 
and highlight how this shift towards a more collaborative socio–technological environment has 
fundamental implications, not just for the Chinese state and its domestic firms, but also for the 
global high–technology system itself, its system of intellectual property rights, its relational 
networks and modes of value appropriation. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is comprised of 11 sections. In the first and second 
sections, I will provide a brief overview of the idea of critical ecosystem dependencies and how it 
relates to the emergence of alliance capitalism as an emerging development strategy. In the third 
section, I will introduce the idea of complex adaptive systems and highlight how recent socio–
technological change impacts upon the ability of systems actors to shape their technological 
developmental processes. In the fourth section, I will highlight how key system actors are addressing 
the existence of these emergent critical ecosystem dependencies by adopting collaborative alliance 
structures. In the fifth section, I will argue that a defining feature of the emerging socio-technological 
system is the purposeful construction and coordination of high–technology ecosystems via strategic 
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agency. In this section I will introduce the concepts of ecosystem shaping, co–development and 
system embeddedness as new strategic models of behaviour that are being increasingly employed by 
system actors to facilitate successful globalised high–technological development at both the national 
and global level. In section six, I will explore the way in which these socio-technological system 
changes impact on the state and its role in the contemporary technological development processes. In 
section seven and eight, I introduce the Global Network State (GNS) developmental model as a 
theoretical framework from which to examine China’s state capacity at the sectoral level and 
highlight how a key role of the Chinese government as a developmental state in the contemporary 
wireless technology sector is not just confined to fixing market failures, but also involves the active 
creation of markets for new technologies. In the final three sections, I will outline the analytical 
frameworks key concepts, methodology and provide a brief chapter outline.  
 
Critical Ecosystem Dependencies and the Global Knowledge Economy  
“The rise of global fragmented production of both goods and services has led, for the first time in 
history, to true economic international interdependency. It is no longer only that we are dependent 
on trade in order to continue to be wealthy; we now cannot even produce “our” products and 
services alone.” 
(Breznitz and Nunn, 2012) 
The concept of the knowledge–based economy begun to emerge in the early 1970s, and has since 
evolved into both an explanatory and normative framework for examining the emergence of 
innovative technologies and intangible assets (Schilirò, 2010). Intangible assets are assets that do 
not have a physical embodiment. Termed ‘intellectual assets’ by the Organisation for Economic 
Co–operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2011), intangible assets have also been referred 
to as knowledge assets or intellectual capital. Much of the focus on intangibles has been on R&D, 
key personnel and software. But the range of intangible assets is significantly broader. For instance, 
one classification groups intangibles into three primary types: computerised information (such as 
software and databases); innovative property (such as scientific and nonscientific R&D, copyrights, 
designs, trademarks); and economic competencies (including brand equity, firm–specific human 
capital, networks joining people and institutions, organisational know–how, adaptability, 
organisation capital, that increases enterprise efficiency, and aspects of advertising and marketing) 
(OECD, 2011).  
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It is pertinent to note that the proportion of economic value that was attributable to the innovative 
capacity of intangible assets has grown significantly since the 1980s. For example, in 2005 
intangible assets represented 80% of market value on the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DIJA). In 
stark contrast in 1980 the DIJA reflected market values due to intangible assets at zero. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the value of a number of leading multinational companies, 
such as Microsoft and Apple, is now almost entirely accounted for by their intangible assets alone 
(Kuznar, 2012).  
The production of knowledge and intangible assets in the contemporary global economy primarily 
occurs in innovation ecosystems and collaboratively managed networks where ideas and products 
are co–created and commercialised. Collaborative global innovation networks (CGINs) can be 
defined as: “A globally organised web of complex interactions between firms and non–firm 
organisations engaged in knowledge production related to and resulting in innovation” (Chaminade, 
2009 cited in Barnard and Chaminade, 2012). Fragmentary evidence suggests most innovation 
networks are organised in complex technological sectors. Moreover, it can be argued, that these 
networks and technologies are defined by the way they co–evolve. In other words, changes in 
networks may lead to changes in the innovation of technologies; and those technological changes 
may serve to modify the network itself (Rycroft, 2003).  
Furthermore, it is important to note here that CGINs are not just defined by their spatially diverse 
and global nature or by their political or geographical territorial jurisdiction. Instead they are 
represented by sites of codified knowledge, expertise and collaborative organisation. The 
jurisdictional fields of technology, knowledge, productiveness and innovation that regulation 
attempts to define can usefully be conceptualised as ‘zones’ (Barry, 2006). The definition of a 
technological zone has some flexibility, asserts Barry. For example, it may or may not be 
commensurate with a political territory, be it a nation state or other form or level of jurisdiction. 
Zones, it has been argued, make association between participants possible but also create new 
distinctions and separations. As Barry articulates zones are: “spaces of circulation in which 
technologies take more or less standardised forms and in which intellectual property implies new 
‘objects of technical practice’”. Political actors such as states, it is conjectured, have a key role in 
drawing and legitimating these boundaries and entry criteria (Barry, 2006).  
This strategic shift in the behaviour of the firm, from an overt focus on the development and 
protection of properterial ideas and standards to a focus on the need to embed themselves in  
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globalised innovation ecologies, has important implications for how firms and states can develop 
and govern the technological development process in the future.  
I will argue that a key change that needs to be accounted for in theoretical and empirical modelling 
is the emergence of sets of critical ecosystem dependencies that policy and market actors need to 
address when developing policy directives and development plans. The primary point I want to 
emphasise here is that in many high–technology sectors the development of high– technology assets 
and their successful commercialisation is highly reliant on the existence of an ecosystem of partners 
that are both able and willing to participate in the development of complementary products and 
service solutions. For example, in order for Airbus to bring its super jumbo passenger aircraft–the 
A380 to market–an extensive ecosystem of interdependent actors and linkages needed to be 
constructed. This is because airbus is highly dependent on a host of suppliers for subassemblies and 
components (navigation systems, engines, etc.). Furthermore, some of these suppliers were 
themselves confronted with significant innovation challenges as they attempted to develop the 
components required to build the airbus. Moreover, it is imperative that airbus integrates these 
components effectively into the core ecosystem and provides the necessary relational and 
technological support to its suppliers in order that they can adapt to the innovation challenges they 
face. Hence, it is not just suppliers that need to be considered when constructing a functioning 
ecosystem. It is also important that complementary service providers are also integrated into the 
overarching ecosystem. For example, airports that need to invest in new infrastructure to 
accommodate the oversized planes, regulators who oversee safety specification and compliance 
issues etc. (Bauer and Lang and Schneider, 2012). 
Conversely, it can be argued that technological components and assets are always embedded and 
functionally integrated in a larger socio–technological system. Moreover, technological 
development in the contemporary socio–technological systems is comprised of an array of nested 
systems, each performing independent functions that are integrated into a complex interdependent 
technological ecosystem (Hobday, 1998). This nested systems perspective acknowledges that the 
degree of advancement of a technology is not only related to the sophistication of its individual 
components but also to the complexity of its relational and functional integration. A technological 
system thus is not only defined by the construction of its various parts but also through the 
coordination and integration of a heterogeneous complex of multiple components and subsystems 
into an overall functioning technological ecosystem. Hence, technological advancement does not 
only relate to technological artefact’s in the narrow sense, but also includes arrays and networks of 
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social technologies, such as organisational patterns, logistical systems, and complex forms of social 
coordination. Since the 1980s, such integrated technological systems have also been conceptualised 
as 'large technical systems' based on multiple technical and social components (Hobday, 1998).  
As a direct consequence, it is becoming increasingly clear that understanding firm performance and 
technological governance in such ‘innovation ecosystems’ requires a change in the way in which 
the strategy and the innovation literatures have traditionally linked industry dynamics to firm 
performance (Adner and Kapoor, 2006). Primarily, it requires an approach that is designed to 
address not only the innovation challenges that are faced by the focal firm (Cooper and Schendel, 
1976; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997 cited in Adner 
and Kapoor, 2006), but one that also considers the nature of the innovation challenges confronted 
by the external ecosystem partners. “Moreover, it requires an approach that extends beyond the 
focus on how different actors will bargain over value capture (Porter, 1980; Teece, 1986; 
Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996; Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1997 cited in Adner and Kapoor, 
2006) to include an explicit consideration of the innovation challenges that different actors will 
need to overcome in order for value to be created in the first place” (Adner and Kapoor, 2006). 
Alliance Capitalism 
In this thesis I use the concept of alliance capitalism primarily to refer to the strategic policy  
challenges emerging in the global economy that requires government actors and firms to develop 
embedded relational ties and collaborative R&D activity with other firms and economic and 
technological actors in order to engage in innovative up–scaling, and product development.  
These alliances, it will be argued, are not just designed to appropriate complementary assets and 
resources as earlier alliance forms did, but are designed to facilitate the development of other key 
system actors in order to ensure that critical infrastructure, regulatory standards and complementary 
technologies are developed before a technology goes to market. These alliances can be termed 
innovation ecosystem building alliances. The primary goal of such alliances is to anticipate future 
market and ecosystem requirements and to use this information to build a critical network of 
interdependent alliance partners that are focused on achieving technological ‘convergence’ and 
'interoperability’ across the ecosystem platform. 
These alliances are highly interdependent and co–evolve as a complex adaptive system. This is 
because both the alliances and the socio–technological system are engaged in a process of self–
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organisation and evolution in a bid to adapt to and shape their changing environment. Strategic 
alliances can also be conceptualised as open systems (Katz and Khan, 1966). Open systems are 
defined by the way they are interconnected with other systems and exchange resources and 
information with the external environment in which they are embedded (Katz and Khan, 1966). The 
overarching result is that traditional hierarchal capitalist forms of organisation and competitive 
market behaviour have been fundamentally altered as firms adapt to the emerging collaborative 
economy and the increasing need to engage in strategic ecosystem alliances in high–technology 
sectors. The adaption of the capitalist system itself can be seen manifest in the development of new 
more open forms of intellectual property ownership and appropriation and the increasing pretensity 
of firms to co–develop and co–own high–technology assets.  
For developing nations such as China the occurrence of extra territorial alliance structures has 
provided an important point of entry into global knowledge and production networks. It also 
expands the technological governance arena in which it operates from one focused solely on 
achieving national development goals to one that is focused on achieving ecosystem development 
goals. From this frame of reference, effective technological governance in a contemporary context 
is inherently globalised and needs to take into account not just the interests of national firms but 
also those that Chinese domestic firms are linked to by critical ecosystem dependencies.  
Structure and Agency in the Global Collaborative Economy   
The purposeful construction and coordination of high–technology ecosystems via strategic agency 
is a key feature of the contemporary socio–technological system. This is because in an emerging 
technological field, supportive structures and technology–specific institutions can neither be taken 
as given, nor can they be regarded as being external to technology development. Instead, they are 
often deliberately created and coordinated by innovating actors. Hence, ‘strategy’ can itself shape 
‘structure’. This ability to ‘strategically shape’ the socio–technical environment requires an 
awareness of deep structures, technological interoperability and the emergence and creation of new 
markets and organisation methods and the ability to participate and coordinate activity in multiple 
technological arenas simultaneously.  
The increasing need for technological ecosystem construction and maintenance, it can be argued, 
has created a fundamental need for anticipatory technological governance and coordination. By 
anticipatory technological governance I mean the development and execution by nation sates of a 
globalised technological development and integration strategy that attempts to construct future 
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technological ecosystem platforms via the provision of basic research funding, long term strategic 
policy planning and collaborative alliance building. The overarching goal here is to build up a 
critical mass of trans–territorial technological system connections that the state can then utilise to 
facilitate and maintain national innovative up–scaling and appropriate globalised technological 
assets and value.  
The ecosystem metaphor provides a conceptual frame of reference that acknowledges the fact that 
technological ecosystems are in a constant state of flux as the ecosystem itself is continuously 
redefined. Hence, it is a metaphor that transcends simple unidirectional models of causality and 
development with the idea of complex interactional systems that are in a continuous process of 
adapting and growing. The metaphor can be used to describe existing conditions or those one might 
try to create; its users often aim to provoke new thinking about the conditions and requirements 
necessary to actively cultivate the development of an ecosystem to achieve a set of specific and 
desirable goals (Mars and Bronstein and Lusch, 2012).  
For the purposes of this thesis two main types of ecosystem shapers can be identified for analysis. 
These are focal organisers and network organisers. Focal organisers are focused on the provision of 
early funding and network development in order to facilitate what is termed ‘first to the world’ 
basic research. For examples the ‘World Wide Web’ is an example of ‘first to world research’ 
(Atkinson, 2012).   
In contrast network organisers endeavor to exploit uncertainty in the ecosystem and build up a 
critical network of system actors in order to either disrupt earlier technological assets, form their 
own unique ecosystem spinoffs that serve to create new classes of technological assets and market 
structures, or build and add value to other system actors established technological platforms. This 
kind of technological development strategy has been termed innovation adaptation. It involves a 
process of taking a complex production system that is relatively well defined and building products 
and related processes and technological platforms (Atkinson, 2012). For example, the iPhone and 
Google both build upon earlier basic research findings to develop new products and technological 
assets. Furthermore, Apple is currently in the process of launching multiple new projects, enhancing 
the company’s platform to enable more people to build business around Apple, for example with 
iBeacons, and a reconfiguration of the iTV ecosystem, via: “the release of a miniature device called 
“iRing” that will be placed on a user’s finger and act as a navigation pointer for “iTV”, enhancing 
the motion detection experience and negating some of the functionality found in a remote. Thirdly, 
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“iTV” will come with a “mini iTV” screen that will seamlessly allow users to view content on this 
smaller, 9.7–inch screen, while also opening up use cases around home security, phone calls, video 
conferencing and other arena” (Shaughnessy, 2013).  
The Chinese government and its private firms have yet to master the ability to produce ‘first to the 
world innovation’ on a consistent scale (Atkinson, 2012) although key Chinese wireless technology 
firms such as Huawei and ZTE are succeeding in gaining indigenous technological knowledge and 
essential patents in the global wireless sector. Indeed, as highlighted in chapter 5, Chinese domestic 
firms are highly adaptive fast followers that are achieving significant global market share in the 4G 
wireless sector as both ecosystem builders and network organisers via the development of new 
technological platforms, markets and collaborative alliance structures. From this perspective, 
achieving first mover status is not the only way to move up the technology ladder and acquire 
market share. Instead, ecosystem shaping, co–development and system embeddedness are new 
strategic models of behaviour that can be utilised to facilitate successful globalised high–
technological development at both the national and global level. 
State Capitalism and Innovation  
I have sought to highlight how high–technology development is becoming increasingly defined by 
the emergence of critical ecosystem dependencies and collaborative alliance structures. For the state 
this changing socio–technological environment poses a number important questions regarding its 
role in contemporary technological development processes and the trans–territorial appropriation 
and sharing of knowledge. For instance, should the state intervene to provide basic research funding 
in high–technology sectors with long–term–time horizons which are unable to attract private capital 
due to risk aversion? Should it attempt to help facilitate the development of globalised relational 
networks and alliance structures or should it let them develop spontaneously? Can and should it 
play a role in sectoral coordination at a domestic and globalised level? 
Obviously, the question of how much the state should intervene in the economy to facilitate high–
technology economic development is a point of much theoretical contention. Free market 
economists assert that government intervention should be strictly limited as government 
intervention tends to cause an inefficient allocation of resources (Labonte, 2010). The close of the 
twentieth century was defined by the ideological precepts advanced by free market theorists, 
specifically the theoretical premises embodied by the neoliberal free market model. The neoliberal 
approach has strong theoretical premises: markets are efficient, the institutions needed to make 
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markets work exist and are effective, and if there are deviations from optimality they cannot be 
remedied effectively by governments. The premises are a mixture of theoretical, empirical and 
political assumptions. Their theoretical core relies, among other things, on a restrictive view of the 
technological basis of competitiveness. The empirical one relies on a particular interpretation of the 
experience of the most successful industrialising economies (Lall, 2004). Resource allocation is to 
be driven by free markets forces, which operate to optimise a country's competitive advantage. This 
it is argued, will ensure dynamic advantage and yield the highest rate of sustainable growth 
possible. In this approach, the only legitimate role for the state is to provide a stable macro–
economy with clear rules of the game, open the economy fully to international product and factor 
flows, give a lead role to private enterprise, and provide essential public goods such as basic human 
capital and infrastructure (Lall, 2004). 
Neoliberal forces advocate the removal of capital controls and an end to exchange rate maneuvering 
in developing countries, as embodied in the “Washington consensus” shared by the United States, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Petersmann, 2005:128). The 
prevailing perspective on financial liberalisation suggests a set of standard procedures and rules for 
reform, including prudent regulation, transparent accounting and supervision, an orderly sequencing 
of capital account liberalisation, and corporate restructuring. The legal framework is that of a 
contextually negotiated contractual obligation between juridical individuals in the market place. 
Private enterprise and entrepreneurial activity are viewed as the keys to economic productivity and 
wealth creation (Petersmann, 2005:128).    
The idea advanced by the neoliberal free market model that the forces of supply and demand will 
spontaneously and freely produce prato–optimum outcomes and high growth rates without the need 
for organisational coordination or any legal and regulatory coercion has proved to be inherently 
flawed. Certainly, it has become increasingly clear, that neoliberalism’s deregulatory policy 
prescriptions coupled with its key theoretical precepts, specifically, the idea of perfect information, 
self–regulatory markets and the existence of rational economic actors lead to the 2008–2009 global 
financial crisis (GFC). Furthermore, the high costs of R&D, the increasingly short time–frames for 
both product development and commercialisation, the occurrence of short product lifespans and the 
significant decrease in venture fund capital since the financial crisis means that the role of the state 
in high–technology development is being reinvigorated as developing nations such as China engage 
in a critique of leading western international economic institutions and free–market theoretical 
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precepts. Indeed, it has been conjectured that a shift towards the idea of state capitalism as a potent 
alternative model of economic organisation has begun (Bremmer, 2009. 2012).  
The idea that state capitalism is presenting a challenge to free market principles is not a view 
without significant controversy. For example, Arbache (2013) argues that: “state capitalist, Russia’s 
economy is now being strangled by the state. Under Prime Minister (and formerly President) 
Vladimir Putin, the state reasserted its authority, regaining its dominance over key sectors of the 
economy, especially the crucial oil and gas industry. Putin also redistributed oil money by 
increasing government spending and the size of the civil service… State enterprises, favored by 
overbearing bureaucrats, are crowding out the private sector. World Bank surveys show Russia is 
becoming a harder and harder place to do business… Private capital is fleeing the country…. Even 
senior policymakers within the Kremlin are doubting the future of Russia’s state capitalist model” 
(Schuman, 2012). In a similar vein asserts Arbache: “While the attractiveness of State capitalism is 
understandable within the context of economic crisis, its multiplication on a global scale has 
harmful implications. In fact, it seems to be highly unlikely that many countries will, 
simultaneously, benefit from State capitalism owing not only to the fallacy of composition, but also 
to the negative externalities brought on by them, which tend to upset the economic system, 
encourage trade and currency wars and raise political tensions between countries” (Arbache, 2013). 
However, as highlighted in chapter three, the ‘successful’ models of state capitalism being adopted 
by developing nations bear little resemblance to the command or nationalised economies of the 
past. In a contemporary context, state capitalism 2.0 as has been termed, (Musacchio, 2012) 
represents a new hybrid form of capitalism that is not defined by any single political or economic 
model but by the way in which the state uses its power to foster economic development 
(Musacchio, 2012). 
In state capitalism 2.0 the largest state–owned enterprises in the world are publicly traded and have 
large institutional investors monitoring their activities. Furthermore, big State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) compete internationally, follow international reporting standards and have professional 
management, even in many public utilities, where social objectives commonly trump profitability. 
Recent reforms in companies like Italy's Enel, Indian Railways, or São Paulo's water and sanitation 
Company, Sabesp, are some examples (Musacchio, 2012). 
Indeed, it can be argued that classical interpretations of state capitalism structured around the idea 
that the state should not intervene in the market is not just clearly out–dated but fundamentally 
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flawed. For example, the World Wide Web was pioneered by the US State Department, and the 
algorithm that provided the foundation for Google’s success was funded by a public sector National 
Science Foundation grant. In a similar vein the molecular antibodies, which provided the foundation 
for biotechnology before venture capital moved into the sector, were discovered in public Medical 
Research Council (MRC) labs in the UK (Mazzucato, 2011). Lessons from these experiences 
asserts Mariana Mazzucato, in her book, The Entrepreneurial State, are important precisely 
because:  
they force the debate to go beyond the role of the state in stimulating demand, or the role of the 
state in ‘picking winners’ in industrial policy, where taxpayers money is potentially misdirected 
to badly managed firms in the name of progress, distorting incentives as it goes along. Instead it 
is a case for a targeted, proactive, entrepreneurial state, able to take risks, creating a highly 
networked system of actors harnessing the best of the private sector for the national good over a 
medium to long–term horizon. It is the state as catalyst, and lead investor, sparking the initial 
reaction in a network that will then cause knowledge to spread. The state as creator of the 
knowledge economy (Mazzucato, 2011).   
Form this frame of reference, ‘innovation policy’ is exactly where the Chinese government needs to 
play a fundamental role. Precisely because, without basic research funding, coordination and global 
alliance building and networking, high–technology innovation will often fail to occur at all.  
 
The Global Network State as a Theoretical Framework 
It is the intention of this thesis to employ the Global Network State (GNS) developmental model as 
a framework from which to examine China’s state capacity at the sectoral level. In contemporary 
literature, a latecomer nation state that possesses the ability to transform its economic policy 
prescriptions and tools to respond to global economic challenges and opportunities is termed a 
developmental state. Developed as a response to the failure of both neo–classical economics and 
dependency theory in explaining the rapid economic growth experienced in East Asia, the 
developmental state model has become the dominant paradigm for understanding East Asian 
economic development, in particular, with the post World War II Japanese economic model 
(Johnson, 1982, 1995). 
A developmental state is defined here as a state that is actively involved in economic development 
policies beyond the normal functions of providing public goods and protecting social and national 
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interests (Evans, 1995: 45–48). To be developmental a state needs to possess two critical and 
interrelated characteristics: state capacity, which requires a well–developed and coherent state 
apparatus and state–owned enterprises to implement state policies and state autonomy, which 
involves the relationship between the state and societal, as well as extra–societal (or foreign), 
pressures. Each characteristic is necessary but not a sufficient condition for effective state 
intervention (Weiss, 1998). Weiss (1998) posited that: 
…the relative success of states adjusting to changes in the international economic architecture is 
dependent upon, in part, their transformative capacity. Central to this capacity is a sufficiently 
robust partnership between relevant state actors, economic sectors and civil society actors such 
that policy changes can be negotiated and implemented. Weiss asserts that states are not unitary 
monolithic structures but are instead “organisational complexes” whose “parts” represent 
different ages, functions and (at times) orientations (Weiss, 1998:15–16). From this frame of 
reference, strategies for industrial development are not formulated and implemented by the state 
alone, but through a complex network of policy linkages, bureaucratic agencies and sectoral 
interests, a form of governance Weiss terms governed interdependence (Weiss, 1998:38).  
However, whilst it is the intention of this thesis to argue that technological and industrial upgrading 
require specific sets of coordinated government interventions in both the domestic and international 
economy, I want to emphasise that changes in the structure of the global economy and the markets 
that comprise it, mean that it is not theoretically prudent to construct a state–market dichotomy as a 
theoretical lens.  
To the contrary, Peter Evans argues that the predisposition of theorists to frame arguments about 
state intervention in terms of state versus the market need to be replaced with arguments that 
endeavour to examine exactly what kinds of state intervention are effective and their effects (Evans, 
1995:10). In the state versus market dichotomy where the state and the market are treated as being 
in a constant–sum relationship, the theoretical attention focuses on the degrees of departure from 
ideal–typical competitive markets. Conversely, the state either wanes or persists. However, asserts 
Evans, in the contemporary world state withdrawal or involvement are not alternatives. State 
involvement is a given (Evans, 1995). Hence, the crucial question that theorists need to be 
addressing at this point is not how much state involvement is appropriate, but rather what kind and 
at what level?  
Furthermore, extant studies of state capacity have essentially neglected to consider how the 
interventionist state has evolved with the growth of markets. The key question that needs to be 
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posed at this point is: as the validity of the traditional state–centric developmental model loses its 
pertinence due to external and internal pressures for economic openness, liberalisation, increased 
deregulation, and structural reform of domestic market institutions, how exactly does the 
interventionist state endeavour to redefine and transform its economic apparatus and coordination 
agencies? 
Moreover, what is important to note here is that the PRC sits uncomfortably in the wider literature 
on the developmental state. Firstly, China remains a one party authoritarian regime. The Chinese 
polity is a state centered system in which the patriarch state has the ultimate power and authority 
over society (Bell and Feng, 2007:62) As a direct result the policy making process is characterised 
by a system of elite politics whereby the leading participants in the policy process are individual 
leaders and top bureaucrats (Zhao cited in Bell and Feng, 2007:62). This elite hold on power is 
reinforced by a lack of organised interests between industry and the public. As a direct result, 
economic policy making in China is defined by an elite–led top down decision–making process in 
which societal and economic actors that do not fit into the bureaucratic agenda are either ignored or 
marginalised (Bell and Feng, 2007:62).  
However, it is important to note here that decision making in China is also subjected to political 
contestation and bargaining. For example, Peter Lovelock and John Ure (1998) use a two-tier 
bargaining model in order to construct a political economy model of bargaining. It is a theoretical 
framework that still has empirical and theoretical validly in a contemporary context. Essentially, 
Lovelock and Ure argue that in China there exists a recognised set of international policy objectives 
and a recognised set of domestic policy objectives that determine the parameters of the bargaining 
and negotiating framework. From this perspective, interested actors can bargain to achieve their 
objectives at either level, but the government’s position as the arbiter between the two tiers is, 
asserts Lovelock, what has allowed it to preserve its coordinating role. Essentially, the picture that 
emerges from Lovelock and Ure’s analysis is a complex bargaining process where policy 
implementation is slow and incremental.  However, it is important to note that in a contemporary 
context decision making is not always as protracted as it was in the earlier stages of the 
development process, as relational ties have often already been formed between Chinese and 
international actors and the necessities and pace of technological development in the wireless sector 
require that actors reach decisions more quickly in order to meet market objectives and leapfrog 
their competitors. 
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In Loveock and Ure’s framework the “‘upper tier’ of the mode, represents China’s relation with the 
outside world which  is motivated by a set of outward- (export-) oriented growth objectives and 
inward-oriented development requirements. Policy at the ‘lower tier’ – or domestic level – is 
dominated by the government and/or Party technocrats, who are essentially unconstrained by 
independent law or institutions. Below this elite layer is a highly complex organisation of power 
that ‘fragments’ authority along vertical/functional and horizontal/territorial lines. The net result is 
incessant bargaining and consensus-building among officials at all levels of the national hierarchy” 
(Lovelock and Ure, 1998:9).  
 
Lovelock and Ure assert that in terms of policy-making Beijing has, continued to utilise this two- 
level bargaining approach to co-ordinate developments: “Beijing has become particularly apt at 
switching negotiations from one tier to another in order to play vested interests off against each 
other” (Lovelock and Ure, 1998:9). Thus, although foreign partners specifically bring much needed 
capital to the Chinese telecommunications development program, they do not negotiate over capital 
at the state level – where such concessions (as to foreign direct investment) must be made. Rather 
they negotiate over market access, market share, technology transfer, etc. Financial issues are 
negotiated at the locality – as part of specific domestic projects – where the defining regulation is 
that foreigners can neither own nor operate telecommunications networks. Yet, as Lampton et al. 
have shown, the bargaining that has characterised China’s interaction with the outside world in 
gaining access to high technology and industrial finance has been replicated domestically between 
contending bureaucratic and entrepreneurial interests (Lovelock and Ure, 1998:9).   
 
Moreover, Lovelock and Ure, conject, that whilst these two tiers are intertwined – they also contain 
distinctive characteristics. Hence, foreign firms will often need to bargain at each level over the 
same issues or same resources. Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates that the Chinese 
government has adopted a strategic policy of switching negotiations from the international to the 
domestic level (or vice versa) in order to achieve their bargaining objectives. That is asserts, 
Lovelock: “on the international level we find the Chinese government bargaining with MNCs and 
International Organisations (IOs) but, on the domestic level, MNCs and IOs bargaining with the 
Chinese government” (Lovelock and Ure, 1998:8). 
 
However, whilst this two tier framework provides us with a medium from which to structure our 
analysis of the of the Chinese bureaucratic process and the complex interactions that occur between 
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Chinese economic actors, international firms and the Chinese state, it does not provide a 
sophisticated enough mechanism capable of capturing the complexity of contemporary relational 
and technological interdependence and the ways in which it operates to constrain and define the 
bargaining power and objectives of both Chinese and international actors.  
 
Firstly, we need to extend the framework to incorporate a third tier. This third tier is designed to 
capture the patterns of bargaining and policymaking that occurs multilaterally through multilateral 
institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). It is these negotiations that produce the macro rules or principles that govern 
FDI and the range of legitimate economic trade tools and institutional structures available for 
national developmental use. Secondly, I want to incorporate the concepts of network legitimacy, 
reciprocal independence, relational networks and collaborative governance as important 
contemporary variables that operate to mould and define the parameters of the contemporary 
alliance building and bargaining environment in the wireless sector. 
 
Hence, due to the presence of an array of complex and multifaceted variables and bargaining 
behaviour, it is imperative that we frame our work with a comprehensive contextual understanding 
of the actual market, and state sectoral institutional tools we are examining. Current literature 
pertaining to the developmental state is primarily focused on economy–wide aggregate level 
analysis (Weiss, 1998; Evans, 1995; Besson, 2004). However, markets, of course, like states, are 
not monolithic structures but diverse entities that are divided by technological, political and 
organisation variables.  
Indeed, the contemporary literature pertaining to globalisation and state capacity is defined by its 
theoretical and deductive style of exposition (Moore, 2002:12). As a direct result the conclusions 
about the impact of globalisation–and their associated expectations about the resilience of the 
institutional specificities of particular markets in the context of such forces are largely informed by 
theoretical reflection (Moore, 2002:12). The problem here is that such analyses are devoid of 
detailed substantive empirical analysis of ‘actually existing’ markets. In order to address this 
theoretical deficit, this thesis will be framed around an industry specific analysis of the global 
wireless telecommunication sector.  
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The Chinese Developmental State and the Global Wireless Sector 
I have selected the wireless communication sector as a case study precisely because it provides us 
with a good illustration of the advantages that firms may gain through strategic alliance 
membership as well as providing a theoretical point of entry for the isolation of exactly what type of 
institutional capacities the Chinese state needs to devise in order to accommodate this emergent 
form of capitalist organisation. The substantive research at the empirical level is designed to 
examine both the nature of existing capacities as well as efforts by the Chinese state to forge new 
ones.  
As this thesis will highlight the key role of the Chinese government as a developmental state in the 
contemporary wireless technology sector is not just about fixing market failures, but rather about 
actively creating the market for the new technologies by envisioning the opportunity space and 
allowing the right network of private and public actors to meet in order for radical innovation to 
occur at a global level. This has entailed a shift to what Sean O'Rian terms, a 'Flexible 
Development” (FDS) or 'Global Network State' (GNSs). GNSs assert O’Rian are defined by their 
capability to form networks for the production of technological innovation, and by their ability to 
attract foreign investment, and stimulate domestic growth. It achieves these key goals by providing 
information about transnational corporations and world markets to domestic firms, and develops 
institutional frameworks and funding decisions designed to provide the necessary conditions for 
stimulating connections between domestic and international companies. That is the developmental 
network state overarching goal is to facilitate collaboration and encourage innovation at a both a 
domestic and global level (O'Rian, 2000). The key difference between earlier forms of the 
developmental states argues O'Rian, is the way in which it is not just focused on the development of 
national champions and sectoral pillars but also on the construction and management of 
transnationally integrated local networks and markets (O’Rian, 2000:165). 
 
Analytical Framework and Key Concepts 
"It is not the strongest of the nations that survive, nor the most intelligent; it is the one most 
adaptable to change." 
(Charles Darwin, 1859) 
Definitions of technological change and systems adaptation are inherently messy. This is a direct 
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product of the fact that the processes that define technological development and change are 
comprised of a plethora of interrelated variables that coexist in a multilevel, dynamic and 
increasingly spatially diverse socio–political technological environment. In order to provide a 
relational lens capable of isolating the diverse sets of highly interdependent and conflicting 
theoretical variables that define the innovation and technological development processes of nation 
states in the contemporary globalised socio–technological system, this thesis will be framed by the 
theory of complex adaptive systems (CAS). The reason for this is that CAS theory provides an 
important medium that helps us to understand the changes that are occurring in the wireless socio-
technological system and the way they are both impacting on and enabling state and firm responses 
to this change. Without a comprehensive understanding of the ‘actual mechanisms’ of soci-
technological systems change it is not possible to hypothesis about the way in which technological 
change and the shift to an innovation based collaborative economy has occurred or has both shaped 
and empowered system actors behavior.  
Globalised socio–technological systems are high–impact, hard–to–understand, technology–
intensive systems that possess significant societal, political and economic implications (Sussmam, 
2012). CAS as a theoretical framework will be employed through this thesis to explore changes in 
both the global and the Chinese socio–technical system and to locate the structural pressures, 
dependencies, networks and agency opportunities that the emerging global socio–technological 
systems exert on Chinese state leaders and their technology development agenda.   
CAS theory helps us to model systems change and strategic planning and agency by providing a 
medium from which to examine and conceptualise the way in which governments and firms are 
adapting to socio–technological change and the globalisation of technological development and 
production.   
A complex adaptive system is comprised of a complex network of adaptive agents. Complexity as a 
term denotes the density of causal interconnectedness within a system. These connections are 
defined by complex systems of elements that are interdependent and interconnected by multiple 
feedback processes. Primarily, complex technological systems are both a ‘scientific knowledge’ and 
an ‘economic policy’ system with flows of resources and information taking place among its 
component nodes and across its boundaries. The resource flows include finance, policy decisions, 
materials, human capital and technological inputs. The knowledge flows include formal and tacit 
knowledge. They also include “learning” about how to scale out technology at a both a centralised 
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and a decentralised level. Such an innovation systems is classified as evolutionary since new 
knowledge is constantly entering the system and facilitating behaviour modifications. There is no 
return to a previous equilibrium. They exhibit complexity in that knowledge and resource flows are 
moving across many stakeholder groups. This requires system actors to minimise and manage 
complexity. The systems themselves are primarily adaptive and resilient while resources flow 
across their boundaries. They behave holistically as a totality and therefore, analytically, their 
behaviour cannot be reduced entirely to that of component nodes. Finally, they engage in 
networking in order to facilitate information interactivity and improve system efficiency (Halle and 
Clark, 2009). 
Complex systems theory highlights how connectivity and interaction between system actors 
involves the selection of linkages and the prioritisation of relationships that are established with 
other systems. Specifically, this ability is what defines the degree of openness of the system at 
different levels of aggregation. Thus, an innovation system depends on the ‘system making’ 
connections between the components of the relevant ecologies that ensure the flow of information 
directed at innovation problems. Hence, there is a close connection between the notion of 
trajectories of technological solutions within a particular technological paradigm, the evolving 
problem sequence, and the dynamic notion of an innovation system (Dosi, 1982). 
This ecological inheritance cannot be understood without reference to the inherited technological 
and political structures that both constrain and enable socio–technical evolution and development. 
Bell, (2011) argues that in order to understand actor–centered agency we need to develop a 
framework that considers the importance of interpretative agency and bounded discretion within 
institutional and structural settings. Similarly, in order to fully understand the evolution of 
technological change and its relationship to structural features in the socio–technical environment 
we need to conceptualise the evolution of technology as an inherently multilevel process (Tushman 
and Nelson, 1990), that is historically contingent with subsequent inventions building upon one 
another. Hence, an ecological framework for studying technological change examines technological 
evolution in terms of its elemental components and the ways in which they recombine over time. 
From this theoretical perspective we need to model agents both as partially constrained by their 
immediate institutional contexts, but as also operating in institutional and structural settings that 
constantly evolve and potentially open up new opportunities for agents. Furthermore, structural 
contexts, according to Bell, include the broader political, economic or social environments that 
operate in a ‘strategically selective’ manner, establishing incentives or disincentives or other 
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rationales for action that may lead agents to favour certain developments or choices over others. As 
Bell asserts: “Although ‘structuralist’s accounts are often handled in a way which implies 
deterministic patterns of constraint, in reality, structures can both help constrain and empower 
agents. The pattern of constraint or enablement embedded in such relationships can also change 
systematically over time” (Bell, 2011).  
The ability of system actors to respond to complex technological systems change can be measured 
by examining their policy adaptions, network connections, new forms of innovation capacity, the 
development of a system of multiple nodes of expertise, such as new technological products, policy 
directives and services which have become prominent nodes in their own right (Halle and Clark, 
2009). 
Methodology and Data Collection   
As it has already been established, the empirical study concentrates on the global wireless 
communication sector as an appropriate industry to study Chinese state capacity, competitive and 
technological upgrading and alliance capitalism. Specifically, I am interested in examining the 
institutional, organisation, relational and policy adjustments implemented by the Chinese 
government and its key domestic firms in response to the dynamic technological and regulatory 
environment that the global wireless communications sector occupies. The primary empirical focus 
is on the transition from 3G to 4G technologies with the shift from a hierarchal global and domestic 
governance structure and properterial knowledge ownership systems to that of a more horizontally 
integrated global alliance architecture and network structure and a more open and shared platform 
for global technological development and knowledge sharing.  
In order to empirically examine Chinese state leaders strategic attempts to intervene in the economy 
and develop a set of policies to facilitate the development of dynamic capabilities we need to 
examine how the various interests of the state, local actors, and the global economy are represented 
and coordinated by the government of China? We need to ascertain how and in what ways the state 
is embedded in professional–led networks of innovation and in international capital and whether or 
not its organisational structure is flexible enough to effectively manage the complex and diverse 
interests it is presented with? We also need to examine the mechanisms that the state is employing 
to create an economic environment where domestic firms can upgrade their technological and 
organisational capabilities and hence increase their indigenous knowledge production and 
technological development? Furthermore, we need to explore what strategies the Chinese 
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government is employing to embed global firms in its economy in new ways that foster reciprocal 
interdependence as opposed to the shallow integration and technological dependency produced by 
previous failed technology development strategies such as techno–nationalism? 
Obviously, dynamic firm and state capacity development, market building and the construction of 
international alliances are non–linear processes, devoid of any deterministic order in there 
development. This of course means that isolating variables for analysis is a very difficult task.  
However, key empirical variables that can be isolated for analyses for the purposes of this thesis are 
elite political control over the development process, relational networks, either state, managerial or 
entrepreneurial, for establishing dynamic capabilities and positioning products in domestic and 
foreign markets, indigenous and collaborative standard making attempts, the occurrence of 
ecosystem building alliances, network legitimation, relational and structural reorganisation of the 
state’s architecture in the sector and policy directly relating to the regulation and incentive structure 
pertaining to both domestic and foreign investment in the sector.   
Furthermore, because I am interested in how Chinese state leaders are targeting global alliance 
ecosystem building and cooperative R&D in a bid to inset Chinese wireless firms at the cutting–
edge of the high–technology productivity frontier we need to empirically examine the institutional, 
regulatory and bargaining strategies that the government of China is engaging in to gain global 
leverage and legitimacy. From an empirical perspective, this requires us to examine the wider 
bargaining frameworks, broader sectoral agreements and terms of engagement that occurs between 
global wireless technology firms, business associations and standards bodies and the political 
interests of Chinese state leaders. What I am interested in here is isolating and examining both firm 
and state adjustments to achieve political and economic leverage in a global innovation based 
market structure that is becoming increasingly collaborative and structurally interdependent.  
In order to achieve this goal, data on governmental–business relations and alliance bargaining 
strategies has been collected from both primary and secondary sources. Because no comprehensive 
database exists for the identification of international R&D alliances between Chinese and foreign 
firms in the global wireless sector, a new database was developed for this thesis. The primary data 
was collected from company annual reports, governmental policy documents, economic/market 
data and in–person interviews that involved the administration of a semi–structured questionnaire. 
Interviews were conducted with Chinese business and academic actors that are responsible for the 
development, implementation and management of strategic policy development and innovation in 
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the wireless communication sector. The interviews were conducted in China in 2011 and 2012. 
There were fourteen interviews and the average duration of each interview was 2 hours. The 
interviews were subsequently documented and transcribed for analysis.  The secondary data was 
drawn from multiple sources, including: journal articles, press releases, academic texts, corporate 
websites, newspapers (Lexis–Nexis database), magazine articles (Business Source Premier 
Database), internet news, (3CPP2), and other public sources.    
The alliance database developed for this thesis includes agreements that contain arrangements for 
the formation of strategic alliances between multinational corporations and Chinese firms, and 
universities and government organisations that specifically involve cooperation in research projects, 
joint product development, R&D joint ventures and R&D consortia. The focus of the data gathering 
was on those forms of cooperation and agreements for which joint R&D activities or ecosystem 
building alliances are at least part of the agreement. My sample is comprised of R&D and 
ecosystem building alliances from North America, Europe, Japan, South Korea and China. Included 
in the sample are Chinese telecommunication providers, wireless equipment manufactures and key 
research institutes that engaged in R&D and ecosystem building alliances within the period 1999 to 
2012. 
Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters, including the conclusion and the introduction. In this 
introductory chapter I have sought to introduce the main arguments and concepts of this thesis. 
Specifically, I have sought to introduce the idea of critical ecosystem dependencies and highlight 
how it has facilitated the emergence of alliance capitalism as an emerging technological 
development strategy. I have also outlined how this thesis will be framed by the theory of complex 
adaptive systems and the idea of socio–technological systems shaping and agency.   
In chapter two, I will provide the reader with a contextual understanding of the globalisation 
process and the early external constraints it placed on China’s developmental strategy. It will 
examine the process of FDI as a development strategy and outline the key reasons why it has 
essentially failed. Chapter two will also outline recent failed techno–nationalistic attempts to 
construct an indigenous development agenda in China. It will illustrate how foreign interests and 
the emergence of a more collaborative economy constrained China’s attempt to adopt a go–it–alone 
techno–nationalistic development strategy using wireless LAN authentication and privacy 
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infrastructure (WAPI) as an example.  
In chapter three, I will outline a framework for the examination of high–technology innovation 
policy in an environment defined by complex global systems change, critical ecosystems 
dependencies and the emergence of technical co–development and collaborative value 
appropriation. I will argue that in order to respond to social technological systems change the 
government of China is currently engaged in an extensive overhaul of its technological 
development strategy. This time it is replacing its go–it–alone, techno–nationalistic strategy with a 
globalised adaptive strategy that is focused on the pursuit of strategic agency and global ecosystem 
embeddedness.   
Chapter four is designed to develop a theoretical and empirical overview of state capitalism as 
developmental model for globalised innovative up-scaling. The developmental state as a theoretical 
model for economic and technology development will be examined here. It will highlight how the 
Chinese state understands and responds to socio-technological innovation, examine its ability to 
develop indigenous knowledge assets, and its capacity to insert itself and its domestic firm into 
emerging technological ecosystems in order to facilitate global technological alliances in the 
emerging collaborative economy.  
In chapter five, the institutional, regulatory and bargaining strategies that the Chinese government is 
utilising in the 4G-TDD global wireless sector in order to gain the global leverage and legitimacy 
necessary for global alliance ecosystem building and cooperative R&D will be examined.  
Chapter six is empirical in nature. It focuses is on the global wireless sector. It will present 
empirical evidence that can support the argument advanced by this thesis that due to socio–
technological systems change and the need for product convergence and interoperability a new form 
of ‘state–led’ alliance capitalism is emerging in China. Its primary focus will be on the global 
positioning of Chinese domestic firms in global innovation and production networks and the 
occurrence, nature and number of strategic R&D alliances that exists between Chinese and foreign 
firms in the sector. The data presented will highlight the increasing innovative capacity of key 
Chinese firms operating in the sector and highlight how these firms have managed to become firmly 
embedded in the contemporary and future global wireless ecosystem through the development of 
innovative core technologies, the co–shaping of intellectual property standards and a focus on 
collaborative global innovation network development.  
 China’s New Alliance Capitalism and the Case of the Wireless Communication Sector 
 
28 
The concluding chapter is designed to provide the reader with a summary of the main arguments 
presented in the thesis in relation to the emergence of alliance capitalism and its impact on the 
Chinese government’s technological development strategy. It will make suggestions for further 
research. Specifically, there is the need for researchers to position any analysis of Chinese 
technological and economic development within a framework that acknowledges the increasing 
relational and interdependent nature of contemporary high–technology development as the 
emerging collaborative economy and the increasing existence of critical technological dependencies 
fundamentally redefines the spatial and relational parameters of the global economy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE PERILS OF STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY: TWO FAILED 
CHINESE ATTEMPTS, FDI AND TECHNO-
NATIONALISM 
Until recently, the Chinese approach to industrial and technological development focused on 
attracting foreign direct investment FDI to leapfrog the economy. FDI is a key development 
strategy utilised by developing countries with minimal capital reserves using cheap labour as a key 
resource. It facilitates the importation of capital, equipment and technology in order to build an 
industrial base and generate capital reserves from exports (Thun, 2006:3). Between 1985 and 2005, 
it is estimated that the annual net FDI inflows into China grew from US$1 billion to US$72 billion. 
In addition, it is estimated that within this period China absorbed more than US$600 billion in FDI. 
This is a figure that is 12 times higher than the total stock of FDI Japan received between 1945 and 
2000. In the early 1990s, Beijing approved a new form of enterprise termed wholly foreign–owned 
enterprises (WFOEs). By the early 2000s, WFOEs attracted 65% of new FDI in China. 
Furthermore, since 1993, China has become the largest recipient of FDI among developing 
countries (Pan, 2009:16). 
It is important to note that the form of this investment is characterised by commitments to new 
assets. This contrasts with the inward investment of other leading investment destinations such as 
Luxembourg, which primarily attracts financial transactions, whilst large OECD countries such as 
France, Germany the United States and the United Kingdom primarily involves mergers and 
acquisitions; that is the trading of existing assets rather than the development of new assets 
(Enright, 2005:2). Indeed, institutions such as the World Bank have credited FDI as the major 
driving force of China's economic success (Zheng, 2005:19). Academic researchers tout the 
enormous benefits of FDI for China citing the benefits of technology and knowledge transfers, the 
introduction of market behaviour and capital infusion (Zheng, 2005:19). Unfortunately, a plethora 
of empirical evidence also reveals FDI has played only a limited role in transferring technology to 
key Chinese technological sectors and has failed to contribute to local technological and innovative 
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capability building processes (Young and Lan 1997, OECD, 2002, Sigurdson, 2002, Gallagher 
2003, Sjoholm and Lundin, 2013)  
As a direct result, the Chinese government during the early 2000s endeavored to adjust its earlier 
development strategy from one that focused on export–led growth and the importance of FDI, to the 
development of a go–it–alone techno–nationalistic strategy and a desire to increase domestic 
consumption. Operating from the assumption that the size of the Chinese market, with 1.3 billion 
potential consumers would provide a powerful bargaining tool, the Chinese government endeavored 
to construct a policy paradigm structured around the idea of indigenous innovation and the 
propeterial ownership of standards and intellectual property rights. However, the Chinese 
government was forced to abandon this new techno–nationalistic strategy in its very early stages as 
the international community and its multilateral institutional bodies quickly reacted to contain 
China's techno–nationalistic ambitions.  
It is the intention of this chapter to examine China's early focus on FDI as a development strategy 
and outline the key reasons why it has essentially failed. It will also outline recent failed techno–
nationalistic attempts to construct an indigenous development agenda. It will illustrate how foreign 
interests and the emergence of a more collaborative alliance based global economy have played a 
major role in constraining China’s go–it–alone strategy using WAPI as an example.  
FDI: Trading Market Access for Technology  
Prior to 1979, FDI was prohibited in China. However, in 1978, the Chinese government, employing 
a mercantilist strategy begun to open up the Chinese economy to transnational economic actors. In a 
strategy that has been called trading market access for technology, the Chinese government sought 
to utilise the size of its market and abundance of cheap labor as an incentive to attract the world’s 
major investors to transfer technology in order to modernise the Chinese economy.  
In a dual track strategy that has been termed Growing Out of the Plan, Barry Naughton (2005), 
argues the Chinese government sought to experiment with new ways of organising economic 
activity without dismantling the command system until successful results had been created in the 
experimental production zones. This included new at–the–border institutions, channels of global 
transaction, through which all foreign transactions had to flow. Specifically, these included special 
economic zones (SEZs), high–tech or export–processing zones, joint ventures (JVs), and a number 
of foreign affairs offices with various objectives (Zweig, 2002:23). In these special economic zones, 
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the state granted economic actors regulatory powers and preferential privileges that were designed 
to encourage economic exchange and decrease the transaction costs of international transactions 
(Naughton, 1995). In this way a new political economy arose with an incentive structure designed 
to redefine the economic behaviour and interaction of bureaucrats, local officials, ordinary citizens, 
enterprise mangers, collectives and foreign investors (Zweig, 2002:23).  
China’s policy was clearly designed to encourage export–oriented FDI, looking externally to draw 
on both inputs and markets, and granting well–defined freedoms and incentives to the foreign–
invested enterprise sector (FIE sector). Policymakers, by developing the coastal development 
strategy that afforded SEZ–like privileges to the entire coast of China, created a kind of gigantic 
export processing zone, where free markets were defined not so much by geography but rather by 
ownership (Naughton 1995: 302).  
As a direct result of these governmental initiatives, FDI inflows into China increased rapidly. In 
1984, a new foreign investment law further accelerated China's inward FDI growth, with another 
sharp increase occurring after 1992 when China reaffirmed the policies of openness and market–
oriented reforms. The massive inflows of FDI within this period were representative of a growing 
trend for Transnational Corporations (TNCs) to outsource and subcontract production and even 
services to China. According to a 2006 World Investment Report, China ranked highly as one of the 
most–favored locations of both the world’s largest TNCs and the largest TNCs from developing 
countries. In a contemporary context, corporations from 190 countries and regions, including 450 of 
the Fortune global top 500 multinational corporations, have invested in China. Moreover, a further 
60,000 foreign–owned factories opened in the period between 2003 and 2005 (Pan, 2009:16). 
Whilst it must be granted that this FDI helped provide a medium for Chinese enterprises to become 
extensively linked with the global economy, this industrialisation was itself ‘shallow’. Economic 
development necessarily implies structural transformation, primarily, from low productivity to high 
productivity activities, from agriculture and simple manufacturing to modern industry (Steinfeld, 
2004:253). The “Japan model” of developing countries progressing up the technology value chain 
depicts seven stages of developmental sophistication that developing nations move through. These 
include, 1, light industry, 2, assembling and processing, 3, expansion into heavy industry, 4, 
increases in local content, the employment of more technologically intensive processes, the 
investment in brand name development, 5, top–shelf electronics, export of capital intensive goods, 
domestic market drives growth, 6, world leader in the production of high–technology goods but not 
involved in indigenous innovation processes, 7, innovators in technology and the knowledge 
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economy. However, a number of theoretical and empirical studies indicate that in the contemporary 
international economy movement beyond stage 3 and beyond is problematic (Steinfeld, 2004:253). 
The overarching problem here is that as a nations growth slows it become stuck in what has been 
termed the “middle income trap” from which it cannot escape (Aiyar and Duval and Puy and Wu 
and Zang, 2013).  
The term “middle income trap” was first advanced by Gill and Kharas (2007) in a bid to describe 
the occurrence of slowdowns in a number of former East Asian miracle economies. Gill and Kharas 
proceeded to conject that the ability to sustain growth through the middle income band required 
substantial reforms to the institutions of economic policy making and political processes (Gill and 
Kharas, 2007, Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2009, Woo, 2009, Ohno, 2010, Resen, 2011 cited in 
Robertson and Ye, 2013).  
Indeed, historical data indicates that very few developing economies have managed to graduate into 
a high-income nation in the past 50 years. Countries that have made the transition successfully 
include Japan, Israel, South Korea and Singapore. A 2012 study conducted by the Asian 
Development Bank conjectured that in 2010, 35 out of the 52 middle-income countries the author 
studied around the world were trapped. Another study by Barry Eichengreen, an economist at the 
University of California, Berkeley, Kwanho Shin at Korea University in Seoul and Donghyun Park 
at the Asian Development Bank in Manila found that growth can slow down quite precipitously in 
countries that experience the trap (Schuman, 2013). 
It has been conjectured that China’s growth will soon slow down and it will also become a victim of 
the “middle income trap”. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that: “China’s 
extractive political institution is not compatible with innovation and high growth in the long run. In 
their view, although the growth process driven by catch-up, import of foreign technology, and 
export of low-end manufacturing products may continue for a while, it is deemed to come to a halt 
as soon as China reaches the living standards of a middle-income country” (Wang, 2013).  
Indeed, China's developmental strategy in this period, with its overt focus on FDI was not able to 
move domestic firms activities beyond that of non–differentiated commodity production or allow 
any degree of control over their position in global production networks. This problem, it has been 
argued, is partly a reflection of China's nationalist industrial policies. This is because China's 
"pillar" industrial strategies, which were structured around the political ideas of self–sufficiency, 
operated from the assertion that a country can still create a particular industry from upstream to 
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downstream and that the whole supply chain can operate within its own territory. What these 
strategies did was to artificially force the local vertical integration of industries and clustered 
activities, regardless of technological connectivity, under the confines of a select number of national 
group enterprises. Furthermore, it was a strategy devised to reduce China’s dependence on the 
foreign importation of key components by facilitating the development of a domestic supply chain.  
However, the problem was that because the state failed to comprehend the dynamic development of 
emerging collaborative global innovation networks and technological ecosystems its intervention in 
the market to assist in the development of its national industries essentially failed. 
It is important to note here that China did not have a coherent predetermined technology plan in this 
period. As Segal and Naughton (2003) articulated: 
…the future is likely to display the continuing salience of techno-nationalist attitudes, but 
without the coherent, tightly integrated policy package that supported techno-nationalism in 
Japan during the 1950s through 1970s. China will select bits and pieces of preferential policies, 
designed to advance techno-nationalist ideals within the context of a fiercely competitive and 
fairly open domestic economy. Such policies will often seem to lack intellectual coherence, and 
represent purely adaptive, opportunistic policies of “muddling through.” In the past, though, 
“muddling through” has been a fairly effective approach for policy-makers trying to cope with 
China’s diversity and dynamism. Perhaps it will be in the future as well.  
 
In the following section I will provide a brief overview of the Chinese government’s key technological 
policy programs in this period.  
China’s Early Science and Technology Policy and Programs 
 
In the 1980s, the Chinese government designed a series of programs to accelerate its scientific and 
technological development. These include: The Key Technologies R&D Program, the 863 Program, 
the 973 Program, the Spark program and the Torch program (Swissnex, 2009).  
Key Technologies R&D Program 
The Key Technologies R&D Program, launched in 1982, was the biggest scientific and 
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technological development program in China of the 20th century. Oriented toward national 
economic construction, its aim was to solve critical, direction-related and comprehensive 
problems in national economic and social development, including agriculture, electronic 
information, energy resources, transportation, materials, resources exploration, environmental 
protection, medical and health care, and other fields. This program, engaging tens of thousands of 
researchers in over 1,000 scientific research institutions nationwide, has had the largest funding, 
employed the most people, and had the greatest impact on the national economy of any plan to 
date (Swissnex, 2009).  
863 Program 
In March 1986, the National Hi-tech R&D Program (863 Program) was launched, after exhaustive 
examination by scientific experts. The program set 20 themes in biology, space flight, 
information, laser, automation, energy, new material and oceanography. The government's role 
here was/is one of macro-control and support. The general direction of research is decided by 
scientists after discussion, and specific projects are decided by a committee of experts, 
responsible for keeping abreast of international research, and report annually on their own fields, 
so as to set new research directions. Another feature of the program is that its results can be 
quickly industrialised (Swissnex, 2009).  
973 Program 
The 973 program was launched in 1998 and comprised a key national key program for 
development. It primarily involved multi-disciplinary, comprehensive research on important 
scientific issues in fields such as: “agriculture, energy, information, environment of resources, 
population and health, and materials, providing theoretical basis and scientific foundation for 
solving problems. The program encourages outstanding scientists to carry out key basic research 
in cutting-edge science and important sci-tech issues in fields with a great bearing on economic 
and social development. Representing China's national goals, it aims to provide strong scientific 
and technological support for significant issues in China's economic and social development in 
the 21st century” (Swissnex, 2009).  
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Torch Program 
Launched in August 1988, the Torch Program is one of China's most significant early hi-tech 
industry programs. Its overarching goal was to provide national guidelines for Science and 
Technology (S&T) policy development. The program focused on projects in new technology 
fields, including new materials, biotechnology, electronic information, integrated mechanical-
electrical technology, and advanced and energy-saving technology. It also focused on the creation 
of high technology development zones. Here, the intention of Chinese policy-makers was to 
recreate the experiences of Silicon Valley, Route 128, and other science and technology parks 
locally by locating universities and high technology firms in the same area and combining 
research and education with production. In order to achieve these fundamental goals it offered 
preferential policies in five key areas to firms operating in the parks including: taxes, finance, 
imports and exports, pricing and personnel policy directives (Swissnex, 2009).  
Spark Program 
The Spark Program was implemented in 1986. Its overarching goal was to revitalise the rural 
economy via the development and popularisation of S&T in rural areas in order to improve the 
lives of the rural population. It resulted in more than 140,000 S&T demonstration projects being 
carried out in 90% of rural areas throughout China (Swissnex, 2009).  
These policy programs, it is argued, represent an attempt by Chinese policymakers to replicate the 
earlier techno-nationalistic success of Japan and Korea. Here the primary techno-nationalistic 
agents were to be large SOEs and government research institutes. Where MNCs were to play a 
role, the intention was that they were to be partnered with strong domestic SOEs (Naughton and 
Segal, 2003).  
However, in contrast to the earlier success of the techno-nationalistic policies pursued by Korea 
and Japan, it became increasingly clear that the techno-nationalistic policies devised by the 
Chinese government were not suited to the emerging economic environment. For example, by the 
late 1980s, the 863 project had only achieved limited success in bringing new products to market. 
Moreover, participating research institutions had few official connections with enterprises, and 
these enterprises had few incentives to cooperate with these institutions to develop new 
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innovations. Moreover, it has been asserted that the Chinese government was to short-sighted and 
sought to achieve significant results with limited resources in to short a period of time. For 
instance, from 1988 to 1994, the average research fund for 863 project researchers was only US 
$5000. This is because the funds were spread on average over 1,044 research programs annually 
(Naughton and Segal, 2003).  
In contrast the Torch program had a degree of success in commercialising technologies and 
supporting the growth of high-technology industries. However, there existed too many high 
technology parks throughout the country with not enough enterprises to sustain them. Moreover 
many enterprises did not apply for the preferential funding available and failed to innovate at all. 
Conversely, by the early 1990s these policy programs were being subjected to increasing scrutiny 
and a new more rigid form of techno-nationalism based on the idea of indigenous innovation and 
standards developed begun to emerge (Naughton and Segal, 2003). 
It is important to note at this point: “that the overall pattern of technology development during the 
reform period has been one of restless change” (Naughton and Segal, 2003). This argues 
Naughton and Segal (2003) is a product of the fact that the size and diversity of China allows for 
more policy experimentation. Hence, it is argued, it has the option of maintaining two or more 
separate, competing, and not necessarily integrated approaches toward technology acquisition 
(Naughton and Segal, 2003). The results are a national mosaic that varies both temporally and 
geographically. Thus, whilst in the following section I will examine Chinese policymakers 
attempt to facilitate indigenous innovation and standards development, it is important to 
remember that the experimental, fragmented and changing nature of Chinese developmental 
policymaking demands an awareness of the conflicting local and national political and economic 
objectives that exists between diverse economic and political actors and thus the need to draw 
multidimensional and nuanced conclusions.   
   
Shallow Integration and the Liberal Critique   
 
The inability of the Chinese government's FDI strategy and its S&T programs to move its firms up 
the high–technology value ladder in this period and the lack of technological spillovers from FDI 
lead to increasing concern and debate in China over its low value–added position in global 
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economy. Chinese intellectuals can essentially be divided into two lose ideological categories, the 
Liberals and the New Left. The Liberals essentially support the theoretical propositions of the free 
market. In contrast the New Left, who are essentially techno–nationalists or mercantilists, are 
critical of neo–liberal policy in its various guises whether as a rubric for free–market economics or 
as a broader metaphor for Western interpretations of modernity (Fewsmith, 2007:1). Essentially the 
New Left assert that emergent economies such as China can only survive through the development 
of economic policies that protect national industries against foreign competition and through the 
exploration of overseas markets for domestic accumulation (Bell and Feng, 2007:58). From this 
perspective, foreign investors and MNCs are predatory and only come to China for profit (Bell and 
Feng, 2007:58). They assert that foreign companies have little intention of transferring their core–
advanced technology to China, which they view as a strategic competitor (Bell and Feng, 2007:58).  
Hence, according to this view the Chinese government should focus on indigenous investment and 
economic development in order to achieve economic independence. Furthermore, it is argued that 
China’s huge market of 1.3 billion people provides an important point of political and economic 
leverage that that could be utilised to force foreign companies to comply with China’s own de–facto 
technical standards (Bell and Feng, 2007:59). Alarmist domestic critics of China’s reform–era 
development strategy have gone further than government officials to declare the failure of the entire 
neo–liberal economic orthodoxy behind the “comparative advantage” and “trading markets for 
technology” doctrines. Zhong Qing, for example, noted that while markets have been traded out, 
technologies have not been brought in. Indeed, academics and policymakers within this period 
became increasingly critical about the presence and behaviour of foreign firms in China, asserting 
that these firms charge unduly high licenses for their patents, “crowd out” domestic firms in the 
market for highly skilled labor, monopolise technology standards, and thwart technology transfer 
and knowledge spillovers (Zhao, 2008). As former Commerce Minister, Bo Xilai, articulates, 
China’s position in the global economy can be compared to: “trading 800 million shirts for one 
A380 airbus” (Zhao, 2008). 
In October 2005, this discourse on indigenous technological development was extended further in a 
number of important central party state documents, including the October 2005 CCP Central 
Committee Proposals on the 11 the Fifth Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development, and the National Informatisation Development Strategy (Year 2006–2020) approved 
by the State Informatisation Leading Group (Zhao, cited in Pan, 2009). 
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It is also interesting to note that at this time the Chinese government erected a number of barriers to 
FDI. For example, whilst official government figures indicate that FDI in China rose by more than 
13% in 2007, the European Union, reported that its investment in China had plunged from 
approximately $7.9 billion in 2006 to around $1.5 billion in 2007 (Pan, 2009). The existence of 
these discrepancies, it has been asserted, is a result of the fact that the official FDI figures were 
driven by funds re–appropriated by domestic enterprises through Hong Kong and offshore capital 
centers. Furthermore, this lack of genuine FDI, it is argued, is no accident. Instead, it represented a 
deliberate attempt by, the Chinese government to restrict market access to foreign firms. Indeed, 
policy documentation does indicate that China's mercantilist tendencies intensified sharply in the 
fall of 2005 which can be seen reflected in the discussion of the sale of minority shares in state 
banks at the plenary meeting of the Communist Party of China (CCP), Central Committee. 
Following this, the path breaking acquisition in October 2005 of the state–owned Xuzhou 
Construction Machinery Group by the Carlyle Group, a U.S. private equity firm, was reversed. 
Several sales that had previously been approved were vetoed at the March 2006 meeting of the 
National People's Congress (NPC). Additional industries were designated as "strategic" and thus 
made off–limits to foreign investors. During the CCP's plenary meeting in the fall of 2006, this 
limitation morphed into an outright ban on any type of FDI that threatened "economic security" 
(Zhan, 2008, Scissors, 2009, Kwok-wah, 2012, Zhihong, 2006). 
However, a number of factors have undermined the Chinese government’s ability to operate from a 
mercantilist economic stance and exploit its presumptive bargaining power relative to TNCs. The 
problem itself as both organisational and monopolistic. Foreign TNCs that invest in China at the 
time had a number of important ownership advantages. They created and controlled intellectual 
property and key technology standards, and hence, had become market makers, controlling the pace 
of innovation and decisively shaping the trajectory of their respective industries (Bach and 
Abaraham and Newman and Weber, 2006). This ownership of intellectual property rights allowed 
them to set the agenda, at an international level, and influence the way in which technology 
progressed, whilst their world–class brand names enabled them to gain direct access to customers 
and marketplaces, which in turn facilitated their initiation of concepts for product development and 
the means of further exploiting market potential elsewhere (Shin–Horng Chen, 2004) The 
strengthening of international property rights within this period, represented attempts by foreign 
firms to ensure that the technology and the knowledge that provided them with this competitive 
advantage via architectural organisational control was protected at an international level. This 
operated to inhibit high–technology up–scaling and value appropriation by domestic Chinese firms. 
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Essentially, in this timeframe, Chinese firms operated in sectors that were dominated by foreign 
firms who monopolised international property rights. Indeed, it has been asserted that such high 
levels of foreign dominance over the production process itself requires us to question whether 
Chinese businesses were actually ‘Chinese’ businesses at all? This is because in the export sector, 
firms that are often termed ‘Chinese’ businesses are in actual fact Chinese subsidiaries of global 
multinational companies and Chinese joint ventures with businesses from the industrialised 
enterprises are often wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOEs). For example, by the early 2000s 
WFOEs accounted for 65% of new FDI in China. Moreover, it is important to note that it was these 
Chinese subsidiaries, or foreign funded enterprises (FFEs), which accounted for approximately 
two–thirds of the total growth in Chinese exports within the period between 1994 and mid–2003 
(Pan, 2009). In addition, foreign companies at this point in time managed virtually all– intellectual 
property and accounted for 85% of the country’s technology exports. As Gavin Heron, managing 
director of TBWA/Shanghai, has argued, China is: “a story of international brands, not local ones . . 
. As soon as a local brand has any traction, they’re bought out by a multinational” (Pan, 2009). 
Indeed, based on their technology and branding superiority, many foreign companies, it is argued, 
secured their supremacy in China’s production (such as delivery dates, industry and quality 
standards, and design specifications) in this period without actual ownership over production. For 
example, through control of industry standards—a phenomenon known as ‘Wintelism’—Microsoft 
and Intel retain huge influence over access to the PC market without ever producing PCs 
themselves (Pan, 2009).  
It is not surprising that the lack of a domestic technology base conspired to place Chinese 
companies in many industries at the mercy of their multinational counterparts, especially in terms of 
technology access. Indeed, it is estimated that between 60% and 80% of the value of all Chinese 
exports are processed (imported) components. Since the import content of the FFEs is often much 
higher, their exports from China yield still less value–added for the ‘national economy’ than the 
roughly equal value of exports from ‘national’ firms. Thanks to Wintelism, leading foreign 
enterprises, through controlling the sales channel and market standards, continued to control the 
realisation of value. For example, Intel earned as much as 10% of its total US$30 billion a year in 
revenue from selling computer microprocessor chips to China. This point is as valid to labor–
intensive products as it is to the high–tech sectors. A Barbie doll made in China is sold for US$20 
in Western markets, but only about 35 cents is retained by the Chinese. In this way it can be seen 
that made in China essentially means made by America in China or made by Europe in China etc. 
(Pan, 2009).  
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Gilboy (2004), argues that China’s technological advance is primarily a product of the dominant 
role of foreign investment. Gilboy argues that China’s domestically owned firms are defined by 
a:“industrial strategic culture that encourages them to seek short–term profits…(and) forego 
investment in long–term technology development and diffusion….Most Chinese industrial 
firms…have not increased their commitment to developing new technologies…. R&D expenditure 
as a percentage of value added at China’s industrial firms is only about one percent, seven times 
less than the average in countries of the OECD” (Gilboy cited in Pan, 2009:43).  
From this frame of reference, China’s integration into global production networks has been at the 
expense of both the national coherence of and the indigenous development of Chinese firms. Hence, 
the New Left assert that in a zealous drive to join with international standards (yu guoji jiegui), 
many Chinese companies have not only developed a dependence on transnational capital and 
technology, but more remarkably, some have deliberately avoided horizontal collaboration with 
their domestic counterparts, especially if such collaboration ‘crosses regional or bureaucratic 
boundaries’ Gilboy (2004). As Gilboy points out: “China’s best firms are among the least connected 
to domestic suppliers: for every $100 that state–owned electronics and telecom firms spend on 
technology imports, they spend only $1.20 on similar domestic goods” (Gilboy cited in Pan, 2009).  
Moreover, it is argued that in this period, an examination of the ‘going global’ strategy of many 
Chinese companies, which is often perceived as orchestrated by the state, reveals that they were not 
so much supported by an ambitious, monolithic state as they were ‘pushed’ out by intense 
competition in domestic markets from FFEs. According to a 2003 survey of China’s 50 largest 
‘industry–leading’ firms by the Shanghai office of the Germany based Roland Berger Strategy 
Consultants, slightly more than half of the participating firms named ‘seeking new markets’ as the 
overriding imperative for globalising their business activities. Among this group of firms, 
manufacturers cited in particular growing competitive pressure from multinational companies in the 
home market, excess capacity, and razor thin and sliding profit margins as key reasons to search for 
new markets abroad. Thus, those Chinese companies going global, instead of representing a 
coherent national strategy, in fact testifies to a weakening of their position in the domestic sphere 
(Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2003).  
Furthermore, Wang (2006), identifies a dualistic pattern in China's technological development, with 
the export–oriented segments of the economy being relatively isolated from those producing mainly 
for the domestic market. (Zeng and Wang 2007, cited in Wang, 2006) stress the weight of 
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constraints such as an insufficiently developed institutional framework, lack of indigenous 
intellectual property rights, relatively low overall educational attainments, the lack of a large pool 
of world–class talent, the embryonic stage of indigenous innovation capacity, and insufficiently 
developed linkages between R&D and industrial enterprises. Moreover, it is argued that the Chinese 
government failed to develop the necessary policies for encouraging technological cooperation 
between universities and industry, or the integration of the country's Nation Science Institutions into 
global innovation networks (Wang, 2006). 
From this theoretical perspective the Chinese government failed to develop a comprehensive FDI 
technological development strategy that could achieve both effective technology transfer from 
foreign technological leaders, as well as maintaining an appropriate balance between indigenous 
innovations and technology imports. 
Indeed, the problem here is that Chinese elites are faced with is that national governments that do 
not take into consideration international capital markets and foreign investors before devising 
economic policy objectives do so at their own risk (Thun, 2006,13). This is because, nation states 
that fail to conform to the framework of supranational institutions – whether in the form of the 
European Union (EU), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund 
IMF in its contemporary form risk finding themselves locked out of the world trading system 
(Thun, 2006:13). 
Indigenous Development/Techno–nationalism 
In January 2006, the Chinese government launched the “National Medium and Long Term Program 
for Scientific and Technological Development” (MLP) (2006–20). Operating from the assertion that 
FDI as a technological development strategy had essentially failed, Chinese state leaders introduced 
two new theoretical formulations into the political arena. These are the “scientific concept of 
development” and “indigenous development”. These terms became powerful code words for 
China's reformulated development strategy and were frequently cited in state media and policy 
documents. In this long–term plan for S&T development the most pertinent goal was to ensure that 
the Chinese nation state becomes a pre–eminent global economic and technological power relying 
on independent, “indigenous innovation” (Gabriele and Haider, 2008:14).  
In order to achieve this goal the plan stipulated that: “By 2020, the nation’s gross expenditures on 
R&D (GERD) are expected to rise to 2.5% or above of the gross domestic product (GDP)” 
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(Naughton Segal, 2003), that China must reduce its reliance on imported foreign technology by 
30% and increase its indigenous innovation capacity by 60% or above and to be among the top five 
countries in the world for the filing of “indigenous” inventions and the frequency of citations in 
international journals and science papers. China is also to build seven world–class research 
institutions and universities. China, it is asserted needs to master core technologies in key 
technology sectors including equipment manufacturing and information communication sectors, 
catch–up with advanced nations in agricultural related S&T capabilities, development energy, 
energy conservation and environmental technology; prevent major diseases; develop modern 
weaponry and achieve international benchmarks in cutting edge technologies in sectors such as 
information technology, biotechnology, materials and aerospace (Gabriele and Haider, 2008:14).  
The S&T plans overt focus on “indigenous innovation” responded to the perception among Chinese 
policy makers, at the time, that foreign technologies dominate in high–tech production networks, 
relegating China to a costly and low–value added role in the global economy. Indigenous 
innovation as a strategic policy plan is designed to develop the core technological base and 
competitive and managerial ability of a firm, industrial sector, regional bloc or nation state (Wang, 
2006). The primary goal of indigenous innovation is to explore and develop potential markets 
through in–house R&D and external knowledge acquisitions.  
In the literature two conflicting perspectives compete for theoretical supremacy. The first 
perspective emphasises the importance of economies of scale in technological learning, upgrading 
and innovation. According to Schumpeter (1950) and Chandler (1991), large firms with their 
abundant resources are better equipped to engage in technological and organisational innovation. In 
contrast, the external networks perspective, points to the importance of dense networking among a 
large number of competing firms that can create an environment that favors technological 
innovation and learning (Armin and Thrift, 1992, Pioe and Sable, 1984, Saxenian, 1994 cited in 
Wang, 2006).  
However, China’s technological development at this point in the development process did not 
correspond to either of these models. Instead, it resembled more of a dualist model in which the 
foreign sector had not established organic relationships with domestic firms, and domestic firms 
had not built institutional linkages among themselves to encourage collective learning and 
innovation. The result has been that linkages among both large and smaller Chinese firms remained 
weak. Furthermore, the foreign sector did not develop production network relationships with local 
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firms either. Because of China’s open–door policy and local government’s generous provision of 
tax incentives, foreign IT firms were funnelled into the high–tech experimental zones of the coastal 
provinces, starting from Guangdong, via the central coastal areas (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang), and 
to the northern coastal areas (Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong). In 2002, these three areas accounted for 
84% of all IT firms, produced 74.7% of the total value of the Information Technology Industry (IT), 
and contributed 86.7% of China’s total IT export value (National Bureau of Statistics 2003 cited in 
Wang, 2006). 
It was an attempt to address these issues which lead Chinese leaders towards the idea of indigenous 
development. However, China's indigenous development plan resulted in foreign actors labelling 
the Chinese government as techno–nationalistic. Techno–nationalists operate from the premise that 
the western dominated international system creates structural inequalities and that nations caught on 
the periphery of the capitalist system are condemned to stay there (Fewsmith, 2007:1). Techno–
nationalist policies are designed to create independent domestic capabilities in core or critical 
technologies. To active techno–nationalists, the construction of domestic institutions designed to 
coordinate and diffuse these capabilities across sectors and assist producers and users of the 
technology are key policy goals (Naughton, 1991:4). They argue that a new type of economic war is 
being waged that involves the standards, rules, and protocols which constitutes today’s 
technological systems (Suttmeier and Yao 2004:167). Chinese S&T policymakers in response to 
this socio–technological environment sought to develop a new developmental agenda that operated 
from the assumption that: “Simply stated, competitive success flows to the company that manages 
to establish proprietary architectural control over a broad sphere of development” (Suttmeier and 
Yao, 2004:167).   
Standards Development as Competitive Strategy 
“China’s huge market is ours, but we’ve been passive, not proactive. To negotiate with the other 
side, we need our own cards to play.  Standards are China’s cards.” 
(Xingdong cited in Kennedy, 2006) 
In the contemporary global economy, international standards have become one of the most 
important non–tariff barriers to trade, especially national product standards that specify design or 
performance characteristics of manufactured goods. A technical standard is essentially a patent 
ratified by government organisations, international organisations or industrial associations or a 
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defacto specification of an industry through market exchanges (Suttmeier and Yao, 2004 cited in 
Bell and Feng, 2007:54). Divergent national standards often inhibit trade, whereas regional and 
international standards increasingly serve as instruments of trade liberalisation. Consequently, the 
setting of international standards–seemingly technical and apolitical–is rapidly becoming an issue 
of economic and political salience.  
The process of standard development can occur either by edict or a process of formal consensus. 
Standards may be developed at a national or an international level. International standards are the 
product of agreements between member bodies of the International Organisation for 
Standardization (ISO). Essentially, international standards are developed by the ISO Technical 
Committees (TC) and Subcommittees (SC) (ISO, 2013). For example, in order to ensure the safety 
and integrity of off shore wind turbines and to address the quickening pace of the development of 
offshore wind farms in Europe, the need for an international standard for offshore wind turbines 
was viewed as increasingly important. In order to develop the appropriate international standards 
the IEC TC88 WG3 was set up in 2000. This brought together international expert knowledge from 
the wind power and offshore engineering industries and the standard, IEC 61400-3 was developed 
and realised (Quarton, 2005).  
 
Notwithstanding the growing economic and legal significance of international standards, standards 
setting has until very recently received scant attention from scholars and non–scholars alike. 
Standards seemed invisible to all but a few experts in engineering and related fields. In addition, 
with the exception of some economists and legal scholars, social scientists deemed standardisation 
unworthy of their attention–the topic seemed hopelessly technical and dry. But is it? The answer is 
an emphatic no. The study of international standardisation raises the kinds of questions familiar to 
students of international relations, including: Who sets international rules? Do international 
standards benefit all or are there winners and losers, either in relative or absolute terms? What is the 
role of power and institutions in international disputes or bargains over standards? What defines 
power and how does it operate? (Walter and Buthe, 2003).  
The use of standards to gain market share and block competition has been termed techno-
nationalism. Although no standard definition exists, in common usage, techno–nationalism refers to 
such public policies that “target” the strategic (usually high–tech) industries and give them various 
governmental support: government procurements, import restrictions, export subsidies, research and 
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development R&D subsidies, R&D tax credits, controls on inward foreign direct investments, 
protection of intellectual properties, government–funded R&D projects, and others. All support is 
given only to domestic firms (i.e. firms owned by its own citizens), for their aim is to strengthen the 
competitiveness of domestic industries against foreign rivals in a growing world market (Heires, 
2008).  
It is important to acknowledge here that the structural politics and conflicts that define the 
international standardisation process have a significant impact on developing nations. This is 
because the capabilities to participate in and influence the ISOs work are unevenly distributed. 
Furthermore, not every standard developed at ISO is equally relevant for all members. However, 
most standards have a significant impact on the future of technological development. Many 
countries therefore have a stake in international standards, but developing countries, especially, do 
not have much say in their development. Without their input, standards, which can also be a means 
of knowledge and technology transfer, might prove unsuitable to their particular needs. The 
centralization of decision making on strategic issues in ISOs leadership and the unequal 
representation of interests in the technical work of the standardisation committees is therefore 
inherently problematic (Heires, 2008).  
In China central and local government officials have sought to establish key measures designed to 
support the creation of domestic IP, including funding for the development of brand–names, 
technical assistance in the preparation of patent applications and the identification of unpatented 
foreign technologies for exploitation by Chinese companies, and funding to defend patent 
infringement cases brought against Chinese companies. In the area of technical standards, China has 
adopted a policy of fostering the development of product standards for a range of electronics 
products including cellular telephones, digital televisions, integrated circuits, wireless devices, and 
video discs. This standards–setting agenda was constructed in order to decrease China’s high 
dependence on foreign technologies, and increase the prominence of standards that rely on 
domestically controlled IP, in order to increase royalty payments to domestic IP owners. Standards 
setting initiatives have been supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology’s (MOST) “863” 
High–Technology R&D funding program; at least 29 standards have resulted from this support.  
One of the highest profile efforts has been the central government’s support for TD–SCDMA—a 
third–generation (3G) cellular telephony standard jointly developed by Chinese and foreign 
companies—with R&D funding and preferential financing for domestic firms (Lee and Oh, 2008). 
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However, TNCs asserted that Chinese standards–setting processes was defined by a techno–
nationalists thrust, in that it was not opaque, is non–centralised and closed to foreign participation. 
Moreover, what I want to emphasis here is that techno–nationalist policies, are becoming an 
increasing outdated technological development strategy that is highly unlikely to succeed in an 
increasing globalised socio–technological environment: This is because it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to create and commercialise high–technology assets without engaging in collaborative 
behaviour designed to facilitate the co–development and ownership of technological assets and 
intellectual property.  
WAPI 
China's first attempts at developing a techno–nationalist strategy was framed around efforts by 
Beijing to set a mandatory encryption standard for its own wireless mobile security protocol WAPI. 
This attempt at standard setting, it has been argued, represented: “a case where China’s mercantilist 
bureaucrats are keen to force foreign interlocutors to work through ‘channels of global transaction’ 
that would be controlled and monitored by bureaucrats intent on seeking rents and steering their 
own version of a developmental path” (Zweig’s, 2002 cited in Bell and Feng, 2007:54).  
At this point in time the dominant standard that was internationally recognised was the 802.11 Wi–
Fi, standard, that had been developed by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
(Lee and Sangjo, 2008:665). However, it was widely acknowledged that Wi–Fi possessed security 
problems. Utilising the security problems associated with Wi–Fi, Chinese policy attempted to set up 
WAPI as a standard for the domestic market (Lee and Sangjo, 2008:665). Moreover, WAPI did not 
comply with chips based on Wi–Fi and was to be used as a mandatory standard for both 
domestically produced and imported wireless networking equipment to be sold in China after May 
2004. The technology was proprietorial and had to be incorporated into products in cooperation 
with one of 24 Chinese companies that had been authorised for this purpose (Linden, 2004:18). A 
number of these companies were potential competitors with foreign firms and the terms of trade set 
by the Chinese meant that foreign manufactures needed to disclose sensitive information to their 
Chinese partners. As a consequence foreign firms that wished to participate in the market would 
have to build local factories and maintain separate production lines for China and the rest of the 
world (Lee and Sangjo, 2008:666). 
Resistance to the standard was fierce (Bell and Feng, 2007). Foreign business were concerned that 
China may attempt to have the standard adopted globally. The Chinese wireless local area network 
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(WLAN) market is a significant market for foreign investors due to its sheer size and potential for 
growth. Research conducted by the firm IDC, indicated that in 2002 China accounted for just 
US$17.2 million of a US$2.2 billion global WLAN market. Hence, the potential growth trajectory 
was substantial. The Wi–Fi Alliance further estimated that the growth of the Chinese market 
between the period 2003 to 2007 at US$50 million to US$500 million (Mannion and Clendenin, 
2003 cited in Bell and Feng, 2007:55). 
Within this period, the Chinese government also sought to integrate its standards with the 
development of indigenous research and development R&D networks. Its policy directives 
emphasised the need for commercial development and attempted to involve high–technology start–
up companies with direct linkages to government research institutes and universities. However, 
whilst it is clear that this new fusion of policy with research was intended to operate within the 
boundaries of China's WTO commitments, specifically, the provisions of the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the international community was becoming increasing 
concerned and questioned the motives of China’s non–consultative and exclusionary methods and 
its intention to try and coerce foreign firms to adopt WAPI (Kennedy, 2006, Suttmeier and Yao, 
2004:167). 
It was these concerns that served to unite foreign governments and firms in a campaign to address 
the potential rise of techno–nationalism in China and over the implications relating to China’s 
future economic openness and the protection of foreign intellectual property rights (Kennedy, 2006, 
Suttmeier and Yao, 2004:167). Intel refused to meet the Chinese deadline for the standard adoption 
and emphasised the fact that the technology behind the WAPI standard was at least a generation 
behind current technologies. In an attempt to halt implementation of the standard and address 
China’s growing techno–nationalistic orientation, foreign companies, especially US chipmakers, 
asked for intervention from their governments, and the dispute developed to involve the US 
government. The Chinese government, facing mounting international pressure, withdrew the 
standard for consideration in 2004 (Suttmeier and Yao, 2004:167; Bell and Feng 2007).   
What needs to be emphasised here is that in the case of WAPI, the researchers and holders of the IP 
rights to this technology came primarily from a small Xi’an–based company named IWNCOMM 
(jietong) – not one of the champions of corporate China and few of the heavyweight domestic 
companies in the manufacturing and service provision sectors expressed enthusiasm for this 
standard. Hence, it is important to note here that in the case of WAPI only a “narrow coalition” 
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supported it. Other actors such as, domestic technology developers, IT manufacturers and 
telecommunication operators were not unified and their existed an extremely well organised 
campaign by trans–national capital and foreign governments led by Intel to defeat the Chinese 
government’s attempt to impose WAPI (Kennedy, 2006, Zhao, 2010).  
Bell and Feng (2000), argue that the failure of WAPI is a direct result of China's deepening reliance 
on foreign investment, technology flows, and export markets as well as its increased engagement 
with international regimes and the multilateral rules and constraints on developmental behaviour 
that this entails. As a result, it is conjectured, China’s institutional and structural location within the 
world economy has fundamentally altered: “creating a structural dependence on foreign 
interlocutors” (Bell and Feng, 2007).  
As a direct consequence of this deepening structural interdependence and the need to participate in 
the global knowledge economy and its emergent production structures, supply chains, innovation 
chains, intellectual property regimes and collaborative networks, it has become necessary for the 
Chinese government to undergo a profound shift in developmental focus. Specifically, it has begun 
to move beyond the construction of an economic development strategy that is overtly techno–
nationalistic in focus. This is because China cannot afford to miss this opportunity to embed itself in 
the global knowledge economy if it wishes to successfully upgrade its current status as a low cost 
producer of simple manufactured products and become a technologically sophisticated innovative 
nation.  
It is here; in this new developmental context that twenty–first century’s post–industrial architecture 
is being forged. The development of system shaping capabilities is hence, an important perquisite 
for successful high–technology development in the contemporary socio–technological system. By 
developing these capabilities firms have the best chance of being involved in shaping the 
architecture of the technological ecosystems around them, and to devise key strategies in relation to 
how they and other systems actors other will be organised. Indeed, research conducted by Santos 
and Eisenhardt (2006) highlighted how even small, startup ventures can acquire a key position in 
the industry architecture by influencing the structure of their sector in ways that would eventually 
fit their own capabilities. Thus, it can be argued that by strategically endeavoring to manage or 
influence a sector’s architecture a firm can capture a disproportionate amount of the benefits created 
by an innovation, especially because innovations often require (or justify or legitimise) the creation 
of a new architecture. This is because opportunities for altering or constructing industry architecture  
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emerges in new sectors, for new technologies, or in areas where a substantial technological, 
institutional or demand discontinuity exist that requires the reorganisation of production structures, 
the establishment of relational ties, network effects and legitimation (Dicken and Kelly and Olds 
and Yeung, 2001). Furthermore, innovation has become inherently more expensive and risky than 
in the past, with a high concentration of advanced R&D spending by countries and enterprises. 
Conversely, there is greater inter–firm and cross–national collaboration and networking in the area 
of innovation (Lall, 2003:12).  
Emerging technologies and innovative products and organisational structures are developed in 
global knowledge and innovation networks. Hence, as the complexity and unpredictability of these 
technologies increases, and firms endeavor to move beyond the monopolisation of intellectual 
property rights and develop new strategic action plans structured around the need to formulate 
organisational and network legitimacy the role of the state in socio–technological development is 
being fundamentally altered. From this frame of reference, it is essential that developing nations 
such as China engage in networking, technology – coalition building, political lobbying, and 
ecosystem alliances in order to transcend its contemporary low technology base and embed itself in 
the contemporary global economy in a way that facilitates sustained long term high–technology 
development and economic growth (Low and Johnston, 2007).  
The key point here is that network capabilities are a key characteristic in the development of 
relational ties and can lead to returns of economic, social, technical and political capital through the 
appropriate identification of network opportunities and constraints.  Hence, in order to gain network 
legitimacy in the global economy the Chinese government has had to undergo a continuous process 
of policy readjustment and experimentation in order to conform to specific sets of multilateral rules 
and behavioural norms and technological opportunities, especially in the wake of the WAPI failure. 
As the WAPI case, with its loss of network legitimacy, highlighted, without the presence of 
relational legitimacy it is highly unlikely that foreign firms will engage in network activity or 
disclose proprietorial knowledge on emerging technology to Chinese firms. Committed relational 
legitimacy is a new form of collaborative activity that provides the Chinese government with a 
strategic tool whereby technology is not just transferred in a shallow fashion at the level of low cost 
manufactured goods but embedded firmly in both the Chinese and the global economy 
simultaneously, as new forms of long–term relationship and collaborative alliances are formed 
(Low and Johnston, 2006).  
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Conversely, as this thesis will argue, it has become necessarily for the Chinese government to 
develop a third strategic development plan that entails both the development and strengthening of 
national innovation policy directives and institutional infrastructures as well as a comprehensive 
attempt to build an open, market based framework that considers not just the possibility but indeed 
the necessity of international cooperation (Yang and Kuo, 2008) and value appropriation. Indeed, a 
third–generation innovation policy that transcends traditional linear interactive models is beginning 
to emerge. This policy paradigm is framed around the need to pay theoretical and practical attention 
to the need for flexible institutional adaptation in the area of science, technology and innovation 
(STI) policy, the facilitation of relational and network ties, as well as to the need to coordinate 
innovation policy components across ministerial boundaries and hence redefine innovation policy in 
a horizontal fashion. (OECD, 2005). As the OECD conjects in a report entitled; Governance of 
Innovation Systems: Synthesis Report, policy directives need to be framed in a flexible and 
integrative fashion: “While horizontal coherence ensures a strategic, integrated focus on innovation 
across boundaries and may be supported by cross–sectoral analysis and coordinated reporting 
systems, vertical coherence ensures follow–up of sector ministerial action plans. Comprehensive 
innovation policy has much to gain from organising information and learning systems that help 
policy makers develop an integrated focus on innovation” (OECD, 2005).  
The state, therefore, needs to think about industrial development in terms of integrative and flexible 
capability building, precisely because it has (1), little direct control over the action of individual 
agents such as firms, research and knowledge zones and international technological and economic 
organisations such as standard setting committees; and (2), only a limited understanding of the 
dynamic nature of global the market. Furthermore, in the specific case of rapid–innovation–based 
industries, markets and products are not well defined, and hence plans for detailed state intervention 
are of limited utility. Thus, for a state to have a positive influence on the development of rapid–
innovation–based industries, it needs to develop methods other than long–term planning, imitation, 
and pure technology transfer via FDI inflows.  
CONCLUSION 
Until recently the Chinese approach to industrial and technological development has been 
structured around the attraction of FDI to help leapfrog its economy. It is a policy approach that has 
clearly failed to deliver the technology and knowledge flows expected. This is because in this 
period the global economy was defined by coordinated attempts by advanced capitalist firms and 
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governments to promote and regulate global production networks via the construction of 
international agencies and trade agreements and intra–national policies and legislation that operated 
to assist developed nations indigenous economic actors to execute transactions that ensure their 
competitive advantage over foreign counterparts. 
Furthermore, the emergence of global innovation networks has rendered S&T policy directives that 
are overtly national in focus obsolete. From this theoretical perspective, collaborative R&D 
alliances, joint ventures and the development of network linkages frame the strategic objectives of 
successful high–technology companies. Strategic policy in this networked environment is primarily 
conceptualised as a portfolio of links whereby dynamic positioning into large networks is critical to 
competitive advantage (Gay, 2008:63).  
In a contemporary context, the implications of new institutionalised forms of cooperation, 
organisation and competition that transcend national borders is under theorised. It is also sectoral 
specific. This is because innovation and technological change is defined by differing characteristics 
and follow different paths depending on the sector in which they occur. Indeed, how to strategically 
embed its firms in these global production and innovation networks and develop long term strategic 
alliances and legitimate governance mechanisms at a global level that will allow the government of 
China to exert a degree of collaborative control over these networks, it can be argued, is one of the 
most perplexing challenges facing Chinese policy makers today. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
  COMPLEX GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL 
SYSTEMS AND THE CHINESE STATE: FROM 
NATIONAL INDIGENOUS INNOVATION TO 
GLOBALISED ADAPTIVE ECOLOGY 
“What really exists is not things made 
but things in the making” 
(William James, 1912) 
 
“It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the knowledge  
economy was not born but made” 
(Mazzucato, 2011) 
 
Rapidly accelerating technological and organisational change at the systems level is fundamentally 
reshaping the immediate and future socio–technological environment and facilitating new forms of 
geo–political interaction, competitive advantage and systematic constraints. Indeed, a new techno– 
economic paradigm is emerging and it is these new technologies that are the site for the spatial, 
relational and organisational transformation of the global economic system. What is so interesting 
and what comprises this paradigm shift is not just the ways in which these technologies will 
revolutionise the way human societies and economic systems interact–but the way these 
technologies co–evolve at a global level, and hence transcend the territorially based behaviour and 
economic appropriation models of both the individual firm and the nation state.  
Indeed, the emergence of global innovation networks and the need for continual innovation alerts us 
to the fact that science, technology and innovation policies can no longer be designed solely in a 
national context. “Go it alone” and “indigenous development agendas” with a techno–nationalistic 
thrust simply do not work in these complex, fast–paced, networked environments. The rapid pace of 
technological change and the increasing organisational and relational complexity of doing business 
in these industries make it impossible for a single company – or even a single nation–to compete 
without technological, financial and organisational collaboration. However, whilst it must be 
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conceded that the ability of national governments to implement indigenous technology agendas is 
highly constrained by the evolving socio–technological regime it is important to note that for 
emerging nations like China, who were effectively locked out of the previous round of economic 
and technological development – due to the privatisation and monopolisation of knowledge, the 
spatial re–organisation of the global economy and advent of more open collaborative models of 
technological development provides a window of opportunity for the Chinese nation to redefine its 
comparative advantage and embed itself strategically in key emerging high–technology ecosystems.  
Drawing on examples from the global wireless sector, the central goal of this chapter is to develop a 
multilevel, multivariate conceptual and empirical framework capable of advancing contemporary 
understandings pertaining to the emergence of the global knowledge economy and the key 
structural and relational opportunities and constraints that advanced technical systems exert on both 
firm level actors and the state. The literature on the evolution of complex socio–technical systems 
and its relationship to the market and the state is voluminous and theoretically diverse. Conversely, 
this chapter is not designed to review the entire literature on socio–technical systems and its 
relationship to the firm, the state and the market but to explore the themes that are important to the 
development of my central theoretical research questions. Specifically, I am interested in 
developing a framework to understand how key ‘ecological’ or ‘systems integration’ technical 
pressures such as the co–production of technology, the occurrence of networked innovation and the 
increasing use of collaborative alliances for market and product development are impacting on and 
shaping the socio–technical policy directives of the government of China and the strategic 
behaviour of key Chinese high–technology firms. 
It is the intention of this chapter to argue that technological change and global systems integration 
via the development and proliferation of scientific and organisational innovation networks, the 
occurrence of critical ecosystem dependencies and the emergence of new forms of collaborative 
architecture is facilitating a shift towards a more alliance based model of capitalist organisation. In 
this chapter the concept of alliance capitalism which currently is overtly focused on the 
internationalisation of the firm, will be extended to incorporate the notion of reciprocal 
interdependence whereby firms from differing global locations are encouraged by a range of strong 
incentives to form trans–territorial technological and market building alliances. These incentives 
include an enhanced ability to address the existence of critical ecosystem dependencies, quicker 
paths to product commercialisation, reduced R&D costs via access to external R&D and co–
development and the ability to engage in the construction of new technological ecosystems and 
markets and their associated technological and organisational requirements.  
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Obviously, the emergence of the collaborative economy and alliance capitalism as a key form of 
economic organisation has fundamental implications for the technological, economic, political 
agency and strategic action of all actors in the contemporary socio–technical system. Firstly, 
strategic agency has itself become dispersed and reliant on the capacity of actors to develop and 
maintain relational legitimacy and ties with diverse sets of stakeholders. Network legitimacy refers 
to the ability of firms and organisations to: “successfully allocate their resources, perform activities 
and market their competencies to key network stakeholders, by conforming to regulative processes, 
institutional norms and cognitive meanings within the network environment” (Low, 2010).  
Secondly, the co–evolution and development of technological assets and intellectual property in a 
global environment means that a number of new collaborative structural dependencies are 
beginning to emerge. However, this does not mean that the socio–technical system as an 
overarching structure shapes strategic agency in a highly determinate fashion. To the contrary, it is 
the intention of this thesis to highlight how key ideas and the actions of strategic system actors can 
shape the socio–technical system itself. That is ‘agency’ and ‘strategy’ can shape ‘structure’. This 
ability to strategically shape the socio–technical environment requires an awareness of 
technological ecosystems and their associated structural features, the emergence and creation of 
new markets and organisation methods and the ability to participle and coordinate activity in 
multiple technological arenas simultaneously. Moreover, a number of identifiable roles and 
associated capabilities have recently emerged that indicate that early attempts to shape the socio–
technical system itself are already emerging and that these strategic shapers will play a key role in 
these technological systems innovation platform architecture development, coordination processes 
and value apportion processes. These system roles and capabilities include; focal and network 
organisers, system integrators, and strategic technological niche development. 
Conversely, in order to effectively operate in this environment the government of China is 
presented with a set of strong incentives to engender a strategic shift away from ideas of indigenous 
technological development and national sectoral pillars to a socio–technical development strategy 
that is informed by the concept of ‘globalised adaptive ecology', which is a strategic policy response 
that combines state agency and developmental planning with the need to gather, co–create and 
appropriate technological knowledge and assets from multiple states and technological knowledge 
zones. It is also a highly malleable policy framework that is designed to be continuously redefined 
as the architecture of the system itself is subject to dynamic change.   
The idea of ‘globalised adaptive ecology’ and ‘structural socio–technical system shaping’ provides 
us with powerful medium from which to examine the adaptive behaviour of the Chinese 
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government and Chinese firms and their ability to operate and compete in multiple technological 
domains and system levels. The key concepts that will be incorporated into this framework are: co–
evolution, alliance capitalism, self–organisation, complex adaptive ecology, dynamic structural 
change, knowledge coordination, experimental trial and error learning, strategic system shaping, 
actor agency and trans–territorial multilevel governance. 
In order to evaluate the increasing occurrence of collaborative alliance based behavior and the co-
development of high-technology products this thesis will empirically examine the alliance based 
behavior and co-development product activity and network connections of three key Chinese high-
technology firms: China Mobile, Huawei and ZTE in chapter six of this thesis. It is important to 
note here that the emergence of critical ecosystem dependencies and the shift to a more alliance 
based economy is applicable to a number of high-technology sectors. However, the focus of this 
thesis is on the global wireless sector only.  
Ecological and Socio–Technological Systems Integration 
In the twenty–first century, the emergence of large–scale global socio–technical systems has 
profoundly modified how both states and firms interact and how states govern technological 
development. In this new socio–technical economic system, future economic growth is located in 
emerging high–technology sectors such as biotechnology, genomics, cloning, nanotechnology, the 
green economy, microelectronics and information communication technology. These technologies 
are themselves highly ubiquitous, have the power to integrate and combine in new forms and 
possess the power to disrupt existing economic models and societal orders on a faster and larger 
scale than ever before in human history (Khanna, and Khanna, 2010). 
Certainly, in the twenty–first century global economy the creation, dissemination and appropriation 
of knowledge has become a major engine of economic expansion. For instance, global R&D 
expenditures over the past decade have grown faster than GDP, an indication of widespread efforts 
to make economies more knowledge and technology intensive. For example, global total R&D has 
risen from an estimated $522 billion in 1996 to approximately $1.4 trillion in 2012 with the rate of 
growth slowing only in the 2008–09 recession year. Although the specific data is comprised of 
approximate estimates, the sustained and strong upward trend highlights the rapidly growing global 
focus on innovation through R&D. Primarily, most of the global funding growth is being driven by 
Asian economies, who are expected to increase their R&D expenditure by nearly 9% in 2012. In 
stark contrast European R&D is expected to grow by approximately 3.5% whilst North American 
R&D growth for the 2012 year is forecast at 2.8%, albeit off a higher base (OECD, 2012). 
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However, it is important to note that the globalisation of R&D is not the only defining characteristic 
of the new innovation landscape. Innovation not based on R&D, including non–technological 
innovation, is increasingly perceived as an important contributor to economic growth and 
development. Specifically, innovation surveys find that a large share of innovative firms do not 
conduct any formal R&D at all. For example, almost half of innovative firms in Europe do not carry 
out R&D in–house. Instead they are focused on the development of new organisation methods, 
forms of network coordination, collaborative connection generation and knowledge sharing. Indeed, 
recent research suggests that process and organisational innovation are becoming prominent drivers 
of improved firm performance globally (OECD, 2012). Hence, comparative advantage is itself 
located in the adaptive, organisational and relational capacities of the firm and the state.  
For example, Procter and Gamble (P&G) have recently moved from a closed in–house innovation 
system to an open innovation system structured around the idea of ‘Concept and Develop’ (C&D). 
By utilising this more open innovation platform, P&G, aim to become the open innovation partner 
of choice (Joia, 2009). To achieve this goal, P&G actively search for external collaborators to 
develop long term relationships and joint development opportunities. These external sources of 
innovation assert P&G are for everything from concepts to how to go–to market: “Finding them 
requires a robust pro–search effort across the globe, looking at every region, every country, every 
company, every university, and identifying what expertise exists” (Joia, 2009). When the process 
began 10–15% of the innovations at P&G included ideas from external sources and today this has 
increased to 50%, resulting in the company achieving 6% organic growth in an industry, which is 
growing at 2–3 % annually (Lafley, 2008 cited in Ruiz, 2009). 
Furthermore, product modularity and architectural innovation have increasingly reframed the 
technological development process in recent years. Product modularity refers to how components 
are integrated into products via sub-elements, sub-assemblies, sub-systems or "modules" that 
independently perform distinctive functions. “Module knowledge (also called component 
knowledge) focuses on these modules (components) themselves as opposed to the linkages between 
components” (Narayanan and O’Conner, 2010). 
Architectural innovation refers to the linkages that occur between the components of established 
products in new ways, whilst the core design elements remain untouched (Henderson and Clark, 
1990). For example, the Sony Walkman can be cited as an example of an architectural innovation, 
where miniaturisation of radio technology facilitated portability, hence significantly altering the 
way in which music was listened to. Indeed, the Walkman fueled an entire industry of portable 
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music players. Conversely, it has been conjectured that: “modular innovation involves the 
introduction of new technology to specific modules of a product that displaces the core design 
concepts while leaving the established linkages between components relatively untouched” 
(Narayanan and O’Conner, 2010). 
Indeed, the emergence of new sectors, business models and structural changes in the socio–
technical system coupled with the rapidly accelerating pace of technological change at multiple 
levels indicates that ‘technology’ itself is a ‘major agent’ of both system change and structuring in 
the contemporary socio–technical system. Specifically, the concepts of ‘convergence’ and 
‘interoperability’ are ‘key structural change drivers’ that play a fundamental role in shaping the 
behaviour of system actors and thus need to be accounted for in theoretical and empirical 
modelling. 
Conversely, in order to participate in the global networks and sectoral systems that comprise the 
contemporary socio–technical system, actors need to develop technological innovations that possess 
the ability to converge or interact with other firm’s products and evolving technological platforms. 
Furthermore, the ability to ensure ‘convergence’ and ‘interoperability’ is highly dependent on the 
capacity of firms to access globally dispersed scientific and technical knowledge sources and 
generate long–term networked relational ties with other system actors. As a direct consequence, 
innovation occurs within an ecosystem of interdependent innovations (Adner and Kapoor, 2010).  
Conversely, economic innovation and technological development in the contemporary global 
knowledge economy can be said to occur within a context of dynamic uncertainty and is defined by 
the possibility of multiple outcomes and system forms. At the present time this multilevel 
technological environment is comprised of a number of loosely configured technology zones and a 
set of more formalised institutional precepts. These include innovation ecologies, socio–technical 
regimes and emergent technological niches (Barry, 2006). Within this dynamic technological 
environment the firm and the state are both rooted in a dense array of deterritorialised or partially 
territorialised alliances with public and private sector actors (Haberly, 2011). This means that, the 
development of strategic socio–technical innovation strategies and associated capabilities must be 
framed by an understanding of how technology facilitates and shapes the emergence of socio–
technological systems and how exactly these large scale global technological and knowledge 
systems are being politically, economically, socially and scientifically shaped and organised at the 
national, global and sub–national level. Thus, in order to comprehend exactly how the emerging 
collaborative economy and the contemporary global socio–technological system effect the 
behaviour and developmental capabilities of its members we need to understand how the system 
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itself functions and the key variables that encapsulates its evolution, development and governance. 
This requires an understanding of exactly how complex adaptive systems contribute to 
technological evolution and socio–technological systems development. 
Complex Adaptive Systems and Technological Evolution 
The theory of socio–technical complexity is derived from evolutionary economic theory. Primarily, 
complexity theory and its numerous theoretical derivatives endeavor to offer a paradigm cable of 
explaining the structural and dynamic properties of technological knowledge generation and 
diffusion as it relates to the emergence of innovative technological knowledge assets, institutional 
forms and economic development (Antonelli, 2010). Specifically, complexity theory is both 
systematic and dynamic and provides a set of theoretical tools that help us to conceptualise how 
knowledge production occurs, is diffused and exploited as well the emergence and transformation 
of system architectures for the coordination of knowledge and appropriation through time (Peir 
Paolo Patrucco, 2008).  
Socio–technical complexity theory operates from the assertion that the current global socio–
technical market system is an example of a complex adaptive system (CAS) that is composed of a 
decentralised collection of networked actors interacting in various market contexts. Technology 
systems as CASs are characterised by their dynamic interdependencies across various scales and are 
driven by mutual interactions between institutional, ecological, technological and socio–economic 
domains. Hence, because the contemporary global socio–technological system is defined by the 
existence of dynamic and highly interdependent developmental processes no single technological 
artifact or developmental process can be isolated for theoretical analysis. Thus, it has been asserted 
that given the fact that technological development and innovation in a contemporary context is so 
interrelated, technological development is best conceptualised as occurring in an ecological system 
of coevolving artifact’s (Schot and Geels, 2007). For example, in the global wireless sector each of 
its three key segments (applications, devices and core networks) is highly dependent upon 
innovation in the other segments for value creation. For instance, new applications depend upon 
both advances in device hardware capabilities and advances in the spectral efficiency of the core 
networks to provide the network capacity to serve those applications (Faulhaber and Farber, 2010).  
Another important tenant of CAS theory is the concept of co–evolutionary potential. The central 
idea of co–evolutionary potential is the inherent need of systems actors to sense and respond to 
feedback and the ways in which this feedback ultimately spurs mutual and dynamic interactions 
between the particular sub–systems or evolving elements. Hence, in CAS, strategic technological 
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policy development often resembles a “co–evolutionary dialogue” where a continuous learning 
process is driven by the mutual and reciprocal interactions among the interlinked sub–systems and 
agents. Alongside this “dialogue”, the ability to form new relations and new emerging properties 
enhances the chances of adaptive change and social–ecological resilience. This emphasises the 
inevitable interdependencies between technologies, institutions, values and the emerging systems 
relational architecture (Nye, 1992, Vicenti, 1994, Mokyr, 1990, Basalla, 1988, Nelson and Winter, 
1982 cited in Rammel and Stagl and Wilfing, 2007). 
For example, in The Wide Lens, Adner asserts that the historical focus of companies on managing 
their execution risk, that is, coming up with innovations that are valued by their customers, and 
delivering them better and faster than the competition has resulted in what he terms a “blind spot” 
(Adner, 2012). This “blind spot” arises because by focusing solely on product development and 
customer need, critical ecosystem dependencies are neglected. As a direct result even highly 
innovative products with a wide customer base fail to reach it to market (Adner, 2012). The key 
problem here, is that in many contemporary global knowledge economy sectors, bringing an 
innovation successfully to the market requires partners that are both able and willing to participate 
in the development of complementary products and service solutions. Conversely, Adner, asserts 
that contemporary innovators need to be aware of two new kinds of risk: co–innovation risk and 
adoption chain risk (Adner, 2012). Co–innovation risk asks the question: “to what extent does the 
success of an innovation depends on the successful commercialisation of other innovations?” What 
is important to emphasis here is that customer insight and innovative development efforts will not 
make up for the absence of complementary assets (Adner, 2012). Adoption chain risk considers the 
question: “Who else needs to adopt my innovation before the end customer has a chance to assess 
the full value proposition?" The issue is: what are the incentives for partners to participate? The key 
to managing this risk is to recognise that alignment with the interests of adoption chain partners is 
as important as delighting end customers (Adner, 2012). Examples of firms that have been 
disadvantaged by a lack of complementary ecosystem assets include Philips. In the 1980s Philips 
made a significant investment in order to develop its high–definition television (HDTV) sets. 
However, the project failed when other firms failed to develop the high–definition cameras and 
transmission standards needed to make HDTV work. Philips incurred a $2.5 billion (USD) write–
down at the time (Adner, 2012). 
Another pertinent example is Nokia. In a bid be first to market with a 3G handset Nokia invested 
millions in the development of the devices. However, it failed to achieve first mover status precisely 
because its ecosystem partners did not complete their innovations in time. By the time the necessary 
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complementary assets and products were ready for the market, such as customised video streaming, 
location based services, and automated payment systems, so was the competition (Adner, 2012). 
These examples of ecosystem failure can be contrasted with a number of innovations whereby firms 
recognised that their success was dependent on the development of a complementary ecosystem. 
For example, the Digital Cinema Initiative (DCI) is a consortium of movie studios that came 
together in a unique way to overcome the cost of adopting digital film within the theater value 
chain. In essence, they subsidised and shared the cost of capital investment in smaller theater chains 
to ensure that digital film would enjoy the broad distribution and availability critical to its growth 
(Moore, 2012).  
It is clear that these theoretical propositions are highly applicable to the global wireless industry, 
where a firms value relationships are embedded in a larger flow of activities that can be called the 
‘wireless value ecosystem’ (Pagani and Fine, 2008). Such large flow activities create unique sets of 
ecosystem dependencies that need to be addressed by all ecosystem actors in order for the system to 
function effectively. On the upstream side, contractors and electronic manufacturing services 
(EMS) create and deliver the purchased inputs used in an equipment manufacturer’s value 
relationships. On the downstream side, network operators (initially subsidiaries of the national 
postal, telegraph, and telephone service (PTTs) or carriers) serve as distribution channels and 
perform additional activities that affect the buyer. The ultimate basis for any differentiation is the 
company and its product’s role in the buyer’s value relationships. As a firm, each company in the 
wireless industry has its own value relationships; as industry players, all take part in the broader 
industry value system. Achieving, sustaining, or renewing strategic advantage depends not just on 
an individual firm’s value relationship, but on its role in the broader value ecosystem. These value 
systems are not static; they change over time. For example, Apple Computers is the leader of an 
ecosystem that crosses at least four major industries: personal computers, consumer electronics, 
information, and communications. The Apple ecosystem encompasses an extended web of suppliers 
that includes Motorola and Sony and a large number of customers in various market segments 
(Moore, 2012). 
Moreover, in the global wireless sector, manufacturers of handsets and carriers must work closely 
to ensure that both the phones and the networks function in a way that ensures both quality 
transmission and spectrum efficiency. As carriers develop new protocols to increase network 
performance, they must work with the device makers who will build the handsets in order to 
achieve system convergence and interoperability. Consequently, the development of industry 
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standards is increasingly occurring jointly in standards committees where both carriers and device 
makers can represent their interests in order to enable innovation on both sides of the market to 
occur. Due to the complex nature of the market, which means that no single actor can provide a 
service to the customers with an end–to–end solution on its own, there is a need to sustain viable 
alliances and to create a value network with the right partners (Barnes, 2002; Pigneur, 2000; Sabat, 
2002 cited in Pagani and Fine, 2008).  
Figure 3.1. developed Pagani and Fine (2008), uses a five–pronged diagram framed around the 
content value chain, application value chain, infrastructure value chain, network value chain, and 
device value chain in order to highlight the complexity and co–evolutionary nature of the global 
wireless value system. 
Figure 3.1. Wireless Value Network Structure of 3G 
 
Source: Pagani and Fine, (2008). 
 
Conversely, the idea of co–evolutionary potential and adaption provides theoretical insight into the 
conditions under which agents or clusters of agents change their schemata (routines) and how this in 
turn changes their fitness functions (selection mechanisms) that lead to systemic coevolution 
(Holland and Miller, 1991, Levinthal, 1997, Miller, 1992 cited in Geels and Schot, 2007). From this 
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frame of reference, coevolution is essentially a state of dynamic equilibrium, in which heterogeneity 
in adaptation performance among agents constantly reshapes the competitive landscape where the 
selection mechanisms operate. Leading agents or clusters of agents which adapt faster or more 
efficiently constantly exert a pressure for higher fitness that at times results in the fundamental 
transformation of the system. Thus, the composition of agents, the distribution of agents schemata 
and the connections between agents are subject to constant change and evolutionary pressures. 
Structure, Agency and Globalised Adaptive Ecology 
It can be argued that in this new more collaborative environment achieving first mover status is not 
the only way to move up the technology ladder and acquire market share. Instead, ecosystem 
shaping, co–development and system embeddedness are new strategic models of behaviour that can 
be utilised to facilitate the successful adoption of a firm’s products in the contemporary market 
system.  
Until recently the study of global innovation and production networks (GIPNs) (Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz, 1994, 1996) or global production networks (GPNs) (Borrus et al., 2000; Ernst and 
Kim, 2002; Yusuf et al., 2004) was primarily structured around the idea of organisational space, and 
assumed a hierarchical governance structure dominated by either commodity–chain drivers or 
network flagships (Lee and Saxenian, 2007). From this theoretical framework, system drivers or 
flagship firms occupy the highest hierarchical layer and assert control over system participants at 
lower levels via their control over critical assets such as de facto standards, intellectual property 
rights, brand names, marketing channels and technology production. It is this hierarchy that serves 
to divide the hierarchy from lower levels. On the one hand, although high–tiers continually shed 
capabilities, they still maintain their dominance by continuing to control critical assets. On the other 
hand, although there is an upgrading path providing for lower tiers, this path has a glass ceiling 
because the power asymmetry works to the disadvantage of lower tiers in the head–on competition 
with higher tiers (Lee and Saxenian, 2007).  
However, this system of hierarchal control via intellectual property and organisational control 
mechanisms is becoming an increasingly out–dated framework for conceptualising global systems 
innovation in high–technology sectors. This is because in the emerging collaborative economy and 
its associated networks and sectors the network does not select for intellectual property ownership 
pre see – but rather the ability of system actors to engage in collaborative behaviour in order to 
facilitate the co–production, commercialisation and organisation of innovative knowledge assets.  
This has resulted in the emergence of a new form of network organisation, the Collaborative Global 
Complex Global Technological Systems and the Chinese State: From National Indigenous 
Innovation to Globalised Adaptive Ecology 
63 
Innovation Network (CGIN). This new model of global innovation has created new sets of system 
opportunities for economic and technological actors. 
The advent of CGINs and the associated critical ecosystem dependencies that permeate these 
contemporary technological systems is an important example of structural change in the 
contemporary global economy. The ability of innovating actors such as the Chinese state to engage 
in transformatiative high–technological development is hence mediated by these structural features 
and the way in which they frame contemporary socio–technological development processes. 
However, what is important to note here is that the structures and institutional frameworks that 
define contemporary CGINs are themselves a direct product of actors past decision making 
processes and selection mechanisms. Thus, structures are always mediated by actualised agents 
(Bell and Hindmoor, 2014). From this theoretical perspective structures can both constrain or 
empower agents. In order to expand the range of contexts for analysis in which agents interact, Bell 
and Feng (2013) have developed an 'agents in context' approach. An 'agents in context approach' 
expands the range of contextual variables that need to be examined when trying to locate the source 
of institutional and structural agency that strategic actors agents employ when trying to affect 
socio–technological change. These include; the power of the state, the structural power of 
businesses, material incentives or disincentives and strategically selective terrains (Bell and 
Hindmoor, 2014).  
In the contemporary socio–technological system the ability of the Chinese state as a developmental 
actor to mediate these structural opportunities and constraints in a way that is commensurate with 
its high–technology developmental goals will be greatly enhanced by its ability to either build new  
technological ecosystems or infiltrate existing networks and technological ecosystems and play a 
role in both the shaping of the interests of key system actors and contribute organisational, financial 
and technological resources for the further successful development of the whole ecosystem.  
Agency from this theoretical perspective involves the “propagation of innovations” by questioning 
and replacing “business as usual” policies and creating alternative practices, thereby challenging the 
established world views and paths, attitudinal and behavioural patterns, as well as providing others 
who think as they do (followers, early adopters) with a constant motivation for a self–sustaining 
change (WBGU 2011: 243). 
Bell and Hindmoor (2014), assert that agents such as the Chinese state act in a myopic and self–
interested manner, producing large structural effects they do not fully comprehend or control. The 
power in question, they argue, is not material or ideational, but is a form of structural or ecosystem 
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power born of myriad agent interactions in a structured context. That is: “it was a form of power 
generated by unplanned, uncontrolled interactions between agents” (Bell and Hindmoor, 2014).  
Agency is thus understood in a systemic way to spread its effect and power from one scale or level 
to the next, depending on opportunities and resources, alliances and circumstances. Agency for 
strategic change is conceptualised here as being embedded in and dependent on the evolutionary 
processes of selection, variation and retention – starting from within niches and diffusing across 
scales. And once again these evolutionary approaches to social innovation rely on the market as the 
central selection mechanism, or at least as the central metaphor organising their understanding of 
change and agency (Hausknost and Hass, 2013).  
Conversely ‘globalised adaptive ecology’ as a theoretical framework needs to model this 
increasingly globalised and collaborative economy in a manner that captures the way in which the 
coordination and governance of scientific and technical knowledge is goal directed by system actors 
in order to ensure system interoperability as well as how the socio–technological system is 
characterised by a high degree of complex, self–organising and adaptive behaviour at a global level. 
One key strategy used by innovating actors to shape the technological direction, institutional 
infrastructure and organisation processes of the emerging technical system is to actively construct a 
technological niche or ecosystem. Technological niches provide actors with an innovation 
launching platform that helps them to insert themselves into the socio–technological ecology and 
develop strategic action plans before regimes or more institutionalised forms of behaviour are 
formed. It is here, in these clusters and networks of experimental technological and organisational 
development that new institutional forms and organisational behaviour begins to develop. 
Strategic Niches and Technological Development 
The niche is a central construct that describes the position of an organism or species in an 
ecosystem. A similar concept has been applied extensively in organisational ecology, to describe 
the position of an organisation or organisational form in a socio–technological population or 
community, respectively. It is argued that the niche of an organisation (or an organisational form, 
for that matter) is the locus of competition, legitimation and selection (Hannan, Carroll, and Pólos, 
2003). 
As I have already previously established, achieving first mover status is not the only way to move 
up the technology ladder and acquire market share in the contemporary socio–technological system. 
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Latecomer firms that are engaged in technological up–scaling can also engage in a number of 
alternative strategies, such as ecosystem shaping, co–development and ecosystem embeddedness.  
In fact, it is becoming increasingly clear that in the contemporary knowledge economy which is 
defined by sets of collaborative ecosystem dependencies, the pursuit of first mover status may not 
be best practice for market success and technological value appropriation. Instead, it has been 
argued, that it is important that firms consider the parameters and dependencies links that will 
define their specific ecosystems before developing a strategy. From this theoretical perspective: “it 
only pays to be the first mover if your innovation has very little dependency on the ecosystem. The 
more complex your innovation becomes and the more it depends on co–innovations and adoption, 
the less beneficial it is to be a first mover (i.e. the risk of moving first goes up significantly)” 
(Adner, 2012).  
For instance, recent firm examples suggested that for second and subsequent movers it can be more 
valuable in the short term to build a copycat product that plugs into an existing ecosystem than it is 
to build a first–to–market innovation. As Adner argues:  
...scale matters, and networks and ecosystems give you that scale. To be a great business in 
today’s digital world, it requires spotting all the emergent technological trends on the borders 
and edges and transforming them into new, scalable market opportunities that build on existing 
strengths in a unique way. The classic example is Microsoft Windows and the Apple Macintosh 
computer. Apple had first–mover advantage, delivering the Macintosh in 1984 while a truly–
useful version of Windows didn't appear until 1990. How did Microsoft do it? Steve Jobs said 
Bill Gates stole from him, and in fact he didn't even build a “better” mousetrap. He built one 
that was good enough. So how did Microsoft win? It won by building a bigger ecosystem, by 
bringing more people and companies into its orbit. It let others build Windows PCs. It didn't 
demand that everything under its banner be super–great. It didn't go for the last dollar. Mastery 
of the ecosystem is the great strength that made Apple the supreme success story of our time 
(Adner, 2012).  
Furthermore, what the Apple and Microsoft examples highlight is how important addressing critical 
ecosystem dependencies is for the successful commercialisation of technological products. For 
example, Apple's iPod was successful after earlier MP3 players had failed not only because it was 
simple to use but also because Apple waited until broadband technologies were sufficiently 
developed in order to support the music data transfers it was reliant on. This created an emergent 
ecosystem that Apple further enlarged by introducing the iTunes Music Store. This ecosystem was 
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then further enlarged when Apple further opened up the Mac–only device to PC users.  Hence, it 
can be seen that in the case of Apple, first mover outcomes have been very poor for their most 
inventive products (e.g. Lisa, Newton). However: “when Apple has followed, with incremental 
innovation (e.g. iMac, iPhone, iPod, iPad), they have achieved much greater success, outperforming 
both their own first movers, as well as the first movers in each of these categories” (Darner, 2012 
cited in Blackenhorn, 2011). As Adner, concludes: “Aligning, enticing, and — occasionally — 
subsidizing partners are the new ante in the ecosystem game. Amazon and Apple will go down as 
case studies in alternative strategies for succeeding in ecosystems. Their product–focused rivals will 
illustrate what it means to be “stuck in the middle” (2012).  
System Integrators and Network Organisers 
A number of identifiable roles and associated capabilities have recently emerged that indicate that 
early attempts to coordinate and shape the socio–technical system itself are already emerging and 
that these strategic shapers will pay a key role in these technological systems evolution and value 
appropriation processes. Three main agent types can be identified in the contemporary system as 
key strategic shaping actors in this global socio-technical system. These are system integrators, 
focal organisers and network organisers. 
System integrators primary goal is to bring the component subsystems into one system and ensuring 
that the subsystems function together as a system. Hence, the role of the system integrator is a more 
technical role. System integration involves integrating existing often disparate systems. Systems 
integration is also about adding value to the system, capabilities that are possible because of 
interactions between subsystems. In todays connected world, the role of system integrators is 
becoming increasingly important because more and more systems are designed to connect, both 
within the system under construction and to systems that are already deployed. Primarily, system 
integrators need to develop and source new technologies and ensure interoperability and 
convergence can occur for diverse and locationally dispersed participants. This can involve industry 
alignment, partner selection, pre–competitive market construction and infrastructure development. 
Focal organisers are focused on the provision of early funding and network development in order to 
facilitate what is termed ‘first to the world’ basic research.  It is this early research that provides the 
key platforms for ecosystem building and development. Governments and large multinational firms 
are often focal organisers due to their ability to invest risk capital and wait for longer periods for 
capital returns.  
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Network organisers play a key role in organising system participants and in the overall governance 
of technological niches, ecology and zones. The role of the network organiser is to shape global 
ecosystems and thereby fundamentally influence the future trajectories of socio–technological 
industries and markets. Network organisers drive ecosystem collaboration by recruiting members 
and working to set the direction and timing of sustained collaboration over time. Network 
organisers seek to ensure that the ecosystem is designed to provide a win–win value proposition for 
all participants. This is because pursuing strategies that ensure one members success at the expense 
of other members does not work in these sorts of collaborative ecosystems–precisely because the 
successful co–development and adoption of products from the ecosystem are a perquisite for 
successful market entry and commercialisation of all system actors. 
Thus, a key role of the network organiser is to align the interests of all ecosystem members towards 
the pursuit of a common goal. Conversely, a network organiser needs to possess the ability and the 
commitment to create the ecosystem structure, establish fair standards and consistency and 
convince potential followers that there is value in it for them. Primarily, this entails that the network 
organiser is willing to make the initial investment required in order to kick start the ecosystem. This 
often requires that the ecosystem leader capture value and collect its rewards in the end, not the 
beginning. For example, in the case of the e–book, Amazon made certain to keep all of the players 
aligned and showed a willingness to sacrifice some margin to the publishers in order to ensure that 
they would feel less threatened and more fully incentivised by the new development, and this has 
been one of the keys to the Kindle's success (Adner, 2012). 
Secondly, it can engage in the development of new organisational forms and methods that are 
designed to unite and drive technological participants in new ways that challenge exciting 
technological regimes and zones. This involves the generation of new innovation platforms that 
conspire to both form and reshape existing institutional models, identities, practices and 
relationships and reduce uncertainty in the socio–technical environment.  
For example in chapters five and six, I will highlight how China Mobile as a state owned flagship 
firm, in a highly successful attempt at ecosystem building and shaping, constructed a global 
collaborative platform for the co–development of Time Division Duplex (TDD) and Frequency–
division duplexing (FDD) standards and network devices in order to appropriate value and network 
embeddeness in the emerging 4G market. 
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It is important to note here that the assets of the shaping entity play a fundamental role in 
persuading potential participants to invest in the shaping strategy. These include organisational 
resources, relational legitimacy, intellectual property portfolios, market access and network 
emebeddness. In this domain, large established companies and governmental actors have a potential 
advantage as strategic system shapers. This is because system participants believe that these 
companies or governmental actors possess the necessary resources to support and sustain the 
shaping strategy. Consequently, these actors are able to motivate a large number of system 
participates to make significant investments and take aggressive action to accelerate movement 
toward a preferred outcome. It also provides the focus and incentives necessary to unleash 
distributed innovation as thousands of specialised participants experiment to meet shifting and 
emerging customer needs and business opportunities (Hagel, 2008). 
Intellectual Property and the Collaborative Economy 
In a more collaborative alliance driven economy the privatisation and monopolisation of knowledge 
as a development strategy, as expounded by earlier western models of value appropriation and the 
more recently devised Chinese indigenous innovation strategy, have decreased in utility. In stark 
contrast the ability to create and generate relational ties that allow system actors to connect more 
rapidly and effectively with others to create new knowledge has assumed significant strategic value. 
That is, stocks of knowledge become progressively less valuable while flows of knowledge – the 
relationships that can help to generate new knowledge – have significantly increased in value. 
Conversely, it has been asserted that in the emerging socio–technological system rather than 
jealously protecting existing stocks of knowledge, institutions and firms need to offer their own 
knowledge as a way to encourage others to share their knowledge and help to accelerate new 
knowledge building (Hagel, 2008). 
Hence, it can be seen that the capacity for ‘connectivity’, which is associated with the potential of 
the system to establish relationships and generate interactions with other systems with the objective 
of increasing their knowledge and technological base is an important perquisite for socio–
technological systems participation. For the Chinese government the strategic objective here is to 
find ways to harness the increasing modularity of the this new socio–technological system in order 
develop to the necessary institutional and relational assets that are essential for both the co–creation 
of intellectual property assets as well as new modes and diversified forms of IP value appropriation 
and sharing.   
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This ecological systems change towards a more open, collaborative and relationship – based model 
of intellectual property development and appropriation provides the Chinese government, its key 
domestic firms and the international trading regime with a distinctively new, more inclusive global 
innovation system. The strategic challenge here is to attract external innovators who can “co–create 
value” by identifying new functions and designing novel solutions for a given technological system. 
In such systems, firms will both give and take IP from the ecosystem (Henkel and Baldwin and 
Shih, 2012). 
The increasingly systematic nature of this collaborative behaviour is seen manifest in the emergence 
of new “collaborative IP mechanisms”, such as IP clearinghouses, exchanges, auctions and 
brokerages, model agreements and frameworks for IP sharing (OECD, 2011). For instance, firms 
increasingly say that they are organising licensing activity and strategic alliances around an IP 
strategy that seeks to share technologies rather than to use IP solely as a defense mechanism. For a 
number of firms this represents a fundamental change in IP management and strategy (OECD, 
2011). Moreover, recently a new form of third party–innovation intermediary or ‘inmediary’ – has 
emerged around the world. NineSigma, InnoCentive, Yet2.com, YourEncore are a few examples. 
These intermediaries facilitate and broker collaboration across technology markets by providing 
innovation platforms that link companies with potential problem solvers, and facilitate the diffusion 
of knowledge or technologies (Chesbrough and Vanhavenerbeke and Bakici and Lopez, 2011).  
The intellectual property and products developed in this this new IP system are defined by multiple 
owners and modes of value appropriation. For example, in order to respond to this increasing fast 
paced and complex socio–technical environment Nokia has developed a network of nine satellite 
design studios in various target geographies such as Brazil, China, and India. Design teams 
collaborate with local partners (for example, Shristi in India) as well as across the global studio 
network to develop new lines of phones. Another example can be drawn from the recent 
announcement by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to develop an “Open 
Innovation Platform” to improve collaboration among customers, EDA (electronic design 
automation) software vendors, and chip architecture IP providers. TSMC hopes to make it easier for 
customers to access various design tools, foundry data, and factory process models to accelerate 
chip design cycle time and improve time to market. Another example, is how computer chip 
manufacturers, such as Nvidia, provide “reference designs” which include sample hardware 
implementations and driver software. In this fashion, they split their own IP: keeping the majority 
proprietorial, they also create “open” modules that include all the designs, electronic files, and test 
programs that a systems manufacturer might need (Henkel and Baldwin and Shih, 2012). 
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Furthermore, recently released data filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) indicates that 
the frequency of co–inventions, i.e., patents with several inventors listed as applicants, is increasing. 
It is interesting to note that an industry breakdown of joint patents highlights the fact that it is 
emerging high tech sectors that contain the most co–owned patents. For example, the chemical 
industry at (32.1%) and the information technology sector at (26.7%) contain the largest percentage 
of jointly owned patents. This is followed by instrumental pharmaceuticals, including 
pharabiotenology (11.5%), the automotive industry (5%) and aerospace and defense (3.7%). In 
stark contrast sectors, such as food and beverages and steels and metals and oils and gas were not 
accounted for in any patent co–ownership figures (Hagerdooorn, 2003).  
Moreover, in the 4G sector a number of patent pools have recently been set up to make it easier for 
companies to license the technology they need to implement a given standard and to prevent costly 
patent litigation in the future. For example in 2008, Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave 
Access (WiMAX), a key 4G technology, alongside Long Term Evolution (LTE) a 4G wireless 
communications standard developed by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), brought 
about a change in how patent licensing is addressed. This involved the creation of a single 
organisation, the Open Patent Alliance (OPA), which has brought together major vendors including 
Intel and Cisco Systems. OPA members include Acer, Alcatel–Lucent, Alvarion, Cisco, Clearwire, 
Huawei Technologies, Intel Corporation, Samsung Electronics, Beceem, GCT Semiconductor, 
Sequans, and UQ Communications, indicating broad 4G ecosystem support for the pool. A 
WiMAX patent pool, it is asserted, will help to ensure product differentiation and interoperability at 
a more predictable cost through a more competitive royalty structure. This it has been conjectured is 
critical to the long–term success and broad adoption of WiMAX, by enabling a wider array of 
devices such as smart phones, consumer electronics and PC industries to quickly integrate the latest 
wireless broadband technologies into their products. Furthermore, as of October 2012 a new 4G–
LTE patent pool has been formed. The patent pool managed by Dolby Laboratories Inc. a 
subsidiary Via Licensing Corp., includes; AT&T, Clearwire Corporation, DTVG Licensing 
(DIRECTV), HP, KDDI Corporation, NTT DOCOMO, SK Telecom, Telecom Italia, Telefónica 
and ZTE Corporation (Reddy, 2012). Moreover, Via president Roger Ross says his company is 
talking to another 26 patent holders, including, “a couple of chip companies,” and he expects the 
number of companies in the patent pool to grow in the near future. All 26 of the companies 
involved hold at least one standard essential patent, meaning they hold a patent that must be 
licensed in order to make products that meet the requirements of standards bodies (DeGrasse, 
2012). Clearly, these patent pools represent the emergence of a more open, collaborative or mixed 
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(combination of open and closed) approach to intellectual property ownership and a fundamental 
change in the way the technology will be developed and deployed. 
For example, in the global wireless sector the transition from 1G to 4G has been defined by a shift 
from proprietorial technologies and patents to increasing openness and standardisation. These three 
distinct stages can be clearly seen in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Wireless Business: Three Eras 
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Source: Steinbock, (2003). 
In recognition of the emergence of a more collaborative model of socio–technological behaviour in 
emerging high–technology sectors the OECD in its 2011 GII report entitled: Stronger Innovation 
Linkages for Global Growth’, emphasises the need to develop a framework from which to measure 
the number and type of collaborative innovation linkages that are occurring at a system level, 
asserting that at the present time: 
The challenge is to detect and quantify the dynamic and often informal nature of linkages and 
their efficacy. A key measurement problem is that a significant share of collaborative activity 
remains unmeasured...Innovation indicators for less–developed economies ought to assess the 
extent to which connections and linkages are present in the field of innovation, define the nature 
of these links—including determining whether they are national or international—identify 
involved or excluded agents, and ascertain the efficiency of existing information channels 
(OECD, 2011). 
Indeed, it has been asserted by the OECD, that the category of ‘technological cooperation’ is the 
most useful for developing the next generation of globalisation indicators... “There are three reasons 
to believe a focus on cooperative arrangements—innovation networks—holds this promise: First, 
innovation networks are becoming the major scientific and technological actors in the process of 
globalisation. Second, innovation networks provide critical information about the other two 
categories of globalisation indicators—technological generation and exploitation. Third, innovation 
networks provide a useful way to integrate input and output indicators of technological 
advancement” (OECD, 2011). 
It is important to emphasise here that due to the fact that intangible assets and relational capacity are 
the key competitive currency in the collaborative economy, ecosystem participants need to 
engender significant trust in order to be considered for ecosystem membership and alliance 
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partnerships. Hence, it can be argued that in order for the Chinese state and its key domestic firms 
to achieve ecosystem membership and shaping capacities in the global socio–technological system 
China's weak intellectual property regime will need to be urgently addressed.  
Open Innovation, Patent Tradability and the China's Weak 
Intellectual Property Regime 
It is widely held that the existence of strong intellectual property rights (IPRs) encourages 
innovation, which subsequently results in increasing benefits for everyone. The central thrust of the 
argument is that if strong property rights provide incentive structures for the production of goods, 
there must also exist appropriate incentives for the production and dissemination of ideas (Goldin 
and Reinert, 2007:204). However, Chinese firms have exhibited a persistent lack of respect for 
IPRs. Indeed, China is the world’s single largest producer of pirated goods. China possesses an 
extensive and sophisticated network of intellectual property infringers who pirate products from 
virtually every industry imaginable. For example, China is one of the world’s largest manufacturers 
of fake DVDs, designer goods, car parts, and pharmaceuticals. It has been estimated that 90–99% of 
software in China is pirated. Furthermore, counterfeit labelling of agricultural and other food 
products is common. Moreover, counterfeiters have also even begun to copy the experience of 
shopping itself by replicating the store fronts and interiors (“trade dress”) of famous global stores 
and restaurants, including IKEA, McDonalds, Starbucks, Dairy Queen, and The Apple Store 
(Kassner, 2012). 
This has led to low confidence in the Chinese IPR regime, uncertainty in the rule of law, and 
bureaucratic and complicated human resource management. Indeed, the lack of IPRs is often cited 
by business representatives as barriers to R&D in China. For example, in a 2004 survey conducted 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 84% of executives cited inadequate IP protection in 
emerging economies as a challenge for R&D globalisation. According to Hagedoorn the protection 
of IP is fundamental component in international partner selection and related R&D behaviour 
(Zhao, 2010).  
In a similar vein, firms in the U.S. IP–intensive economy are increasing being deterred from 
entering R&D or co–development alliances with Chinese firms due to the significant losses that this 
has incurred for firms. In 2009 losses of approximately $48.2 billion in sales, royalties, or license 
fees due to IPR infringement in China were reported. This estimate falls within a broad $14.2 
billion to $90.5 billion range because many firms were unable to calculate exact losses. Of the 
$48.2 billion in total reported losses in 2009, approximately $36.6 billion (75.9 %) was attributable 
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to lost sales, while the remaining $11.6 billion was attributable to a combination of lost royalty and 
license payments as well as other unspecified losses (The Commission on the Theft of American 
Intellectual Property, 2013). In 2010, the commander of the U.S. Cyber Command and director of 
the National Security Agency, General Keith Alexander, stated that: “our intellectual property here 
is about $5 trillion. Of that, approximately $300 billion [6%] is stolen over the networks per year.” 
He later called the theft “the greatest transfer of wealth in history” (The Commission on the Theft of 
American Intellectual Property, 2013). 
What needs to be emphasised is that because, as already established, contemporary high–
technology firms have few physical or tangible assets, a significant component of their value is 
derived from their intellectual property portfolios. As a direct result, in high–technology sectors, 
where knowledge is a firms primary asset for generating competitive advantage, the formal 
protection of pre–existing knowledge and intangible assets via formal legal mechanisms such as 
patents and trademarks is an important strategy for firms wishing to engage in collaborative 
alliances for future technological knowledge generation. Indeed, it has been argued that it is no 
accident that we are beginning to see a simultaneous increase in open innovation, markets for 
technology, and the importance of IP in firm strategy, primarily in the form of patents and cross 
licensing (Hall, 2010).  
At first glance the two concepts (open innovation and IPR protection) appear to be irreconcilable. 
Open innovation implies a willingness to allow knowledge produced within the firm to spill over to 
others (possibly in with the expectation of receiving knowledge spillovers from others in return). In 
contrast, IPR protection enables a firm to exclude others from using that knowledge. It has been 
argued that the latter creates a ‘patent fence’. A patent fence is used to refer to the idea that stronger 
patent rights can have an adverse effect on innovation and stifle, not facilitate innovation and 
knowledge transfers. However, unlike the closed innovation approach which regards patents as 
monopolistic “fences” and “barriers” to keep competitors away, an open innovation approach 
considers patents as “currency” that can be used to acquire access to third–party IP to expedite 
technology development through non–exclusive licensing and/or cross–licensing (Hall, 2010). 
Furthermore, the open innovation approach allows for the selling or bartering of non–essential IP to 
secure at least some return on the investment for IP protection, instead of simply abandoning 
patents that have little or no direct value to the IP holder (Hall, 2010).  
Conversely, it can be argued that in contemporary technological innovation ecosystems patents are 
conceptualised not as exclusionary mechanisms per see but as a tradable currency that provides 
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firms with a valuable bargaining tool from which to co–develop technological assets and products 
and gain access to technological ecosystems. This means that the Chinese government and its 
domestic firms need to build up a stock of core technological patents as well as develop an effective 
IP protection system for both domestic and foreign firms.  
Policy directives and recent governmental press releases indicate that the Chinese government is 
beginning to acknowledge the growing importance of IP reform as an important prerequisite for 
high–technology ecosystem development: “Only through effective intellectual property protection 
can science and technology innovators be rewarded for the fruits of their labors... By doing so, their 
rights and innovative spirit can be protected and the momentum can be maintained. Protecting IPR 
is a necessary means to maintain market integrity and encourage enterprises to invest more” (Hu, 
2010). In November 2011, after a nine–month special campaign against IPR infringement and 
counterfeits, the State Council set up a leading group against IPR infringement and counterfeits 
headed by Vice Premier Wang Qishan. Two specific campaigns were launched to address the 
concerns of foreign firm’s including, “Campaign Thunderstorm” to fight against patent 
infringement and counterfeiting and “Campaign Skynet” against patent fraud. China now seems 
convinced about the importance of patents: “As a fundamental system to encourage and protect 
innovation, the patent system is playing an increasingly important role in economic, technological 
and social development of a country”, says the State Intellectual Property Office document that 
calls the patent drive an “inexorable requirement to deal with fierce international competition” 
(Murthy, 2011). 
An example of the Chinese government’s commitment to reform its IPR system can be drawn from 
a number of recent cases where foreign firms were awarded damages for IPR infringement by a 
Chinese firm. These includes a case by a German company that won a settlement of $3m in Beijing 
for infringement of its design for a bus, a British company has sued successfully over the heating 
element of a kettle and a firm from Wuhan has won $7 million in a case against a company from 
Fujian and its Japanese supplier over the use of a process to clean sulphur (The Economist, 2010).  
What needs to be emphasised here is that as more Chinese businesses turn to innovation and 
services rather than manufacturing, the more they will become active producers and stakeholders in 
IP reform. Indeed, Chinese businesses have already started to demand reforms to strengthen IP 
enforcement within China and a handful of businesses have utilised foreign courts to protect their 
intellectual property rights abroad. As China continues to transition from a developing nation to a 
more sophisticated global economy, the stage is being set for incentives to favour stronger IP 
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enforcement (Evans, 2003). This IP regime will need to take into account newly emergent forms of 
collaborative IP protections discussed earlier in this chapter as well as more traditional IP protection 
mechanisms.   
Alliance Capitalism, Resource Sharing and Relational Ties 
As it has been established in this chapter the significant increase in cross–border collaborations over 
the last two decades is one of the most prominent components of the technological globalisation 
process. Indeed, collaborative initiatives have become the preferred institutional form through 
which diverse forms of development initiatives are designed and implemented. “That is global 
development partnerships and collaboratively–governed standards initiatives are the institutional 
pathway of choice for a new generation of initiatives dealing with everything from global health to 
the marginalisation of so–called ‘blood diamonds’ to the role of telecommunications in empowering 
peasant farmers in global markets” (Zadek, 2006).  
For example, evidence of this shift in the US can be seen by looking at R&D Magazine’s, R&D 100 
Awards. For forty–five years, R&D Magazine has been recognizing the one hundred most 
innovative commercial products introduced in the previous year. In 1975, forty–seven out of 
eighty–six domestic innovations were produced by Fortune 500 companies, and forty of these 
involved no outside partners. By 2006, the Fortune 500 companies were responsible for only six out 
of eighty–eight innovations, and in most cases, partners were involved (Block, 2008).  
The extant literature on alliance capitalism contains relatively little research on the development of 
alliance capitalism in China or on the role of the state in the facilitation and maintenance of such 
alliances. Alliance capitalism is a term used to describe the increasing interdependence of economic 
entities and the partial erosion of hierarchical control over value–added activities in favor of 
network–based collegial entrepreneurship (Dunning, 1997). Primarily, the existing literature is 
pitched at the level of the firm with an overt focus on the nature of its internationalisation. Hence, 
this literature fails to address the dynamic and highly interdependent nature of high–technology 
ecosystems and knowledge zones or the role of the state as a network organiser and system shaper. 
In order to address this theoretical gap we need to reframe  current conceptualisations of alliance 
capitalism with its overt focus on the internationalisation of the firm to incorporate the notion of 
reciprocal dependence whereby firms and states from differing global locations are encouraged to 
form alliances not just to function effectively in the global economy and gain market access, but to 
also address the existence of critical ecosystem dependencies and the need for interoperability and 
convergence.  As a consequence the role of the state in the development process is transformed as it 
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endeavors to revise its governance structures and policy directives in a way that is responsive to 
global–national manifestations of economic and technological embeddeness. 
It is important to emphasise here that the concept of network legitimacy, reciprocal independence, 
relational networks and collaborative governance are all important contemporary variables that 
operate to mould and define the parameters of the contemporary alliance building and bargaining 
environment in the global wireless sector and hence provide key analytical variables for theoretical 
analysis. Network legitimacy and relational networks refer to the process of cooperation and 
competition between network constituents. Over time, and over many exchanges and interactions, 
these orientations are linked to sanctioned relational behaviour all actions in the industrial network 
system. That is they form sets of relational ties and rules of behaviour and exchange (Dicken and 
Kelly and Olds and Yeung, 2001). In China’s wireless sector, network justification and the 
behaviour of firms in the network emanates primarily from the development and commercialisation 
of innovative and creative technological solutions. This requires creative management of technical 
resource and activity links, connecting a firm’s technology to other firms in both the domestic and 
global network. As a result, cooperative and competitive market, equity, research, software, and 
training alliances and ventures are formed between network actors. For example, in order to gain 
network legitimacy in a Chinese context telecommunication giants like Motorola, Nokia and Lucent 
have engaged in resource and activity sharing programs with local Chinese equipment 
manufacturers. Active and constructive participation in programs like joint manufacturing, 
marketing, technical alliances, and contributions to social causes and regional developments have 
earned these companies network legitimacy and facilitated relational interdependence among 
significant local network constituents, including local customers, suppliers, equipment 
manufacturers, carriers, provincial and central government authority (Low, cited in Low, Johnston 
and Wang, 2007). 
Collaborative governance, as it is termed is a mechanism designed to bring public and private 
stakeholders together in collective forums with public agencies to engage in consensus–oriented 
decision making. Defined by cooperation and win–win incentive structures for stakeholders the 
overarching goal of collaborative governance is to expand participation, redefine power and 
resources imbalances and construct mutually beneficial leadership and institutional designs. Key 
factors that determine the success of the collaborative process itself include face–to–face dialogue, 
trust building, and the development of commitment and shared understanding. 
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Relational assets are the mechanisms with which an actor forms and governs relationships with 
other actors. Firms and individuals use their relational assets to gain access to other actors assets 
and to coordinate the use of their partners assets with the focal actors own resources. The basic idea 
here is that the ability to leverage resources that other actors control arises from the ability to 
engender trust in one’s own judgment and intentions. Relational assets provide ownership 
advantages through superiority in coordinating the use of functional assets (Mitchell, 2003).  
It is via this interaction with foreign firms that domestic Chinese manufactures have gained access 
to global markets, equity, and technology processes. Thus, it can be seen that in an industrial 
network system, network legitimacy occurs in a context of reciprocal interdependence of both a 
complementary and substitute nature. It involves both collaborative governance and alliance 
development that in a Chinese context is to a certain point state directed. By state directed I mean 
that the Chinese government plays a fundamental role in providing funding and long term 
anticipatory policy planning in a strategic attempt to respond to the emergence of technological 
ecosystem dependencies and a more collaborative global innovation system. Its fundamental goal 
here is to maximise the participation and positioning of its domestic firms in globalised high–
technology ecosystems.  
The key point to note here is that in the contemporary socio–technological system, technological 
ecosystems where critical ecosystem dependencies exist, actors are no longer focused on the ability 
to govern and control other actors assets in order to enhance and prolong the value of their own 
intellectual assets. Rather they are focused on forming alliances and co–development models that 
ensure the successful appropriation and creation of value by all ecosystem actors. The type and 
structure of alliances that occur in the emerging collaborative economy differ in a number of 
important ways from those that occur in a more closed economy or economic sector. In earlier 
closed economic models strategic alliances took the form of joint ventures, R&D partnerships, 
technological alliances, licensing, franchising, and cross manufacturing arrangements. Among 
these, the most popular form of a negotiated alliance is the joint venture where two firms provide 
equity shares towards a company with a specific goal (Dunning, 1997). In the collaborative 
economy technological and organisational alliances are designed to accelerate the innovation 
process itself, address the existence of critical ecosystem dependencies and develop the 
technological and learning capacities of its members. This involves the development of new 
technological ecosystems, alliance facilitation, IP sharing and the construction and coordination of 
new markets and forms of economic co–operation (Han and Shin and Chang and Oh, and 
Pinsonneault, 2012). 
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These new alliance forms can be termed innovation ecosystem building alliances. Such alliances 
differ from traditional, closed alliances in many aspects, including their strategic scope and scale, 
governing mechanisms, and member composition. It is important for the state to understand and 
assess the potential value inherent in these new modes of collaboration. Firstly, unlike traditional 
alliances, innovation ecosystem building alliances transform dynamically over time as new 
members join. Although studies abound regarding the market reaction to strategic alliances at the 
time of formation, little is known about the on–going value creation and wealth spillover that result 
from changes in member composition over time. Secondly, the main goals and value–drivers of 
innovation ecosystem building alliances is to increase overall market demand rather than market 
share. In other words, ecosystem building alliances seek to enlarge the “economic pie,” through 
value co–creation, rather than fighting with competitors over a “fixed pie”. Consequently, the rivals 
who do not participate in the alliance may also benefit from the innovation ecosystem building 
alliances (Han and Shin and Chang and Oh, and Pinsonneault, 2012, Lee. and Olsen and Trimi, 
2012, Piller, 2010, Mitleton-Kelly, 2011, Roser and DeFillippi and Samson, 2013). 
For example, the alliance goals in global innovation networks are often focused on the creation of 
new, revolutionary products (e.g., smart phone devices) or services (e.g., interactive digital TV 
services). These new products and services are enabled by technological innovations that are co–
developed by innovation ecosystem building alliances partners and can enhance the industry's total 
profitability, amplifying the business prospects of both participants and their rivals. For instance, 
this innovation–driven open collaboration model is frequently used by firms operating in the mobile 
phone industry, including handset manufacturers, software developers, and mobile operators. These 
collaborations facilitate value co–creation through the joint design and development of 
technologically innovative devices, services, and standards. The collaborative maneuvers currently 
being harnessed in high–tech industries possess the potential to reshape the competitive dynamics 
and alter the strategic positioning of the companies that operate within this vibrant and fast–paced 
environment. Moreover, the technological innovations cultivated through innovation ecosystem 
building alliances could enable the participating firms to develop and introduce an entirely new 
market, which would create substantial economic value and opportunities for all parties involved in 
such collaboration (Han and Shin and Chang and Oh, and Pinsonneault, 2012). 
Furthermore, in an open innovation model, a company commercialises both its own ideas as well as 
innovations from other sources, leveraging its traditional market pathways but also seeking new 
ways to bring these ideas to market via new, external company pathways. Under the open 
innovation model, there are many ways for ideas to flow into the process and many ways for it to 
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flow out into the market. Projects can be launched from either internal or external technology 
sources, and new technology can enter into the process at various stages. Note that the boundary 
between the company and its surrounding environment is now porous (like a colander), enabling 
innovations to move more easily between the two. In many industries the logic that supports an 
internally oriented, centralised approach to R&D has become obsolete. Useful knowledge has 
simply become too widespread and ideas must be shared and harvested (Chesbrough, 2013). 
From this theoretical perspective globalisation profoundly alters the institutional environment of 
business and states rendering the traditional two–tier firm–government bargaining model obsolete 
(Gardberg and Fombrun cited in Windsor, 2007). This raises the questions in relation to the role of 
the state and multinational enterprises MNEs as key units of analysis (Schepers, cited in Windsor, 
2007). This is because high–technology development is itself molded and shaped by multiple actors 
in multiple countries at multiple levels in multiple policy arenas (Brewer cited in Windsor, 2007). 
For example, the development of wireless communication standards involves national, regional and 
global bodies including the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 4G Americas, European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM) Association, Global TD–LTE Initiative (GTI), Net!Works, Open Mobile Alliance (OMA), 
Small Cell Forum, TD Industry Alliance  (TDIA),  TeleManagement Forum (TM Forum) UMTS 
Forum (UMTS), Wireless Industry Partnership (WIP) and the Wireless World Research Forum 
(WWFR). 
Conversely, it can be seen that new forms of state–led global alliance capitalism take the form of 
complex combinations of multiple actors and firms linked to one another through dense overlapping 
networks of economic and political connections. Any economic activity occurring in these networks 
can be said to be embedded simultaneously in multiple states, through both territorial and non–
territorial channels. Certainly, alliance capitalism as reciprocal interdependence, it can be 
conjectured, both signifies and demands a fundamental shift in the organisational behaviour of both 
multinational firms and governments. Theoretically, it poses an array of important questions in 
relation to the construction of the global economy and the institutional and relational aspects of 
state capacity. 
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Conclusion  
It is becoming increasingly clear that the nature and pace of contemporary technological change and 
the structural changes to the contemporary socio-technological system at both a domestic and global 
level requires governmental policy makers to engage in a process of continuous adaption and self –
organisation in order to respond to the dynamic fast paced and networked nature of the emergent 
socio-technological system. It is also clear that in evolving highly distributed innovation systems 
key roles exists for the coordination and linking of actors and knowledge assets. 
Furthermore, the fact that innovation ecologies and spatially unconstrained innovation systems 
transcend national boundaries and are hence influenced by the policy jurisdictions of multiple states 
and technological knowledge zones and spaces indicates that the governance of complex socio–
technical systems urgently requires the development of new sets of policy directives and capacities 
that address the globalised and spatially diverse nature of contemporary technological development 
processes. Specifically, the occurrence of networked innovation and collaborative alliances require 
strategic policy responses in the areas of resource and knowledge management and coordination, 
domestic and international level bargaining, alliance construction, and collaborative governance 
mechanisms. 
What is important to emphasise at this point is that in the global knowledge economy bargaining 
power, resource and cluster development, coordination mechanisms and the development of 
regulatory capacities are key policy attributes that serve to frame the construction of successful 
development plans. This is because the key role of the state in this environment is to incorporate 
new social groups, associates and organisations into bargaining processes and to find the right 
balance between various particularistic interests. This requires the development of collaborative 
architectural planning and coordination mechanisms. 
In the following chapter I will develop a framework for conceptualising the Chinese developmental 
state as a strategic actor committed to high–technology up–scaling. I will explore its ability to 
respond to contemporary socio–technological system change at both a domestic and global level as 
well as its ability to adapt and engage with the dynamic fast paced and networked nature of the 
emergent socio–technological system. This will involve an examination of exactly what policy tools 
and alliance capabilities the Chinese government is developing and its capacity to influence and 
shape the contemporary socio–technological environment in a way that is conductive to its high–
technology developmental goal. 
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In order to assess whether or not socio-technological systems change is shaping the policy directive 
of the Chinese government in the global wireless sector an empirical evaluation methodology needs 
to be established. As it has already been established in this chapter socio-technological systems 
change in the global wireless sector is increasingly defined by sets of critical ecosystem 
dependences and collaborative alliance structures for product development. Hence, Chinese firms 
and government participation in ‘collaborative alliances for product development’ is a key 
analytical variable that can be employed to measure the extent to which social technological 
systems change is shaping the behaviour of both Chinese domestic firms and governmental policy 
makers. Another important variable that can be used as an analytical benchmark is the use of ‘trans-
territorial governance’ and ‘market making mechanisms’. That is, are Chinese firms and 
governmental policy makers in the sector engaged in trans-territorial governance, new modes of 
value appropriation and market making behaviour? If it is found that the Chinese government is 
utilising these new developmental mechanisms it provides empirical evidence for the 
conceptualisation that socio-technological systems change is playing an important role in both 
Chinese domestic firm behaviour and the development and execution of Chinese policy making in 
the sector. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT, ALLIANCE 
CAPITALISM AND CHINESE STATE CAPACITY 
“Prosperity does not grow out of a country’s natural endowment, its labour pool, its interest rates, 
or its urgency value, as classical economists insist…a nation’s competitiveness depends on the 
capacity of its industry to innovate and upgrade…” 
(Porter, 1990:73) 
Innovation is a catchword that serves to mould and define the strategic policy objectives of the 
twenty–first century Chinese state. The central government's guiding policy documents for the 
promotion of innovation is the Medium to Long Term Plan (MLP) for the Development of Science 
and Technology (S&T) which was issued in January 2006 and the (2011–15) five year plan. These 
key S&T documents articulate the key goals and policy directives that the Chinese developmental 
state will employ in its attempt to become an “innovation–oriented” society by the year 2020 and a 
world leader in S&T by 2050 (Bute, 2013). In 2012 the State Council issued another important 
policy document designed to accelerate the innovation process: “The Development Plan of National 
Strategic Emerging Industries during the 12th Five-Year-Plan Period (2011-2015)” (Yi, 2012). The 
goal of this policy document is to specify strategies and plans of nurturing and developing strategic 
emerging industries during the 12
th
 Five Year Plan period (2011-2015). According to the State 
Council, strategic emerging industries are defined as sectors that are based on major technological 
breakthroughs, address major development challenges, have long-term impacts on economic and 
social development, are knowledge-intensive and have growth-potential (Yi, 2012). It is a state–led 
policy approach that establishes a central role for the government in the development and the 
steering of the innovation process. It is also defined by the way in which Chinese state owned 
enterprises are becoming active global investors and participants in international and technology 
markets with increasing global market share in key sectors.  
The ability of the Chinese government to upgrade the Chinese nation’s competitive position in the 
global economy by utilising a highly interventionist state–capitalist model of economic and 
technological development is a point of much theoretical contention. Specifically, the idea that the 
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state should play a leading role in steering and financing innovation policy has been the subject of 
feverent debate. In China 2030, a recent analysis of the Chinese economy, the World Bank asserted 
that the country requires: “a better innovation policy, [which] will begin with a redefinition of 
government’s role in the national innovation system…[and] a competitive market system” (World 
Bank, 2013). U.S. business executives go a step further and compare China’s new innovation 
development plan to: “the Borg in “Star Trek”—an enormous organic machine assimilating 
everything in its path, in this case the inventions of other nations....... China will build its 
dominance by: “enhancing original innovation through co–innovation and re–innovation based on 
the assimilation of imported technologies” (McGregor, 2010).  
The key objective of this chapter is to present a theoretical and empirical overview of state 
capitalism as developmental model for globalised innovative up–scaling. Exactly, how the Chinese 
state understands and responds to socio–technological innovation, its ability to develop indigenous 
knowledge assets, to insert itself and its domestic firms into emerging technological ecosystems and 
to facilitate global technological alliances in the emerging collaborative economy is of key interest 
to both the nation states that compromise the international economic sphere and the international 
institutions designed to regulate it. This is because, an analysis of the Chinese states capacity to 
influence and shape the global socio–technological environment it is immersed in provides critical 
information regarding the future development of China’s innovation system, its global reach, the 
effectiveness or rigidity of the institutions that define the international regulatory environment, the 
ways in which markets, and techno–economic systems are embedded and dependent upon political 
and social systems, a synopsis of the most pertinent problems faced by late developing nations and 
an agenda for future research.  
The Developmental State  
The relationship between the state and market under conditions of globalisation is one of the most 
controversial topics in political economy. Specifically, the question of whether or not the process of 
technological and economic globalisation impinges on the capacity of developing nations to design 
and implement development strategies is the focus of much theoretical discourse from theorists at 
each end of the ideological spectrum.  
In contemporary literature a latecomer nation state that possesses the ability to transform their 
economic policy prescriptions and policy tools to respond to global economic challenges and 
opportunities are termed developmental states. Developed as a response to the failure of both neo–
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classical economics and dependency theory in explaining the rapid economic growth experienced in 
East Asia the developmental state model has become a leading paradigm for understanding East 
Asian economic growth (Johnson, 1982).  
Essentially, the developmental state paradigm is comprised of a collection of theoretical assertions 
and empirical descriptions that relate economic growth to institutional structures and organisational 
forms (Boyd and Tak–Wing Ngo, 2006:1). In the literature the “developmental state” comprises 
two components: one ideological and one structural. It is this ideology–structure nexus that serves 
to distinguish the developmental state from other states (Ukwandu, 2009). In terms of ideology, a 
state is defined as “developmentalist” when it conceptualises its priorities and goals as that of 
ensuring economic development primarily interpreted as meaning high rates of accumulation, and 
industrialisation (Ukwandu, 2009) and in a contemporary context high–technology innovative 
development. That is such a state’s legitimacy rests upon its ability to promote high sustainable 
economic growth and structural change in the productive system in both the domestic and 
international economy (Castells, 1992:55). It is a state that intervenes intensively in the economy by 
either direct involvement in the economy through state–owned enterprises, or by using policy tools 
to prioritise strategic industries with cutting edge technology, by ‘picking  winners,’ or creating  
institutional settings designed to put the country in an advantageous position (Deyo 1987, Gereffi 
and Wyman 1990, Gilpin 2001, Wade 1990). 
Gechenkron’s (1962) theory of ‘late industrialisation’ is the earliest prototheory of the 
developmental state (Dent, 2004:80). In his seminal study on economic backwardness entitled: 
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Gerschenkron emphasised that the fundamental 
developmental role of the state is the mobilisation and coordination of resources necessary for 
closing the techno–industrial gap between ‘late industrialising’ and the advanced industrial nation 
states (Dent, 2004:80). Operating from documentary evidence drawn from the experiences of 
nineteenth century continental Europe and the early twentieth century Soviet Union, Gerschenkron 
illustrated the importance of the state’s industrial and mercantile policies in gradually strengthening 
a weak business sector in the pursuit of techno–industrial catch up (Dent, 2004:80).  
Gerschenkrons theory was further developed by Chalemers Johnson in his study of the Japanese 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI). Basing his observations in the model economic planning 
bureaucracy in Japan, the Ministry of International trade MITI, devised a Weberian ideal type of 
an interventionist state that was neither socialist nor a free market. He termed this state variant as a 
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plan–rational capitalist developmental state; a state that conjoins private ownership with state 
guidance (Johnson, 1962). 
If the view of development as a process of sequentially mastering comparative advantage in 
technologically more sophisticated industries is correct, developmental states must also assume an 
active role in industrial policy and in stimulating the acquisition of dynamic comparative advantage. 
From this frame of reference, markets alone are insufficient to climb the ladder of comparative 
advantage, since the successful generation of new comparative advantage requires co–ordinated and 
anticipatory changes in investments, institution–creation and reform and trade and ta–cum–
subsidies policies. Only governments, it is argued, are capable of correcting coordination failures in 
a complex and ever changing economic and technological system. In developed counties, where 
financial institutions and entrepreneurs are ready to engage in risky activities, markets alone may be 
adequate for the task…but not in developing countries where financial institutions and 
entrepreneurship are inadequate and institutional change can only be promoted by government 
(Andersson and Gunnarsson, 2003). However, as the 2008 US financial crisis highlighted, the state 
also has a role to play in overseeing the use of financial instruments that are risky in order to 
prevent financial loss and meltdowns caused by excessive speculation.  
The Chinese Developmental State  
The Chinese state possess three key institutional features identified by developmental state theorists 
as central characteristics of a developmental state: transformative goals, a relatively insulated 
bureaucracy and institutionalised government–business relationships (Deans, 2004:134). However, 
whilst a large academic literature devoted to examining the locus, implications and international 
ramifications of China’s economic transformation exists, it is largely devoid of analysis framed by 
the wider research agenda pertaining to the developmental state (Deans, 2004:134). This is 
primarily because the Chinese developmental state differs in a number of fundamental ways from 
other developmental states. 
In order to address the institutional and theoretical anomalies posed by the Chinese state, Ming Xia 
in his book, The Dual Developmental State (2000), constructs a modified developmental state 
paradigm that asserts that the Chinese developmental state is dual in nature in and that it is 
sustained by both the legislative and the political institutions of the Chinese state (Xia, 2000:26). 
One of the most distinctive aspects of the Chinese reform process is its adoption of a dual track 
system. The dual track system refers to the coexistence of a traditional plan and market channel for 
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the allocation of a given good (Naughton, 2005:8). Instead of quickly dismantling the planned 
economy the reformers decided to facilitate the functioning of the planned economy in order to 
secure stability, protect the status of key government initiatives in sectors such as energy and 
infrastructure. A two–tier price structure was implemented. For example, a single commodity will 
have both a typically low state set price and a higher market set price (Naughton, 1995:8). 
However, a fundamental feature of the Chinese economic transition is its commitment to the 
transformation of its economy from a command to a market controlled one with the plan being 
replaced as the economy gradually grew out of it (Naughton, 1995:9). 
From this theoretical perspective, there exists in China a unique dual structure that radiates from the 
central to the local levels, between the governments of the People’s Congress (PCs) (Xia, 2000:27). 
This system of the PC’s legitimates the ruling communist party, integrates the nation and ratifies the 
large number of laws required for market creation and the supervision of the judicial branch (Xia, 
2000:27). Moreover, the dual development state is comprised of a two–tiered structure in which the 
developmental role of the central state is nestled within the context of a central/local state 
synergism (Xia, 2000:27). This allows reform minded local leaders to experiment with new ideas 
and policies. However, a mandate for reform is required from the centre which means an 
interrelated relationship between the centre and local state has been formed. As a direct result, the 
reform process in China is guided by interaction between central and local governments and a 
power sharing mechanism that facilitates the mobilisation of the population and their commitment 
to the development agenda (Xia, 2000:27).  
Methodologically, Xia utilises the theoretical and empirical concepts of comparative transactional 
cost analysis. Transactional costs analysis is a useful theoretical mechanism that can expose the 
transaction costs associated with the exchange of ownership rights to economic assets and the 
enforcement of exclusive rights. Its fundamental premise is that transaction costs include the cost of 
arranging a contract ex ante and monitoring and enforcing it ex post (Xia, 2000:27). That is it is, 
“the costs of running the economic system” (Xia, 2000:27). Comparative transaction costs analysis 
is usually applied at the level of the firm. From this frame of reference, the government is 
conceptualised as a super firm that is involved in a process of economic and political cost benefit 
analysis in order to ascertain the specific set of costs associated with the implementation of a 
developmental agenda (Xia, 2000:27).  
Furthermore, Xia extends upon the classical developmental state paradigm and incorporates Oliver 
Williamson’s (1975, 1996) concept of ‘the mode of governance’ into his theoretical model. As a 
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theoretical concept, the mode of governance refers to economic and social transitions that are 
organised into three types of institutional matrixes, or modes of government (Xia, 2000:4). These 
are market, hierarchy and hybrid (Xia, 2000:4). In the literature, most theorists agree that the 
Chinese developmental state model is neither market nor hierarchy but hybrid (Xia, 2000:4). That 
is, since the inception of the reform process in 1978 the Chinese state has not transformed its 
political and economic structure to one that can no longer be defined as socialist nor can it be 
classified as capitalist. Phillip Deans calls this hybrid economic model a post–socialist 
developmental state (Deans, 2004:134).  
Firstly, China as a post–socialist developmental state is engaged in a complex process of transition 
from a command to a market economy (Deans, 2004:134). Secondly, China has a large population 
base and vast geographical size (Deans, 2004:134). This means that coordinating an integrated and 
comprehensive economic development program from an authoritarian centre is complex and hard to 
monitor effectively. Thirdly, in China Deng Xiaoping initiated the reform process with legislative 
decentralisation (Deans, 2004:134). Conversely, the reform process has resulted in a significant 
redistribution of economic decision–making power, primarily from central to local level authorities. 
The central authorities have granted local governments across China varying degrees of financial 
autonomy. In addition, some have exploited growing international contacts to find further sources 
of extra–budgetary investment finance, or pressured theoretically (quasi) independent banks and 
enterprises to support local development plans. As a result, China's developmental trajectory owes 
at least as much to the dysfunctional agglomeration of numerous local initiatives, as it does to the 
plans and strategies of the national level decision–making elites. This has resulted in a political 
control structure they has been termed fragmented authoritarianism. Fragmented authoritarianism 
contrasts sharply with the centralised bureaucratic authoritarianism that characterises and defines a 
large proportion of developmental states (Moore, 2002). 
The developmental states theoretical focus on the organisational structure of the state and its 
conceptualisation of the state – not as a single monolithic actor – but instead as a strategically 
important facilitator that coordinates political and economic strategies and provides resources and 
incentives designed to encourage industrial transformation is compatible with an important body of 
theoretical scholarship on post–Mao China the “fragmented authoritarianism” literature – in which 
the state is no longer conceptualised as the monolithic authoritarian actor it was in both the 
totalitarian models or Mao–or Deng– in– command literature (Moore, 2002:279). What is important 
to emphasis here is that this fragmented political and economic institutional infrastructure raise 
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important questions regarding the nature of the policy responses available to the Chinese state in 
responding to adjustment challenges. 
The fragmented political and economic authority that defines the Chinese policy making system is 
commonly characterised as a bargaining system (Moore, 2002:282). It is precisely these deep 
structural divisions within the bureaucratic system that conspire to mold and define the range of 
policy options available as different policy networks advance and negotiate a range of policy 
choices. However, it has been argued, that the fragmented nature of Chinese economic and political 
authority across the industrial landscape combined with a weakening of the formal planning system 
has resulted in a reduction of the ability of the state to respond effectively and authoritatively to 
administrative and economic development issues. That is the Chinese state lacks the embedded 
autonomy which has been cited as a key variable by the developmental state literature required for 
successful development by a latecomer nation (Evans, 1995:32). “Embeddedness” means that 
economic actions are embedded in a network of concrete social relations (Granovetter, 1985). 
Whilst the original conceptualisation was employed as a medium to examine local and social 
interpersonal relations recent studies have extended upon the concept and applied it to analysis of 
government institutions and polices and the operations of the nation state itself (Sit and Liu, 
2000:654). 
Moreover, whilst current conceptual literature on the developmental state stresses the importance of 
planned industrial policy, the Chinese reform process, until 2006, is notable for its lack of a long–
term plan and is commitment to experimental incremental change. That is the reform process is 
defined by its lack of a blueprint and its emphasis on prior experimentation and learning. Thus, the 
fundamental results and overarching shape of the reform process are time and context dependent. 
The Chinese have termed this process “grouping for stones to cross the river” (Naughton, 1995:5). 
Yet the fact that China did not possess a predefined economic plan and sequence of reform 
initiatives, it can be argued, has provided it with an adaptive edge that has allowed it to 
continuously monitor economic results and quickly adjust its policy prescriptions in an increasingly 
unpredictable global networked economic environment.  
It is important to note here that the co–production of innovation ecologies and the technological 
governance processes that transcend traditional territorial boundaries have important implications 
for the way the Chinese developmental state operates and the types of capacities that it needs to 
develop. The spatial extension of state capacity from one that is focused on national economic and 
technological development goals to one that is focused on the development of globalised 
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technological ecosystems and the fact that investment and growth in the contemporary knowledge 
economy is increasing driven by intangible assets means that the contemporary developmental state, 
committed to technological development and up–scaling is presented with a whole new set of 
developmental variables and objectives. Hence, traditional models of the developmental state need 
to be modified and extended upon in order to incorporate the key developmental objectives of states 
in an era of intangible assets and high–technology trans–territorial development. 
From this theoretical perspective, the impact of globalisation on the capacity of the developmental 
state is defined not by the diminution of state capacity per se but in the creation of new forms of 
policy capacity (Jayasuriya, 2004). Specifically, it is argued, traditional forms of state capacity are 
defined by the transformative model. This model is understood in terms of a particular set of 
attributes or: “key endowments that a state or public agency may possess to give it a set of 
transformative powers over policy and structure” (Jayasuriya, 2004:488). These traditional forms of 
state capacity include infrastructural capacity, transformative capacity and distributive capacity. 
Whilst these types of state capacity are all important policy tools employed by the developmental 
state to achieve their developmental goals, the fact that contemporary technological governance is 
located in multiple sites, and involves a number of non–state actors, argues Jayasuriya (2004), 
means that it is necessary to reconceptualise state capacity as a form of socio–economic 
engagement rather than as a series of organisational attributes.  
Two important new forms of state capacity, it has been argued, are relational capacity and 
regulatory capacity. Relational capacity is important for states that wish to play a key role in their 
nation’s developmental process. These states need to be able to engage with multiple actors in 
multiple sectors and require relational legitimacy for ecosystem building and shaping purposes. 
From this theoretical perspective, economic, political and technological development requires the 
recruiting of actors and resources within a specific sectoral ecosystem or particular field of 
governance: 
...much of the so–called post–Washington consensus articulated by proponents such as the 
former World Bank chief economist Stiglitz (2002) is based on the idea that economic reforms 
need to be made institutionally sustainable. For these theorists, the concept of relational capacity 
captures the essence of capacity building as part and parcel of a wider process of legitimacy 
building that stands in contrast to the technocratic top–down models of governance privileged 
by attribute models of capacity (Jayasuriya, 2004).  
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Regulatory state capacity is necessary for governments that seek to constitute new arenas of 
governance and regulatory reach at multiple levels and in multiple sectoral environments 
(Jayasuriya, 2004). The ability to change the global regulatory environment and construct new 
forms of regulatory management bestows on such states technological ecosystem power in key 
technological sectors. Regulatory state capacity can be seen manifest in new forms of assertive 
legalism and constitutionalism in economic and political decision making. For example, central 
bank independence represents an important example of how new arenas of governance are being 
created by states through an increasing process of legalisation or proceduralisation (Jayasuriya, 
2004).  
Conversely, it can be argued that new forms of state capacity are emerging and these new forms of 
state capacity are contributing to the emergence of a new form of the state. It is a state made of 
shared institutions, and enacted by bargaining and interactive iteration all along the chain of 
decision making: national governments, co–national governments, supra–national bodies, 
international institutions, and governments of nationalities, regional governments, local 
governments, and NGOs (Jayasuriya, 2004). Decision–making and representation take place all 
along the chain, not necessarily in the hierarchical, pre–scripted order. This new state functions as a 
network, in which all nodes interact, and are equally necessary for the performance of the state’s 
functions. This new form of the developmental state has been termed the Global Network State 
(GNS). 
The GNS asserts, Sean O’Rian, is defined by its capability to form networks for the production of 
technological innovation, by its ability to attract foreign investment, and stimulate domestic growth. 
It achieves these key goals by providing information about transnational corporations and world 
markets to domestic firms, and develops institutional frameworks and funding decisions designed to 
provide the necessary conditions for stimulating connections between domestic and international 
companies. That is the developmental network state overarching goal is to facilitate collaboration 
and encourage innovation at a both a domestic and global level (O’Rian, 2000). 
In transforming itself to operate within a locally and globally networked economy and polity, 
asserts O’Rian, state governance itself is ‘re–scaled’ as the prior privileged role of the national level 
gives way to a ‘glocal’ form of state (O’Rian, 2000:165). Furthermore, coherent state bureaucracies 
may not be the only organisational structures, which may promote embedded autonomy. From this 
theoretical perspective, embedded autonomy is not guaranteed by a coherent bureaucracy per se but 
by the flexibility of the state structure itself. This is because the decentralisation of state agencies 
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enables them to become deeply embedded in their local economies and their specific economic 
sectors, despite the fact that they are often dealing with a wide range of individuals and 
organisations across widely dispersed networks (O’Rian, 2000:165).  
Moreover, the role of the state in achieving its development goals is not to assume the task of 
development itself but instead to shape the capabilities of the business sector, society itself and its 
associative markets to do it (O’Rian, 2000:166). This requires the building of local and global 
network capabilities and innovation systems. It is important that these systems and network 
structures are designed to be adaptive enough to operate at the forefront of the future regulatory, 
market and technological environment. In this way these emergent network structures and global 
alliances can acquire lucrative first mover advantages (O’Rian, 2000:165). 
However, as it has previously been established, in this new more collaborative environment 
achieving first mover status is not the only way to move up the technology ladder and acquire 
market share. Instead, ecosystem shaping, co–development and system emebedeness are new 
strategic models of behaviour that can be utilised by the developmental state to facilitate both the 
successful adoption of its national firm’s products in the contemporary global market system as 
well as help to facilitate the co–creation and development of new technological products that are 
both domestic and foreign in ownership.  
The contemporary Chinese developmental state exhibits numerous features of a GNS. Certainly, it 
is highly responsive to transnational technological innovation and has developed a range of policies 
designed to stimulate innovation driven growth at both a domestic and a global level. Specifically, 
the Chinese state as a strategic actor has played a key role in facilitating both the development of 
indigenous technology was well as global alliances between its domestic and foreign firms. 
Furthermore, whilst the Chinese state is a highly effective bureaucratic actor with the power to 
exercise top–down policy making decisions it is also deeply embedded in a ‘network polity’, that is 
comprised of an array of socio–political alliances that are local, national and global in nature.  
The type of state capacities being utilised by specific nation states is an important analytical 
variable that can tell us alot about their developmental path and capacity for high–technology up–
scaling in the contemporary collaborative economy. Hence, in the following sections of this chapter 
I will examine the policy tools and state capacity of the Chinese government as it attempts to 
become a global ecosystem shaper and regulatory actor in order to facilitate the technological 
development of the Chinese nation state.   
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Chinese State Capacity and High–technology Innovation  
State capacity is itself a core concept in the political economy of development. It provides us with a 
powerful tool from which to isolate and study the process of technological and economic 
development. Primarily, it refers to the ability of the state to formulate and implement policy. Any 
analysis of Chinese state capacity must be framed by an understanding of the specific form of state–
capitalism that it practices. Essentially, state–capitalism in China is defined both by the way in 
which Chines state leaders exert control over the development process and the way in which state–
owned hybrid companies are responsible to both the state and the market. This form of state 
developmentalism has been termed state capitalism 2.0 (Musacchio, 2012). 
It is important to note here that this model of state–capitalism bears little resemblance to the 
planned socialist economies of the past. It is a form of state capitalism that is becoming increasing 
used by developing nations to address the way in which contemporary high technology assets are 
produced in global innovation networks, the emergence of intangible intellectual assets and the 
increasing existence of critical ecosystem interdependencies in high–technology sectors.  
Moreover, state capitalism 2.0 can be conceptualised as a modified model of earlier developmental 
state forms that has sought to adjust to contemporary socio–technological systems change and 
develop a range of new state interventionist policy tools that are designed to address the increasing 
need for the state to play a role in funding long–term risk capital to help facilitate the development 
of technologies with long time–frames in emerging fields such as nanotechnology, green 
technology and biotechnology. It is also designed to provide a mechanism for the state to play a 
trans–territorial role in the coordination and shaping of technological ecosystems at a global level.  
This new hybrid form of state capitalism, it is argued, is not defined by any single political or 
economic model per see, but by the way in which the state uses its power strategically to facilitate 
economic development. In this new model of state capitalism hybrid companies are responsible to 
both the state and the market and profitability and technological development are its key goal. This 
hybrid form of capitalism—state support disciplined by the market—gives state capitalism three 
huge advantages, according to Musacchio: “It produces global champions that have quickly risen up 
the ranks of the world's top companies. It gives companies the freedom to invest for the long–term 
rather than obsessing about short–term profits” (Musacchio, 2012). Indeed, it has been argued that 
increased external infrastructural spending that is financed via pools of state capital held by 
Sovereign Wealth Funds and direct investment by state-owned enterprises and private firms are in 
the process of facilitating significant global structural changes (O’Brien, 2014). 
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Certainly, a highly distinctive characteristic of state capitalism in China is the central role of 
approximately 100 large, state–owned enterprises SOEs which are controlled by organs of the 
Chinese national government in critical industries such as steel, telecom, and transportation. China 
now has the world’s third largest concentration of Global Fortune 500 companies (sixty–one), and 
the number of Chinese companies on the list has increased at an annual rate of 25% since 2005. It is 
these companies that are China’s national champions. Moreover, more than two–thirds of the 
Chinese companies listed on the Global Fortune 500 are state–owned enterprises. Excluding banks 
and insurance companies, controlling stakes in China’s largest and most important of firms is 
owned by a central holding company on behalf of the Chinese people, the State–Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which has been described as, “the world’s 
largest controlling shareholder” (Lin and Milhaupt, 2011). 
Musacchio proceeds to divide state capitalism 2.0 into two main types. Leviathan as a majority 
investor and Leviathan as a minority investor. He writes: “Closer to the more familiar view of state 
capitalism as a process involving outright state management, the state can act as a majority 
shareholder and manager of SOEs—a mode we refer to as Leviathan as a majority investor... In the 
Leviathan as a majority investor model, the government usually exercises control of SOEs 
indirectly, by appointing managers and boards of directors. In some SOEs, however, ministers act 
directly as presidents. Moreover, SOEs can be fully owned by the government or they can be 
publicly traded, as long as the government is the majority shareholder. Governments also exercise 
their control as a majority investor using large companies as conglomerates controlling a series of 
firms or through what is known as state–owned holding companies (SOHCs)” (Musacchio, 2012). 
The state can also influence the economy in an indirect way, asserts Musacchino, by acting as a 
minority shareholder and lender to private firms. Musacchino, terms this mode of state capitalism 
Leviathan as a minority investor. This model of state capitalism is a hybrid form, which mixes 
features of full state control and the private operation of enterprises. The key channels used by 
Leviathan as a minority investor are, it is asserted are: “holding shares in partially privatised firms 
(PPFs); minority stakes under state–owned holding companies; loans and equity by state–owned 
and development banks; sovereign wealth funds (SWFs); and other state–controlled funds (e.g. 
pension funds, life insurance)” (Musacchio, 2012). 
It has been argued that state capitalism as an economic model is beginning to either replace or 
subsist with the free market. In response to the increasing use of state capitalist economic models by 
developing nations and in order to facilitate debate regarding their potential impact on the global 
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economy in January 2012, The Economists, published a provocative article entitled Emerging–
market multinationals: The Rise of State Capitalism, in which it, The Economist stated that: “the era 
of free–market triumphalism has come to a juddering halt.”... Liberal capitalism in the U.K. and the 
U.S. isn’t just convulsed with internal crises caused by unregulated financiers. It now faced, “a 
potent alternative”: state capitalism, which has on its side one of the world’s biggest economies ––
China –– and some of its most powerful companies ––Russia’s Gazprom OAO China Mobile ltd. 
(CHL), DP World Ltd., and Emirates Airline” (The Economist, 2012).  
Indeed, asserts Mariana Mazzucato, in The Entrepreneurial State (2011), a strong case can be made 
that the role of the government, in the most successful economies, has gone way beyond creating 
the right infrastructure and setting the rules. Instead, it has been a leading agent in achieving the 
type of innovative breakthroughs that allow companies, and economies, to grow, not just by 
creating the ‘conditions’ that enable innovation. Instead, the state can proactively create strategic 
polices around a new high growth area before the potential is even comprehend by the business 
community (from the internet to nanotechnology), funding the most uncertain phase of the research 
that the private sector is too risk–averse to engage with, seeking and commissioning further 
developments, and often even overseeing the commercialisation process. In this sense it has played 
an important entrepreneurial role. As Mazzucato asserts: “The only way to make growth ‘fairer’ is 
for policy makers to have a broader understanding of the role played by the state in the fundamental 
risk–taking needed for innovation” (Mazzucato, 2011).  
Furthermore, it is interesting to note, that professional venture capitalists in the United States have 
concentrated their activities and earned their returns in a very small number of industrial domains. 
For instance, in the three decades since 1980, Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
has accounted for 50–75% of all dollars invested by members of the National Venture Capital 
Association (NVCA), with its average share usually hovering around 60%. The ICT and biomedical 
sectors together have consistently accounted for 80% of all dollars invested by venture capitalists. 
What is important to emphasis here is that it is only in these key sectors that the state invested at 
sufficient scale in the translation from scientific discovery to technological innovation (Janeway, 
2012). That is the only reason that venture capitalists saw such high returns in these sectors is 
because the early research and development process had already been funded by the state.  
The central problem here is that venture capital and private equity funds, which are the primary 
funding mechanisms that private firms in the contemporary knowledge economy utilise to obtain 
funds to conduct R&D and fund the commercialisation processes are defined by a short–termism 
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that is highly antithetical to deep innovation. As Richard Jannaway articulates: “They're the 
invisible hand of capitalism itself: reaching out for quick gains while avoiding as much downside 
risk as possible. Private markets are loath to put up the billions of dollars and patiently wait a 
decade or more, yet that's precisely what's needed to develop breakthrough drugs, disruptive clean 
energy technologies or that new, new thing you and I can't yet imagine” (Jannaway, 2012). 
Furthermore, Jannaway and Mckenzie, analysed venture capital funds from the 1980s until the 
post–bubble era. Their research found a strong correlation between the level of venture capital 
investment and the occurrence of initial public offerings (IPO). For example, the median rate of 
return for the sample under favorable IPOs conditions was 76%. In stark contrast the medium rate 
of return for the sample under unfavorable IPOs conditions was only 9%. This data supports the 
hypothesis that venture capital funds are primarily focused on short term returns (Jannaway, 2012). 
Thus, it can be argued that governmentally funded R&D programs and commercialisation support is 
especially important in a contemporary context due to the occurrence of long time horizons in some 
high–technology sectors for basic research and the significant decline in venture capital that has 
occurred following the 2008–11 financial crisis. For example, in China – China's venture capital 
(VC) and private equity (PE) firms have seen a sharp drop in activity recently, following a period of 
rapid expansion.  As a direct result an industry reshuffle is now expected to occur, with many firms 
expected to shut down or seek opportunities in other sectors. Empirical data indicates that in the 
first three quarters of 2012, domestic PE firms raised a total of $7.9 billion for investment, which is 
a significant drop from the $35.7 billion raised in the same period of the previous year (Global 
Times by consultancy firm Zero2ipo) (Qian, 2012). Hence, a number of small–sized PE and VC 
firms, which were set up only two to three years ago, have already closed or turned to other 
business areas, asserts Li Weidong, a research director at the financial consultancy firm China 
Venture (Li cited in Qian, 2012).  
Furthermore, it has been conjectured that the combination of authoritarian hierarchy and 
collaboration within the high–powered incentive structures that define the Chinese states 
bureaucratic infrastructure is reminiscent of another capitalist mechanism of transitions – private 
equity investments. From this theoretical perspective the Chinese pattern of decentralised 
experimentation and innovation bears close resemblance to key features of the venture capital 
model as practiced in the United States (Lin and Milhaupt, 2011). For example, a key policy 
programs recently initiated by the Chinese state is designed to approximately 9 billion yuan (1.32 
billion) of government funds into new venture capital funds designed to support the growth of the 
Chinese high–technology sector. The state government has stated it will not take any more than a 
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20% stake in each fund and will not exercise any control over the funds or firms so they can 
develop along market lines. The venture capital funds will be required to invest in early–stage 
companies and those with the potential for fast growth. The stated goal asserts the National 
Development Reform Commission (NDR), is: “The purpose is to promote the country's structural 
economic adjustment ... and meet the broader goal of encouraging the development of high–tech 
industries" (NDR cited in Lin and Milhaupt, 2011).  
Certainly, it can be conjectured that innovation policy and R&D funding is exactly where state 
capitalism can pay fundamental role. However, the type of state intervention that state capitalists 
are conducting in the contemporary globalised socio–technological environment differs in a number 
of fundamental ways from previous rounds of technological development. For example, the state–
led development strategy being employed by the Chinese government is highly adaptive and 
involves both system structuring and system shaping properties. That whilst the Chinese state 
intends to play a key strategic role in supporting the high–technology development and innovation 
of its domestic firms in sectors where the risk of investment is high – it also intends to do this in a 
way that responds to the need for collaborative behaviour and system integration at a global level. 
National Innovation and Science and Technology Policy Objectives 
and Reforms 
The Chinese leadership conceptualises innovation as an essential tool to promote its economic 
growth, maintain political stability, support advanced military capabilities, and retain its global 
trade and geopolitical power. Ma Kai, minister of China’s National Development and Reform 
Commission in 2006, argued: “China’s economic growth largely relies on material inputs and its 
competitive edge is to a great extent based on cheap labor, cheap water and land resources, and 
expensive environmental pollution,” he said: “Such a competitive edge will be weakened ...with the 
rising price of raw materials and the enhancement of environmental protection. Therefore, we 
should enhance [our] independent innovation capability and increase the contribution of science and 
technology advancement to [our] economic growth”. In short, for China, innovation is a policy of 
nearly unrivalled importance (Woolf and Ballantine, 2006).  
China’s current innovation development program is defined by its depth, scope, the way in which it 
involves long–term planning beyond the single ministry technology development programs of the 
past and the way in which its execution is broadly dispersed between half– a dozen ministries at the 
level of the central government (Wolff and Ballantine, 2006). The “Medium–to Long–Term Plan 
for the Development of Science and Technology” (State Council 2006a), is the third of its kind 
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since 1949. This plan sets out the key objectives and priorities for the country’s development in 
S&T, as well as the main instruments that the Chinese government intends to use to achieve them. 
The overarching goal is that China becomes an “innovation–oriented” society by the year 2020 
and—in the longer term—a leading “innovation economy” in the world by 2050 (Cao, and 
Suttmeier, and Simon, 2006). More concretely, the objectives to be reached by 2020 are: China’s 
R&D intensity will be increased to 2.5% of GDP (2.0% by 2010), innovation will contribute to 60% 
of economic growth, and China’s reliance on foreign technology will be reduced to below 30%, and 
overall, China will be among the top five countries worldwide in terms of key innovation output 
indicators (Fensterheim, and Huang, and Murray, 2009).  
In contrast to previous S&T plans, the latest plan specifically emphasises the need to develop 
capabilities for “indigenous” or “home–grown innovation”, with a view to create the conditions for 
achieving a leading position in a number of S&T–based industries. These include the following: 
central government–initiated (applied at all levels of government) activities to promote indigenous 
R&D; government funding of large–scale R&D programs and projects; preferential tax and 
financing policies to encourage domestic R&D; preferential government procurement policies to 
support domestic R&D; the development of high–value domestic intellectual property; and the 
designation of special economic zones that support domestic R&D activities with preferential 
access to infrastructure, financing, and other services. The plan also seeks to develop domestic 
technical standards to decrease dependence on foreign technologies and increase the prominence of 
standards that rely on domestically controlled intellectual property. Incentives offered by local 
governments, such as tax exemptions and favourable terms for land use and utilities, reportedly are 
important factors that influence where R&D or production plants are located in China (United 
States Trade Commission, 2007). During the ‘17th National People’s Congress’ (NPC) which took 
place in October 2007, China’s President Hu Jintao pointed out that the core of China’s national 
development strategy is: “To enhance China’s capacity for independent innovation and make China 
an innovative country...The Ministry of Science and Technology of China emphasises innovation as 
“the soul of a nation” (Fensterheim, and Huang, and Murray, 2009). 
In addition, the S&T policy directives seem to reflect official enthusiasm to expand and develop 
future cooperation between foreign R&D firms and Chinese partners and to improve prospects for 
further technology spillovers, with its emphasises on international cooperation and collaboration. It 
states that international S&T cooperation is an important aspect of China’s policy of openness to the 
outside world. China is ready to enter into cooperation with any country depending upon the needs 
of Chinese S&T and economic development, according to the principles equality and mutual 
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benefit, mutual enjoyment of benefits, protection of intellectual property rights, and respect for 
standard international practice. Cooperation can be bilateral, multilateral, with private parties or 
with governments in foreign countries at any level or through any channel (Irwin Crookes, 2008). 
Hence, it can be seen that the plan contains two key strands. Firstly, there exists a drive to promote 
indigenous enterprise level development to foster domestic intellectual property that can be licensed 
internationally and can reduce the country’s reliance on overseas technology inputs (State Council, 
2006) Nevertheless, the fact that the plan also emphasises the need for international cooperation and 
collaboration indicates that the Chinese government is currently engaged in the development of a 
delicate policy programme that endeavours to combine the need for domestic technological and 
competitive upgrading with the need for international collaboration. 
Key Policy Directives and Innovation Indicators  
An examination of key innovation indicators such as patent data, R&D expenditure, number of 
published scientific papers and number of engineers and scientists suggest that so far the Chinese 
government’s state–led innovation programme is beginning to show results. Indeed, China’s 
innovation development policy has begun to show return in a number of key areas.  
The capacity of the Chinese state to implement its innovation development agenda has been 
enhanced in the last decade by its accumulation of $3.2 trillion worth of foreign exchange reserves. 
Indeed, China now enjoys the world’s largest current account balance. In 2011, it ran a $276.5 
billion trade surplus with the United States (Atkinson, 2012). In 2007 the Chinese government setup 
the Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC), a sovereign wealth fund to invest and manage part of 
China’s foreign trade surplus. As of August 2013 the fund had 572.2 billion in assets under 
management (Atkinson, 2012). The fund was set–up to address the need to seek greater returns, 
increase diversifications and hold less US currency reserves. Since its inception the CIC has made 
substantial investments in various asset classes, including direct investments and institutional real 
estate (Atkinson, 2012) 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasis here that the Chinese development state is unique in that it 
possesses unprecedented power in its bargaining with foreign firms. In a survey conducted in 2004, 
the Delegate Office of German Economy interviewed 243 companies regarding their reasons for 
investing in China. Among the companies consulted 94% cited future market access as a key reason 
for their investment in China. An additional 42% and 46% respectively cited low production costs 
and the necessity of following major customers as their reason for investing in China (Atkinson, 
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2012). Furthermore, with the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese economy has now become a crucial 
engine and driver of economic growth. For example, in a survey conducted by, The Economist 
Intelligent Unit (2011) almost half (49%) of all survey respondents indicated that the impact of the 
global financial crisis has raised their companies expectations for China. For larger companies with 
global revenues of more than US$5bn the figure is 73% (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011).  
A cornerstone of the Chinese developmental states innovation development programme is its 
commitment to increase its level of R&D expenditure. In 2011 China’s R&D expenditure 
represented 1.97 % of the GDP. In 2012, China further increased R&D expenditure by 17.9% a year 
to 1.02 trillion yuan (US$162.24 billion) or 1.98% of GDP. By 2020 the Chinese government 
intends to increase this expenditure to 2.5% of GDP (Atkinson, 2012). Companies and enterprises 
invested the most on R&D, with 657.93 billion yuan recorded in 2011, up 26.9% year–on–year. 
government–affiliated research institutes and universities spent 130.67 billion yuan and 68.89 
billion yuan, up 10.1 % and 15.3 % from a year earlier, respectively (Atkinson, 2012).  
It is interesting to note here that China has overtaken the European Union in R&D expenditure as 
percentage of GDP. The 28 member states of the European Union invested only 1.97 per cent of 
their joint economic output in R&D in 2012, a mere one per cent increase from a year earlier 
(Boehler, 2014). Japan reordered the highest level of R&D expenditure in 2012 at 3.4% followed by 
the US and Germany who both spent 2.8% respectively (OCED, 2012).  
In 2012, the number of patents increased (albeit from a low level) by about 40%; China’s share of 
total patents registered with the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), however, 
remains small. The majority of the patents, however, are ‘design’ or ‘utility model’ patents. 
Nevertheless, in 2011 China became the world leader in the number of invention patent 
applications, with 217000 file applications filed, outperforming the United States, Europe and Japan 
(Zhen and Suny and Wrighty, 2012). In 2012, China secured its lead with the most patents granted. 
Moreover, for the first time ever China’s State intellectual Property Office (SIPO) granted over a 
million patents. This increase in patenting activity is a result of the Chinese central government’s 
policy prescriptions that offer generous incentives for patent filing. For example, Chinese 
companies who file above a certain number of patents receive significant tax breaks. Tenure is more 
likely for university professors who are able to obtain patents. Patent application fees for qualifying 
individuals and companies are entirely subsidised by local government (Zhen and Suny and 
Wrighty, 2012). 
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The Chinese government have recently further extended their original IP patent policy 
prescriptions, “Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy”, released in 2008 and “Action 
Plan for Implementing National IP Strategy” (2009). The Chinese, "National Patent Development 
Strategy (2011 – 2020)" “has been described as the first–of–its–kind intellectual property mission 
from any government” (Murthy, 2011). The plan asserts that by 2020, China will attempt to 
quadruple both patent applications in foreign countries and domestic patent applications for every 
one million people. The annual patents transaction financial target is to reach 100 billion yuan 
(US$15 billion) by 2015. To boost domestic patents, China is offering incentives such as cash 
rewards, houses and tax breaks to scientists and innovators. Moreover, the patent policy directives 
promise infrastructure for quicker filing, examining and granting of patents, funding patent holders, 
and integrating new patents into the economy. Its patent proliferation plan includes establishing, by 
2015, a national patent data center, five regional and 47 local patent information centers (Murthy, 
2011).  
Another key innovation policy directive of the Chinese state is the goal of entering the top five 
countries for paper citation by 2015. The report, The Statistical Data of Chinese S&T Papers, 
showed Chinese researchers published 1.14 million international sci–tech papers since 2003, 
ranking second in the world. These papers had a total citation of nearly 7.1 million times, ranking it 
fifth, moving up one place from 2012. The four countries with top paper citations are the United 
States, Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan (Cheng, 2013).  
In order to create a highly skilled national work force within the next 10 years the central 
government released a new national development plan, the National Medium–and Long–term 
Talent Development Plan (2010–2020). This plan is the first national comprehensive plan in 
China’s history of national human resources development and is of vital importance to China’s 
overarching developmental plan. It features concrete numbers of rencai needed for specific sectors. 
For example, by 2020, more than 5 million rencai will be needed in equipment manufacturing, 
information technology, biotechnology, new materials, aeronautics and astronautics, oceanography, 
finance and accounting, international business, environmental protection, energy resources, 
agricultural technology, and modern traffic and transportation (Wang, 2010). The plan proposes that 
of every 10,000 people in the labor force, at least 43 professionals should be working on R&D and 
R&D professionals will number 3.8 million by 2020. To put China’s ambition in perspective, it is 
pertinent to look at the current number of R&D personnel in developed countries. According to 
Eurostat, there are a total of 1.356 million R&D personnel in the 27 countries of the European 
Union: including 284,300 in Germany, 211,100 in France and 175,500 in the United Kingdom. In 
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contrast, the United States Department of Labor Statistics Bureau has put this number in the US at 
621,700 (Wang, 2010).  
FDI investment is another key component of the Chinese government’s innovation development 
plan. China attracts the third largest amount of FDI in the world, behind the United States and the 
United Kingdom. During the past five years foreign companies have established hundreds of new 
R&D centers in China. According to several recent surveys, executives from multinational 
companies rated China as the most attractive country for future R&D investments. China has 
become a large exporter of high technology products, accounting for one– fourth of China’s total 
exports in 2005. What is important to emphasise here is that note, China’s dependence on FDI as a 
driver of growth has, in fact, been carefully managed (Bach et al., 2006: 508–10).  
The management and control of FDI in China is clearly evident in the way the Chinese states 
classifies industrial sectors according to whether or not FDI is to be ‘encouraged’, ‘restricted’ or 
‘prohibited’. Indeed, a central component of the most recent 5 year plan (2011–2016) plan is to 
engineer shift away from FDI in labour extensive manufacturing sectors. Hence, the plan places 
restrictive measures on foreign investment in traditional industries: “including the labour–intensive, 
polluting, energy–consuming or low–tech manufacturing and processing industries” (Opinions, 
2010). Gradually: “China intends to guide the expansion of capability in some of these industries to 
its less–developed central and western regions. Investment in technology–intensive projects will 
continue to be encouraged” (Opinions, 2010). Obviously, the plans strategic goal here is to ensure 
that all foreign FDI is redirected into high technology sectors (Opinions, 2010). 
Fiscal policy is another important tool in implementing China’s new long–term plan. The provision 
of tax incentives—perhaps the most novel policy—is designed to encourage company R&D 
investments. Suggestions include making R&D expenditure 150% tax deductible, effectively 
constituting a net subsidy, as well as introducing accelerated depreciation for R&D equipment 
worth up to 300,000 RMB (Schwaag Serger and Breidne, 2007).  
Public procurement is also an important new instrument for promoting innovation in Chinese 
companies. (Schwaag Serger and Breidne, 2007). This policy asserts that Chinese government 
agencies and entities must purchase domestic goods, works or services except where those goods, 
works or services can’t be obtained within China under reasonable commercial terms (Schwaag 
Serger and Breidne, 2007). To qualify for inclusion in these catalogues the product not only had to 
be made in China, the intellectual property on which it was based also needed to be Chinese or 
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transferred to China. The new policy was to make procurement open to foreign–owned companies 
in China as long as the innovation occurred on Chinese soil and they moved the R&D to China. 
However, after intensive foreign lobbying Chinese agencies took steps to officially rescind the 
policy in July 2011 (Atkinson, 2012). 
Furthermore, in a bid to further strengthen China’s industrial base and move from a factor driven 
economy to investment innovation driven economy one, China has developed a number of policy 
directives designed to develop Innovative Cluster, and National Economic and Technological 
Development Zones (ETDZs). To date the Chinese government has successfully incubated entire 
industry sectors such as solar and wind power, battery technology and electric vehicles. Indeed, 
according to an OECD report, China has excelled at mobilising resources for science and 
technology on an unprecedented scale and at exceptional speed (OECD, 2011).  
Moreover, China has been intent on using its huge market as an asset to develop distinctive 
standards with an expectation that its standards will be taken to an international level, in ways that 
small countries are not able to do. Lester Ross has asserted that market size and conditions: “where 
dynamic technological developments threatened to eclipse existing standards” are the factors which 
encourage Chinese policymakers to formulate domestic standards: “....in the expectation that market 
size may result in international adoption of the China’s standard” (Yan, 2007). The overarching 
thrust of this policy position is on the development of market power as a substitute for technological 
weakness. This approach is expounded in China’s “indigenous innovation” policy. The idea of 
indigenous innovation endeavours to facilitate domestic technology breakthroughs rather than an 
overt reliance on the borrowing of imported technology from other countries. Conversely, a 
domestic standard for China’s 3G network, it was conjectured, would operate to provide Chinese 
companies with a comparative advantage that would provide them with an opportunity to gain 
market share in a sector dominated by European and U.S. suppliers. Hence, it can be seen that the 
rising interest of standard setting by the Chinese government is actually a strategic response to 
globalisation and the global economy, where standards have become important tool to leverage 
gains in international production networks (Yan, 2007). 
Thus, it can be argued that via a mix of bureaucratic and fiscal state capacity the Chinese state has 
recently devised a state–led ‘grand innovation’ development strategy designed to facilitate 
the innovative up scaling of the Chinese nation state and the development of core indigenously 
owned high–technology intellectual property. The focus of these policy directives it has been 
argued contains a distinctively techno–nationalistic thrust. However, it can be argued, that the 
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Chinese states strategic attempt to develop indigenous technology is key component of its 
globalisation and alliance capitalist plan. This is because without their own intellectual property 
rights and assets Chinese firms will lack any bargaining power or intellectual capital from which to 
play an active role in the construction of, or gain access to contemporary socio–technological 
ecosystems.  
Furthermore, as I will highlight in the next section, the Chinese innovation developmental plan also 
contains a number of strategic policy directives designed to facilitate globalised relational capacity. 
What is important to emphasise at this point is that in the global knowledge economy bargaining 
power, resource and cluster development, coordination mechanisms and the development of 
regulatory capacities are key policy attributes that serve to frame the construction of successful 
development plans. This is because the key role of the state in this environment is to incorporate 
new social groups, associates and organisations into bargaining processes and to find the right 
balance between various particularistic interests. This requires the development of collaborative 
architectural planning and coordination mechanisms. 
The Collaborative Economy, Alliance Capitalism and the  Chinese 
Government 
The advent of the collaborative economy and the need for continuous systematic innovation at a 
global level has created new sets of system pressures and economic opportunities for economic 
actors and organisations. For Chinese policy–makers the nature and type of strategic development 
choices and capacities required in a context of collaborative global innovation are very different 
from those required when the policy objectives were solely centered around the idea of indigenous 
technology and the idea of building national champions. Indeed, systems complexity, alliance 
capitalism and collaborative organisation require a fundamental shift in the way governmental 
policy interacts with the emerging global technological system. 
Firstly, as I established in the previous chapter, the state’s territorial jurisdiction over knowledge is 
becoming less important than its capacity to access and organise complex networks of collaborative 
and dispersed innovation processes. Certainly, the fact that technological innovation and product 
development in the contemporary knowledge economy occurs in globally and organisationally 
dispersed innovation networks has significant implications for Chinese technology developmental 
policy and governance structures. Indeed, it has been argued that because these technologies are 
created and developed in contemporary innovation networks that are increasingly defined by 
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economic space instead of political geography they transcend national or geographical governance 
structures. 
Hence, it is very important that the state understands the deep structure and maneuvering spaces of 
dispersed Collaborative Global Innovation Networks (CGINs). At a systems level these CGINs are 
defined by self–organisation via collaborative alliances and dynamic adaptability. The shaping of 
these systems will occur in a globalised adaptive ecology of system actors committed to the 
construction of global collaborative platforms for the co–development of its technological assets 
and markets and the transnational sharing of appropriated value. Furthermore, as it has already been 
established the power to shape or structure the overarching architecture of a technological system is 
defined by distributed agency. This means that the ability to influence the socio–technological 
systems development is intimately connected to an actor's ability to collaborate with technology 
producers, users, evaluators and regulators in developing technological ecosystems specific design 
heuristics, testing standards, regulatory schemes and commercialisation process. 
It is precisely these changes in the global socio–technological system that has spurred the evolution 
of new forms of developmental states such as the GNS. Specifically, the need to develop new sets 
of developmental capabilities that address the existence of critical ecosystem dependencies and the 
relational capacity to participate in and form networks and their associated technological 
ecosystems are important strategic capacities required by nations wishing to engage in high–
technology innovation at a global level. The specific sets of policy instruments and mechanisms that 
allow the GNS to achieve its key goals include the ability to source and provide information about 
transnational corporations and world markets to domestic firms and the development of institutional 
frameworks and funding decisions designed to provide the necessary conditions for stimulating 
connections between domestic and international companies. That is the GNS overarching goal is to 
facilitate collaboration and encourage innovation at a both a domestic and a global level (O'Rian, 
2000).  
Indeed, it can be argued that, trans–territorial state capacity and ecosystem–shaping capabilities are 
important new state policy tools that contemporary developmental states need to develop if they 
wish to construct an innovation driven economy. The state can play a key focal role in the 
coordination of the collaborative process here as a network organiser and system integrator. By 
helping to facilitate the insertion of its domestic firms into global innovation ecosystem and by 
integrating international firms into its domestic economy and innovation platforms, the state can 
spur the development of a complex network of extra–territorial linkages that facilitate the 
Technological Development, Alliance Capitalism and Chinese State Capacity 
106 
development of globalised technological niches and ensure the interoperability and openness of key 
emerging innovation platforms and their associated technologies. In this way governments can 
ensure the technological advancement of its domestic firms as well as the ability to appropriate 
technological rents from multiple globalised sources. 
Hence, an important question that needs to be asked at this point is to what extent, does the Chinese 
developmental state, have the capacity to actively create and shape new market for technologies by 
contributing to the production and co–shaping of socio–technological sectors? Does it have the state 
capacity and relational legitimacy to actively recruit the right network of private and public actors 
required to construct and sustain technological ecosystems and market structures at both a domestic 
and a global level?  
It can be argued, that the Chinese developmental states relational capacity has increased 
significantly since the implementation of its innovation development policy in 2006. Certainly, 
recent policy directives indicate the Chinese state has undergone significant policy adaptations, 
developed a dense network of global technological and market connections, and devised new forms 
of innovation capabilities that are designed to allow it to develop connections with a broad range of 
foreign counterparts as well as with transnational regulatory bodies. Indeed, it can be argued, that 
the Chinese government has responded to recent developmental constraints by acquiring and 
projecting influence within global market governance and high–technology development arenas as a 
‘fledgling regulatory state’, market ‘rule maker’ and ‘technological network organiser’. For 
instance, China has endeavoured to gain international recognition for its home–grown technology 
standards through regulators such as the ISO while at the same time seeking to strengthen its 
negotiating power vis–à–vis the WTO by identifying standards–dependency as a potential national 
security risk WTO (Strange, 2011).  
Primarily, both network organisers and system integrators key role in the contemporary global 
socio–technological system is to focus on developing long–term reciprocal trust and forward linked 
incentive structures to induce system actors to join and participate in the socio–technological 
network structures that will generate the most value and socio–technological development for their 
nation. Indeed, it has been asserted that:  
In a word of growing specialisation and reliance on other companies for key elements of 
business value, the ability to build trust quickly and effectively represents a significant source of 
strategic differentiation (Hagel and Brown, 2005).  
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These concepts provide important cognitive frameworks for policy makers who need to adjust their 
focus from an overt focus on national intellectual property appropriation and ownership towards the 
idea of dispersed innovation and the need for long–term, trust–based extra–territorial relationships. 
In this system, where the creation of value is globalised and the development of innovative assets 
collaborative, states need to allow foreign actors to assume part of the value creation of, and 
appropriation of parts of any collaborative asset that is made in the socio–technical ecosystem. The 
notion of reciprocal long–term trust based network differs substantially from conventional 
approaches to trust, which primarily looks backward (Hagel and Brown, 2005). That is actors are 
specifically focused on whether or not the other party has delivered against expectations in the past? 
This approach is best practiced in static environments. This is because the past is a reasonable 
predicator of the future, and the time required to establish this type of trust is less critical. In the 
contemporary socio–technological system with its rapid change and highly connected globalised 
systems environment the focus has shifted to forward looking incentives as the primary mechanisms 
to build trust quickly. This is because in highly dynamic fast paced environments the past is less 
and less useful as a predictor of future performance (Hagel and Brown, 2005). 
Instead, what matters to system actors and coordinators is a clear evaluation of current capacity and 
the potential to accelerate capacity building so that participates can adapt successfully to these 
rapidly changing environments. Hence, it has been asserted that that dynamic market environments 
require a more dynamic view of trust, one that is focused on the ‘shaping’ of future capacity 
building as a way to accelerate trust building in the near term (Hagel and Brown, 2005). 
From this theoretical perspective the skill of partners is only a small factor in the development of 
trust over time. What it is argued is more important that a participants current skill set is its ‘will’ to 
acquire more skills and broaden its system capabilities, as Hagel and Brown (2005) assert: “Will 
can trump skill because partners, with proper motivation, will invest aggressively in building the 
necessarily capacities” (Hagel and Brown, 2005). 
‘Will’ from this theoretical perspective is a function of incentive systems–are the parties 
sufficiently motivated to deliver the promised outcomes? The will to preform can be shaped by 
both positive (reward) and negative incentives (penalties). Research indicates that rewards 
generate a more powerful and enduring form of motivating. In this environment the provision of 
cash rewards is not the central motivating, instead the focus is on helping firms accelerate their 
capability building and the building of long term–relationships and the development of multiple 
capabilities in order to facilitate long time participation in network configurations. This requires 
the provision of frameworks for joint knowledge building (Hagel and Brown, 2005). 
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Hence, the goal of successful high–technology governance in a contemporary context is not to 
control the socio–technical environment and appropriate nationally controlled intellectual property 
assets or to focus on the protection and development of nationally developed sectors. Rather it is to 
enable and adapt, and partially shape via collaborative coordination the emerging socio–
technological environment. Conversely, the ability to self–organise, adapt and develop generative 
extra–territorial generative relationships are all important system capacities required by the current 
socio–technical system.  
Recent policy directives issued by the Chinese government do indeed indicate that the Chinese 
developmental state is currently engaged in a strategic attempt to generate extra–territorial 
relationships and a desire to be involved in the co–development and shaping of contemporary 
socio–technological ecosystems in a more open collaborative mode of development. For example, 
the national development program of strategic emerging industries during the 12th Five–Year Plan 
(FFYP) period adopted by the Chinese government calls for closer international exchanges and 
cooperation and a path of open innovation and internationalised development. Specifically, the 
newest five year plan in article XVIII specifies the need to strengthen scientific and technological 
openness: 
Actively carry out all–round, multi–level, high level scientific international cooperation, to 
strengthen the scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation between the Mainland 
and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan regions. Increase the intensity of the introduction of the 
international scientific and technological resources, and participation in international science 
programs and big science projects around the country strategic needs. Encourage our scientists 
to initiate and organise international cooperation in science and technology plan, initiate or 
participate in international standard–setting. Strengthen the introduction of technology and 
cooperation, encourage enterprises to carry out the shares of M&A, joint research and 
development, patent cross–licensing and other aspects of international cooperation, support 
enterprises and research institutions to establish overseas R&D institutions. Open and 
cooperative efforts to increase the national science and technology programs, support of 
international academic institutions, multinational corporations to set up R&D institutions in 
China, to build domestic and foreign universities, research institutions joint research platform to 
attract global technological talent to innovation and entrepreneurship in China. Strengthen non–
governmental scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation (CPC Central Committee 
and the State Council, 2012). 
Recently, the Ministry of Science and Technology lifted the limits on foreign investment in research 
areas to encourage more overseas companies to build technical centers in China. For example, the 
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most recent foreign investment catalogue, published on 13th of April 2010 is defined by its liberal 
attitude towards foreign investment and its recognition that R&D needs to be undertaken via 
collaboration with foreign firms. On April 6, 2010 the State Council issued the Several Opinions of 
the State Council on Further Improving Foreign Investment Utilization Work, (Guofa No. 9, 
“Opinions”). The State Council's Opinion's (2010), states that: 
...foreign investment in developing high and new technologies will be encouraged. China will 
continue to improve its hi–tech enterprise recognition system to enable foreign–invested 
enterprises benefit from the status and provide supports to the qualified Sino–foreign joint 
technology development projects. Multinational companies are encouraged to set up in China 
their functional centers such as regional headcounters, research and development, procurement, 
finance and settlement centers. In addition, The Opinions provide that foreign investors are 
encouraged to participate in reorganisation of domestic enterprises by means of takeover, equity 
acquisition etc. China encourages foreign investors to become strategic investors of the 
companies listed on its domestic stock exchanges, and will continue to reinforce regulation on 
foreign investment in domestic securities and on acquisition of domestic–listed companies. The 
Opinions also provide that China will expand the qualifications for foreign issuers authorised to 
issue RMB–denominated bonds to allow more issuers to benefit from domestic financial 
resources. The Opinions confirm that China is looking to having more qualified foreign–
invested enterprises listed on its domestic stock exchanges. The Opinions also state that China 
will expedite, on the pilot basis, the process of market opening to foreign–invested guarantee 
companies. It will continue to encourage investment from foreign–invested venture capital and 
private equity funds, and to improve the regime for their exit (CPC Central Committee and the 
State Council, 2012). 
Furthermore, the most recent policy documents issued by the Chinese government are also focused 
on accelerating the pace of innovation and creating an open innovation system in which competitive 
pressures encourage Chinese firms to engage in product and process innovation not only through 
their own research and development but also by participating in global research and development 
networks (CPC Central Committee and the State Council, 2012). 
In conclusion, it can be argued, that the recent spatial re–organisation of the global economy and 
advent of more open collaborative model of technological development provides an important 
developmental window for the Chinese developmental state and innovative Chinese high–
technology firms. By exploiting the increasing collaborative nature of the global socio–
technological system the Chinese state is beginning to build up a critical network of interdependent 
alliance partners that are focused on achieving technological ‘convergence’ and ‘interoperability’ 
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across the ecosystem platform. It is also expanding the technological governance arena in which it 
operates from one focused solely on achieving national development goals to one that is focused on 
achieving ecosystem development goals.   
In the following chapter, I will examine exactly how the Chinese developmental state is employing 
a globalised state–led alliance based developmental approach in the global wireless sector. I will 
highlight how this new strategic developmental strategy is defined by an attempt to combine the 
development of core indigenous technological assets with the development of collaborative R&D 
centres and socio–technological alliances with foreign firms in order to facilitate the development 
of collaborative dependencies and global network embeddedness in the sector.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
BEYOND NEO–TECHNO–NATIONALISM: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO CHINA’S EMERGENT THIRD 
WAY: GLOBALISED ADAPTIVE ECOLOGY, 
EMERGENT CAPABILITIES AND POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS 
In order to respond to the rapidly changing and increasingly complex global socio–technological 
environment outlined in the preceding chapter and participate in the development of the 4G 
technological ecosystem and gain core technology and market share, the Chinese government is 
currently engaged in an extensive overhaul of its technological strategy. It is replacing its go–it–
alone techno–nationalistic strategy with a globalised adaptive–policy framework that is focused on 
the pursuit of technological alliances and global ecosystem embedeness. It is important to note here 
these changes are not just confined to the global wireless sector, but also can be seen in other 
technological sectors such as aviation, nanotechnology, and the automobile sector technology (Tang 
2011, Ting, and Shapira 2010, 2011, Boeing, 2012, Quan and Haifeng and Zhenhua 2013, 
Goedeking, 2010, Wang, 2008, McKinsey, 2013). However, as it has already been established the 
focus of this thesis is confined to the global wireless sector.  
Beyond the earlier FDI and techno–nationalist strategies, this new development strategy can be 
conceptualised as the third major attempt by the Chinese government to employ an effective 
industrial development strategy. As this chapter will highlight the primary focus of this new 
development strategy is its attempt to combine the development of core indigenous technological 
assets with the development of collaborative R&D centers and socio–technological alliances with 
foreign firms in order to facilitate the development of collaborative dependencies and global 
network emebeddness. Its key strength is the way it responds to contemporary socio–technological 
systems change in a bid to generate the relational ties and collaborative alliances that are essential 
for the development and appropriation of technological knowledge assets and commercialisation 
processes. This is essentially a 'third way' whereby the states strategic control over the globalisation 
process is modified in a way that still allows it a certain degree of regulatory control and strategic 
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agency, but in which the interests of global firms are actually integrated and embedded into the 
Chinese developmental strategy. 
The capacity of the Chinese state to achieve its new developmental programme is heavily reliant on 
its capacity to use its large market as a bargaining chip to induce foreign firms to form alliances 
with Chinese firms and conduct collaborative R&D. In order to motivate foreign firms and 
technological actors to engage in alliances with Chinese firms this strategic plan includes policy 
directives to upgrade the Chinese intellectual property system and its enforcement procedures. 
Without a fair and comprehensive intellectual property system that also addresses system changes 
in intellectual property rights and appropriation methods, the Chinese developmental state will not 
be able to protect either the intellectual property of its own new emerging innovative firms or the 
intellectual property of foreign firms, who when then be disincentivised from participating in 
technological alliances in any substantial way with Chinese firms. 
It is also highly dependent on the capacity of the Chinese government to extend its developmental 
capacity beyond the territorial boundaries of the Chinese nation–state into the emerging 
technological ecosystems and knowledge networks that define the contemporary technological 
system. This requires the Chinese state to become a key ecosystem constructor and shaper that can 
facilitate innovation in key technological sectors and motivate others to join these ecosystems and 
co–develop the high–technology products and intellectual assets necessary for the effective 
functioning of the ecosystem. Indeed, network organisers as strategic system actors play a 
fundamental role in shaping the evolution of their respective high–technology sectors.   
In this chapter the institutional, regulatory and bargaining strategies that the Chinese government is 
using to gain the global leverage and legitimacy that will allow it to engage in global alliance 
ecosystem building and cooperative R&D as a development strategy in the global wireless sector 
will be examined. Specifically, I will highlight how the Chinese government is attempting to ensure 
the development of global alliances between foreign and domestic firms by building the indigenous 
capacity of its domestic firms in order to build up a critical mass of key patents and gloablised 
organisational capacities that can be used as currency to facilitate technological alliances for the co–
development of high–technology assets between its domestic and foreign firms. It is also attempting 
to ensure that foreign firms engage in technological alliances with Chinese domestic firms via its 
creation of a comprehensive funding and incentive programme designed to attract foreign firms to 
set up R&D centers in China.  
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This new developmental strategy acknowledges that in the contemporary socio–technological 
system there exist sets of critical ecosystem dependencies that need to be addresses by all 
ecosystems actors before a technology can go to market. It also acknowledges the fact that in order 
to address these critical ecosystem dependencies the Chinese state as a strategic developmental 
facilitator needs to develop its relational legitimacy at both a global and a trans–territorial level.  
This shift in the developmental objectives of the Chinese developmental state can been seen 
manifest in way in which the Chinese government has undertaken active coordination and 
negotiation with major stakeholders in the 4G Time-Division Long-Term Evolution (TD–LTE) 
sector in order to expand its indigenously developed standard, TD–LTE globally, to promote 
collaborative breakthrough in key technologies and increase the membership of the industry supply 
chain. Indeed, as this chapter will highlight, the Chinese government has played a fundamental role 
in both the global construction of trans–territorial alliances and the coordination of the TD–LTE full 
value chain itself. 
It is important to note here that the avocation of joint cooperation between domestic and foreign 
companies and the sharing of key technologies are all policy directives that were expounded in 
earlier policy areas such as ‘trading market access for technology’ in the era of FDI. Hence, they are 
not new in themselves. What is new is the incentive structures being employed to attract foreign 
participation and the underlying policy objectives and market building goals. Whereas the goal 
before was to gain the necessary high–technology knowledge required to launch Chinese national 
champions into the global market the goal now is the construction of hybrid firms that are both 
Chinese and foreign in ownership structure via alliance mechanisms that allow Chinese state leaders 
to appropriate value from network and ecosystem collaboration, coordination and embeddedness 
rather than from industry or sectoral monopolisation.   
This behaviour is an important example of a state–led adaptive response to the emergence of rapid–
innovation–based technological ecosystems and the emergence of new technological markets and 
appropriation mechanisms. That is, it is an adaptive strategy designed to adjust to technological 
systems change. Specifically, it represents a new round of capability building for the interventionist 
Chinese developmental state, in that new policy tools and methods of strategic global economic 
diplomacy are being devised and experimented with.  
This chapter will be divided into two sections. Firstly, it will offer a reprise of FDI and techno– 
nationalism as technological development strategy in order to establish a clear understanding of 
why these strategies need to be upgraded and adjusted in order for the Chinese nation to achieve the 
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high–technology status and economic growth beyond the middle income trap. In the Second 
section, I will develop an account of China’s new alliance based state–led approach with specific 
emphasis on the role of the Chinese state as a strategic technological and economic coordinator and 
facilitator in the global wireless sector.  
Foreign Domestic Investment and Shallow Industrialisation 
As it has already been established in earlier chapters, China’s first approach to technological 
development focused on attracting FDI to leapfrog the economy. This was a common strategy 
employed by developing countries with minimal capital reserves. It allowed for the importation of 
capital, equipment and technology to help build an industrial base (Thun, 2006:3). Since the onset 
of the reform process, China has attracted hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign direct 
investment and trillions of dollars in non–public investment (Zheng, 2005:19).   
The impact of FDI on economic growth is one of the most controversial topics in international 
political economy. The modernisation hypothesis asserts that FDI promotes economic growth by 
providing external capital and through growth spreads the benefits through the economy (Thun, 
2006:13). It is the presence rather than the origin of investment that is considered important because 
FDI brings with it advanced technology and better management and organisation. In the 
modernisation hypothesis FDI is seen as a critical engine for economic growth in developing 
countries (Thun, 2006:13).   
By contrast, the dependency hypothesis argues that whilst possible short–term positive impacts on 
economic growth result from FDI flows, there are often negative long–term impacts, as reflected in 
the negative correlation between the stock of FDI and growth rates. In the short run, an increase in 
FDI enables higher investment and consumption and thus contributes to economic growth (Thun, 
2006:13). However, as FDI accumulates and foreign projects take hold, there will be adverse effects 
on the rest of the economy that reduce economic growth. This is due to the intervening mechanisms 
of dependency, in particular, "decapitalisation" and "disarticulation” (Thun, 2006:13).  
Certainly, a plethora of empirical evidence reveals that contrary to its significant contribution to 
China's economic development, FDI has in the past played a limited role in transferring technology 
to key Chinese technological sectors and contributing to local technology capacity building. It has 
been estimated that in this period the average level of technology transfer via FDI was 
approximately two years more advanced than the existing Chinese technology base, whilst the 
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technology gap between China and investing counties was estimated to be about 20 years (Young 
and Lan 1997:12). 
Conversely, whilst the Chinese Party elite all share the conceptualisation that China must reform 
and open up its centrally planned economy, they are divided on the exact pace and content that 
reform measures should take (Bell and Feng, 2007:56). Given such results, the New Left, who are 
essentially techno–nationalists or mercantilists, are critical of neo–liberal policy in its various guises 
whether as a rubric for free–market economics or as a broader metaphor for Western interpretations 
of modernity (Fewsmith, 2007:1).  
The recognition that FDI was failing to facilitate technological up–scaling of the Chinese nation led 
to a shift in policy direction by the Chinese government. Operating from the assertion that China’s 
huge market of 1.3 billion people provides an important point of political and economic leverage a 
techno–nationalistic strategy was devised that sought to develop China’s own de–facto technical 
standards (Bell and Feng, 2007:59).  
Chinese Strategic Policy and the Case of the Wireless 
Telecommunication Sector  
In response to the New–Left critique and the increasing recognition that the strategy of FDI has 
essentially failed, early attempts by China to reframe its development strategy focused on the 
development of its go–it–alone techno–nationalistic strategy. Here, Chinese policy makers 
attempted to leverage the size of the Chinese market as a bargaining tool to establish the perceived 
lock–in effects associated with technological standards ownership and the comparative advantages 
that it confers.   
It was within this period the idea of indigenous standard development was explored and 
incorporated into policy documents. The primary emphasis of this policy program was the creation 
and commercialisation of proprietary ideas, standards and technologies created by Chinese 
companies. The development of the Chinese 3G standard, Time Division Synchronous Code 
Multiple Access (TD–SCDMA) and Wireless LAN authentication and privacy infrastructure WAPI 
both fall within this branch of the Chinese government’s standards and indigenous innovation 
technology policy framework. 
In 2006, in accordance with the nation's new “indigenous innovation” policy the Chinese home–
grown technology standard” TD–SCDMA assumed the status of a flagship standard and acquired 
support from the highest level of the Chinese government (Gao and Liu, 2012). 
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The Chinese government offered four types of support for the standards development. Firstly, 
support through signalling. For example, strong support for the TD–SCDMA Industry Alliance (an 
alliance set up by Datang, the founding company to attract domestic and foreign collaborators) by 
the National Development Reform Commission (NDRC), the most powerful government agency in 
China indicated that the Chinese government wanted to support TD–SCDMA. This policy signal 
was very important in attracting other ﬁrms such as ZTE and Huawei, who are competitors of 
Datang, to join this alliance and increase the credibility of TD–SCDMA in attracting the interests of 
foreign firms (Gao and Liu, 2012). 
Secondly, the Chinese government providing financial support. For example, government agencies 
such as NDRC, MII, and MOST provided 700 million RMB Yuan to facilitate collaboration 
between member firms of the TD–SCDMA Industry Alliance. Specifically, part of this money was 
allocated to member ﬁrms to pay Datang for sharing its TD–SCDMA related technologies. This not 
only lowered the barriers for member ﬁrms to develop TD–SCDMA based technology and products 
but also increased member ﬁrms confidence in relation to government support and the future of 
TD–SCDMA (Gao and Liu, 2012). 
Thirdly, the Chinese government provided strategic support via the provision of technical service. 
For example, the former Ministry of Information Industry (MII) organised the MTNet test to verify 
the capability of the TD–SCDMA system to be deployed as a standalone network in 2004, rather 
than as a complement to Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) (Gao and Liu, 
2012). 
Fourthly, support was provided through administrative order. For example, in 2006 the government, 
including NDRC, initiated the large–scale TD–SCDMA Network Application Trial project and 
asked the telecom service providers to support TD–SCDMA trials in 5 Chinese cities. In 2007 the 
telecom service providers were asked again to support TD–SCDMA pre–commercialisation trials in 
10 cities, including Beijing and Shanghai. In April 2008 China Mobile was asked to offer TD– 
SCDMA service based on its pre–commercialisation network in Beijing during the Olympic Games. 
Conversely, as a direct result of the co–evolution process between Datang and the government the 
gradual development of the TD–SCDMA value chain was able to occur (Gao and Liu, 2012) 
However, like WAPI, TD–SCDMA failed to meet the techno–nationalistic aspirations of the 
Chinese government. Specifically, it failed to commercialise due to the fact that critical ecosystem 
dependencies were not addressed and compatible handsets and products were not developed due to 
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the perception by domestic and foreign firms that the standards technology was inferior when 
compared to existing standards such as Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA).  
Competition, Compromise and Alliance Capitalism 
In an important example of adaptive state flexibility and capacity building the Chinese government 
has recently yielded to international pressure and the changing nature of the global technological 
environment, with its very high skill intensity, a rapidly moving technology frontier, and 
technological obsolescence, and an incremental fashion again sought to revise its technological 
development strategy. This time supplementing its go–it–alone techno–nationalistic strategy with a 
policy framework that is receptive to a more open market focus and which is designed to address 
the existence of critical soci–technolgical ecosystem dependencies in the global wireless sector as 
well as the need to meet the requirements of the international regulatory environment. 
Beyond the earlier FDI and techno–nationalist strategies, this new development strategy can be seen 
as the third major attempt to mount an effective industrial strategy in China.  It is also the first to 
achieve both significant growth in high technology sectors and real cooperation between domestic 
and foreign firms.  Indeed, recent efforts by the Chinese state to develop its own wireless technical 
standard and engage in pre–competitive R&D in order to maximise the relative gains that the nation 
receives from participation in the global economy, represents a new and exciting example of recent 
attempts by the Chinese government to develop its own competitive technology policy. 
A contemporary example of China’s attempt to reinvent its standards policy into a theoretically 
sophisticated strategic technology policy that has moved from the conceptualisation of indigenous 
standard development to pre–competitive architectural construction and anticipatory standards can 
be drawn from newly released documents detailing China’s current strategic policy in relation to 4G 
wireless internet development (Cajian, 2009). These documents indicate that the Chinese state has 
undergone a shift in its political agenda, technological focus and R&D expenditure allocations in 
relation to the development of wireless technology in the 4G sector. The emergent policy position is 
designed to facilitate the development of standards that both anticipate and operate to define the 
future regulatory global infrastructure and market governance structure as well as pursuing the 
development of network and research alliances with key stake holders and actors who are central 
actors in emerging wireless technological ecosystems.  
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The Chinese State and the Wireless Communication Sector 
The information communication sector is a “crown jewel” in China’s network of state–owned 
enterprises. China is the world’s largest telecommunications market, with over 1.132 billion mobile 
subscribers and close to 564 million internet users as of at the end of 2012 (China Internet Network 
Information Center, 2013).  It is also the world largest producer of handsets. In mid–2008 China 
became the largest broadband market in the world, when it surpassed the US. At the beginning of 
2012, China's broadband subscriber population base had reached 380 million (Muncaster, 2012). 
With a penetration rate of 39.9% (China Internet Network Information Center, 2013), the Chinese 
domestic market has significant market potential. This contrasts with the more advanced markets, 
which have been saturated, and which are driven by replacement demand, whereas China’s market 
growth is driven by original demand meaning that there is still significant potential for future 
market growth. Because of China's low penetration base, the growth and future of the global 
wireless sector is intertwined with the Chinese customer base and hence attracts the interest of 
foreign companies.  
It is this large market and consumer customer base that affords the Chinese state a strategic 
bargaining tool that it has utilised to induce foreign firms to engage in collaborative alliances and 
technology sharing in exchange for market access. For example, research indicates that the 
bargaining power of MNCs is directly derived from their ownership or access to sophisticated 
technology, product differentiation (including strong brand names), their ability to contribute to 
exports, especially through intra–firm transactions, their access to or lower cost of capital, and their 
product diversity (Low, cited in Low and Johnston and Wang, 2007). In order to establish a 
strategic position in the Chinese market global companies have progressed from initial arms–length 
export transactions to collaborative R&D, production and marketing relationships. Empirical 
evidence indicates that China’s central government prefers to develop economic alliances with 
global, publicly–listed companies especially in joint ventures and alliances with local Chinese 
partners. For example, global companies such as Motorola, Siemens and Lucent who possess 
technological knowledge and product development and marketing experience and a prior history of 
economic legitimacy are considered by China as attractive partner firms (Low, cited in Low and 
Johnston and Wang, 2007). Motorola, Lucent and Nortel have established technical and research 
alliances with indigenous Chinese firms in an attempt to acquire technological legitimacy. Hence, 
they are actively collaborating with local partners (equipment manufacturers), customers (carriers), 
and the Central Government, and helping them participate in global technical and research alliances 
programs. As a result of this behaviour, legitimacy justification requirements espoused by network 
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constituents are being met (Low, cited in Low and Johnston and Wang, 2007). As a direct result, it 
is these telecommunication companies that are assuming key network positions in the Chinese 
wireless sector. These include recognition as valuable corporate citizen; potential access to 
privileged information, including timing and awarding of licenses; preferences and incentives in 
setting up local research and development alliances; and the awarding of local manufacturing 
licenses. For example, foreign manufacturers including Nokia, Motorola and Qualcomm have 
become the direct and instant beneficiaries in the value chain of 3G business (Low, cited in Low, 
Johnston and Wang, 2007). 
What needs to be emphasised at this point is that the Chinese market forms an integral component 
of the internationalisation plans of major global companies. For instance, China was Ericsson's third 
largest market in 2012: “A company cannot call itself a global leader unless it is also an industry 
leader in China, said Ma Zhihong, executive director and Asia–Pacific senior vice president of 
Ericsson” (Want China Times, 2013). The Chinese market comprised 7.6% of Alcatel–Lucent sales 
and 9.6% of Nokia Siemens sales (Want China Times, 2013).  
The Chinese telecommunications sector is defined by the way in which all telecom operators are 
state–owned and are controlled by the central government. A 2010 government report of the central 
government enterprises ownership structure showed that government capital occupied 96.37% of 
the telecommunications industry at the end of June 2010 (SASAC, 2010). Conversely foreign 
investors wishing to operate in the transitional Chinese economy, specifically its 
telecommunications sector, which is the subject of continuous structural reforms and elite control, 
have often been forced to operate within a range of settings, often subjected to different “rules of 
the game” (North cited in Low and Johnston and Wang, 2007:97). Such settings have been known 
to range from a highly marketised setting to one that is highly controlled and regulated, as is the 
case with state–owned enterprises. (Low and Johnston and Wang, 2007:97).  
Furthermore, the Chinese government is frequently modifying the structure of the market itself in a 
bid to reorganise it, presumably in an attempt to find the optimal competitive market structure. One 
of the most significant changes in the structure of the Chinese telecommunications market occurred 
in 2008 when the market itself was transformed into three major full service operators (Cajian, 
2008). The restructuring merged six of the country's state–owned mobile phone and fixed–line 
operators into three nationwide carriers offering fixed–line and wireless services, instead of 
dividing coverage in terms of region or type of service (Cajian, 2008).   
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Indeed, the Chinese developmental state – at all levels – has played leading, entrepreneurial role in 
facilitating innovation–led growth in the wireless communication sector. Certainly, the Chinese 
government considers the sector to be a strategically important industry that requires government 
steering, financing and regulation (Steinbock 2003:5). However, in accordance with the key 
precepts pertaining to the flexible developmental state model (FDS) the government of China’s 
policy–making response to the development of wireless technologies has been framed by a process 
of experimental trial and error policy learning and the implementation of policy directives, laws and 
regulatory mechanisms that seek to respond to the fast paced developmental and commercial signals 
and changes that are occurring in the global wireless ecosystem. I have termed this approach 
‘globalised adaptive ecology’. This ecology is defined by the way in which the Chinese 
developmental state adjusts it policy directives in response to system changes and signals in order to 
acquire the system shaping capabilities and relational legitimacy necessary for globalised 
technological ecosystem membership.  
Hence, contrary to popular rhetoric the government of China has not engaged in any predetermined 
developmental plan in the sector per see, but rather has sought to learn from the evolving socio–
technological environment in order to gather information on barriers to market and innovation 
opportunities and to design specific policy sets to address these barriers as they exist at certain 
points in time (Liu, Quhong and Ling, 2013). This does not mean the Chinese government does not 
have a developmental programme for the wireless communication sector. It does and this is clearly 
outlined in the 2006 and 2011 ten year development plans. What it means is that these plans are 
subject to continuous evolution and coevolve with changes in the socio–technological system itself.  
From this theoretical perspective telecommunications governance can be seen as a highly dynamic, 
adaptive system (Cherry, 2007) that is continuously adjusting to system constraints and 
opportunities.  As a direct result the strategic policy directives issued by the Chinese government in 
the sector often appear confusing and seem to have conflicting objectives.  However, a key desire 
that has been continuously articulated by the state and its representative ministries has been to 
ensure that Chinese domestic firms in the sector achieve global technological breakthroughs and 
market share. The Chinese government is not just interested in the development of technologies for 
the Chinese domestic market, but in facilitating the development of global technologies and 
ecosystem embeddedness. For example, in a personal interview Xielien Liu, a professor and the 
associate dean of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CASS) asserted that: “this is a critical issue for 
the Chinese government how to build/be involved in global innovation networks...the government 
knows this is necessary but how to do this...coordinate this...is a major dilemma...”(Liu, May, 
8:2013).  
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4G: From Neo–techno–nationalism to Global Ecosystem Development 
The Chinese government–operating from recent cues in the 4G TD–LTE socio–technological 
environment has recently begun to develop specific policy measures and a global research and 
development strategy that will allow the Chinese government and its key domestic firms to play a 
fundamental role in the shaping of emerging 4G collaborative knowledge and commercialisation 
networks.   
In a 2006 paper entitled, Zhongwen Guo, the Chinese vice minister of MIIT at the time, asserted:   
The accelerated progress of technology makes the ability of businesses to utilise external 
knowledge increasingly... Many MNCs are changing the strategy of treating competitors as 
enemies and are moving towards deep level technical cooperation and strategic alliance. ... The 
United States has set up 5000 new technology R&D leagues with foreign companies in key 
areas including new materials, information and biotechnology in the last 10 years. Before 1980, 
the revenue of the top 1000 companies in the United States from these technology leagues was 
only 1% of their total revenue. But by 2003, the figure had already reached 20%. Through 
cooperative R&D, MNCs not only can concentrate resources in tackling key technologies, but 
also can disperse R&D cost and investment risk, as well as benefiting from accelerated 
industrialisation and shortened the return period of technology investment through results 
sharing. This ability of utilizing external technologies makes it possible for MNCs to be highly 
flexible in response to competition in the international arena (Guo, 2006).  
Policy directives, press releases and company memorandums indicate that the Chinese government 
is highly responsive to changes in the 4G wireless sector. In 2007, the Chinese State Council 
announced a large–scale research plan for a 4G standard development. The research project, which 
was classified as a key national program, was entitled the “Next–Generation Broadband Wireless 
Mobile Communications Network” (Caijing, 2008). In response to the need to fund basic research 
in the sector a longer time–frame of approximately 15 years was allocated for the research process. 
An initial investment for R&D of 20 billion yuan was given by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), 
with the total investment in the project expected to exceed 70 billion yuan (Caijing, 2008). The bulk 
of this funding is for basic research: “The central financial administration will mostly invest in the 
early stages of basic research” (Caijing, 2008). Furthermore: “product development and 
industrialisation will mostly come from the market” (Caijing, 2008).  
It is important to note here that the way the research and development process works in the wireless 
communications sector, specifically the need for technological actors to participate at an early stage 
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of a products development in order to ensure systems convergence and interoperability across the 
technological ecosystem has raised fundamental implications for intellectual property rights and has 
led to the development of a new more open based collaborative model in the sector. Firstly, due to 
the need to engage in pre–competitive market research in order to address the existence of critical 
ecosystem dependencies and develop the required industry standards, competing companies engage 
in research on the same topics in order to present their solutions to the other standardization 
partners. In this way firms operating in the sector need to share their emerging technological 
solutions with their competitors (Brismark and Alfalahi, 2008). As a direct result patent protection 
is a key perquisite for any firm wishing to participate in the innovation ecosystem early stage 
developmental processes. The key goal of this early stage research process is to develop a set of 
standards that will define the interoperability of the system.  When you have a standard; you have a 
speciﬁcation; and the speciﬁcation deﬁnes the market. This market is owned by all the companies 
that have contributed to the standard (Brismark and Alfalahi, 2008).  
In traditional sectoral systems a basic principle with patents is that when one company can obtain a 
monopoly – it can stop others from using its patented solution. However, in the wireless technology 
sector the need for convergence and interoperability in standardisation, has resulted in the 
development of a system whereby the partnering companies must sign a waiver from the beginning, 
by which they waive their rights to a monopoly and promise to license all of the involved patents on 
Fair and Reasonable Terms (FRAND). In telecom standardisation, the companies that contribute the 
most get the largest share. But an important part of this business model is that companies which 
take part in the development of solutions and products are guaranteed part of the returns instead of 
gaining a monopoly (Brismark and Alfalahi, 2008). 
The way the telecom industry traditionally works with open standards can guarantee this, precisely 
because the sector selects core essential standards solely on their technical merits. Furthermore, a 
voting process decides the outcome, which ensures consensus among participating companies. The 
only way licensing can work in this developmental context is that all participants are open with 
what their technological developments at an early stage in the research and standardisation process.  
The overarching goal here is to achieve interoperability via open standards. The open–standard 
process is unique compared to other industries, in that competing companies continuously share 
their latest results, technologies, and solutions (Brismark and Alfalahi, 2008).  
The findings, patents and industry standards generated by this basic research and involvement in the 
standardisation process, it can be argued, are of significant importance to the Chinese 
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developmental agenda. Firstly, the patents and intellectual capital generated from the research 
provide valuable currency from which the Chinese state and its key domestic firms can bargain with 
foreign firms in order to gain access to established technological ecosystems. As highlighted in 
chapter 3, successful high–tech innovation and commercialisation requires partners that are both 
able and willing to participate in the development of complementary products and service solutions. 
Conversely, ecosystem membership is highly dependent on the fact that a firm 
possesses intellectual assets and skills that other ecosystem actors need to commercialise their own 
products (Adner, 2012). Alternatively, it provides the Chinese state with the intellectual capital 
necessary to construct its own technological ecosystem or niche positions and the power to select 
what foreign firms it will form technological and market sharing alliances with. As has already been 
established, ecosystem alliances are required in complex technological systems due to the need to 
ensure interoperability and product convergence. For example, in the 4G TD–LTE sector there 
needs to be compatible network equipment, infrastructure and handsets.   
In order to address the need for early pre–competitive market research and the existence of critical 
ecosystem dependencies at an early stage in the development of the 4G–LTE standard making 
process the Chinese government asserted at the beginning of the project that: “unlike Datang’s lone 
involvement in the development of the TD standard, China’s homegrown 3G telecom standard, 
there will be multiple participants – Datang, ZTE and Huawei among likely candidates – in the 4G 
technology R&D” (Caijing, 2008). Moreover, the government also asserted that: “the framework 
China has created for its 4G R&D is more open and advanced than that for the TD standard” 
(Caijing, 2008). On the new path toward 4G, China must take to heart the lessons gleaned from TD 
process and build an open, market–based frame–work that welcomes all possibilities.....As Hou 
Ziqiang, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Acoustics told the Chinese 
newspaper, Caijing: “The [4G] future is settled. China and LTE will unite and move forward 
together. The chances of China proposing its own [4G standard] are slim” (Caijing, 2008).  
Hence, in order to achieve both ecosystem embeddedness and ecosystem shaping capabilities, 
policy documents released by the Chinese government and its key ministries indicate that the 
Chinese state is focused on a), ensuring its domestic firms develop the necessary core technologies 
that will allow them to compete in the global wireless ecosystem and b), facilitating the 
construction of the necessary institutional infrastructure and relational legitimacy that will provide 
important opportunities for it key domestic firms to engage in collaborative network building, joint 
R&D and global commercialisation processes. For example, in 2006 the minster for MIIT 
conjectured: “Competition among modern companies is to a big extent the competition over 
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knowledge, technology and information. To obtain knowledge, technology and information, a 
company needs to rely on the R&D and innovation of its own on the one hand, and should also be 
good at utilizing the innovations of others on the other hand” (Guo, 2006).   
Certainly, it is undeniable that recent S&T policy directives clearly articulate an intent to expand 
and develop future cooperation between foreign R&D firms and Chinese partners and to improve 
prospects for further technology spillovers, with its emphasises on international cooperation and 
collaboration. It states that international S&T cooperation is an important aspect of China’s policy 
of openness to the outside world: “China is ready to enter into cooperation with any country 
depending upon the needs of Chinese S&T and economic development, according to the principles 
equality and mutual benefit, mutual enjoyment of benefits, protection of intellectual property rights, 
and respect for standard international practice. Cooperation can be bilateral, multilateral, with 
private parties or with governments in foreign countries at any level or through any channel” (Irwin 
Crookes, 2008). For example, Alcatel–Lucent and China Mobile recently signed a co–creation 
agreement to develop and test a series of lightRadioTM breakthrough technology elements. In 
August 2012, the companies extended this agreement by signing a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) to conduct joint nanocell research in China. Nanocells are a type of radio access technology 
that integrates wireless small cells with carrier grade Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) 
access points (Communiqué de presse, 2012). Furthermore, Chinese delegates are increasingly 
populating international bodies working groups (around 10% of the IEEE 802.16 members are from 
China, as are 20% of the ‘Potential Members’, and very few have recently lost their membership). 
Moreover, a considerable number Chinese companies are active in the two Partnership Projects and 
in the ITU30 (Graham, 2008). 
Hence, as it has already been established in chapter four, the contemporary Chinese high–
technological developmental plan contains two complementary strands. Firstly, there exists a drive 
to promote indigenous enterprise level development to foster domestic intellectual property that can 
be licensed internationally, and can reduce the country’s reliance on overseas technology inputs 
(State Council 2006) and can provide valuable intellectual currency to facilitate technological 
ecosystem membership. However, the fact that the plan also emphasises the need for international 
cooperation and collaboration indicates that the Chinese government is also currently engaged in 
the development of a delicate policy program that endeavours to combine the need for domestic 
technological and competitive upgrading with the need for international collaboration (Jakobson 
cited in Irwin–Crookes, 2008).  
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This new policy framework combines both indigenous and global policy initiatives in a way that is 
designed to enhance the ability of Chinese domestic firms operating in the sector to actually shape 
the development of emerging 4G networks and achieve a high degree of ecosystem embeddedness 
Indeed, it has been conjectured that:  
...domestic firms are gradually experiencing the third wave of innovation named “indigenous 
innovation in open era” as to the great opportunity coming from global industrial restructuring, 
compared to the former two waves of innovation, which respectively are “indigenous innovation 
in closed era” and “all–around introduction in open era (Xiaolan, and Xiong, 2011)  
Certainly, key policy documents and personal interviews conducted for this thesis indicate that the 
Chinese government wants its domestic standard to have global not just domestic reach and that the 
Chinese government was aware that the immature nature of TD–SCMA and the changing nature or 
the global wireless ecosystem meant that the path to 4G required a more open international 
alliance– based approach. For example, in a personal interview conducted at Tsinghua University 
Professor QuHong (2012), asserted that: “Chinese state leaders were becoming increasingly aware 
of the need for an internationalised approach in order to ensure the successful commercialisation 
and global adoption of its domestically developed indigenous standards and technologies” (Quhong, 
2012).  
In the following section I will outline the key fiscal and organisational governance policy tools 
being utilised by the Chinese government to facilitate the technological up–scaling of its domestic 
firms. These strategies are commensurate with the idea that the state as a developmental actor needs 
to play a key role in assisting its domestic firms to engage in cutting edge R&D and enter global 
markets.  
Go Global Policy 
The Go Global Policy, initiated by the Chinese government in 1999, is an example of a state–led 
strategic policy program that is designed to encourage Chinese domestic firms to utilise external 
R&D resources and technological knowledge via introducing foreign technology or equipment, 
joint–venturing, collaborating with users, suppliers and public or private research institutions, to 
facilitate the search for resource security and to obtain higher returns for China’s huge foreign 
exchange reserves, etc. (Chen, 2009). State support plays a critical role for Chinese enterprises that 
want to go abroad. For example, Beijing provides subsidies and credits to Chinese companies 
attempting to enter key overseas markets involving energy projects and or technology acquisitions. 
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Chinese state–owned banks have expanded their overseas presence to help facilitate Outward 
Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) as well as to increase investments in overseas finance markets. 
For instance, from 2007 to 2008, Chinese investment in foreign finance sectors increased seven–
fold to approximately $14 billion. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, this 
represented 25.1% of all of China’s ODI for the year (Ministry of Commerce, 2012).  
Furthermore, in 2009, the Chinese government announced that it would be allocating a portion of its 
foreign reserves specifically to support Chinese enterprises attempts to move into foreign markets. 
Also, the sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation (CIC), has engaged in a targeted 
campaign to expand purchases of shares of foreign companies. Primarily, China’s outward 
investment has a dual purpose of building China’s political capital and influence around the world. 
China’s chosen route to economic expansion has therefore been closely aligned with its strategy to 
strengthen its global political presence. Specifically, Chinese domestic firms and political leaders 
have worked in tandem to build strong relationships with developing countries. Companies like 
Huawei and ZTE have used their experience in building China’s own markets to develop new ones 
in other emerging economies, before tackling developed economies. Their better understanding of 
emerging markets provides a stronger guarantee of success in their initial overseas expansion plans, 
improving chances of a smoother entry into more developed western markets later on. Meanwhile, 
China has been building alliances with other developing economies in political forums and 
multinational negotiations.  
Despite recent media speculation of a slowdown in China, Chinese OFDI continues to 
grow. Indeed, in December 2012 China recorded its highest levels of Chinese OFDI and in a first 
OFDI exceeded inbound FDI. According to the Ministry of Commerce, Chinese OFDI for the year 
2012 was US$77.2 billion, up from US$60.1 billion in 2011 (Ministry of Commerce, 2012). 
Chinese Government Funding for Domestic Firms 
State capitalism is defined by the way in which it provides funding to both state and privately held 
domestic firms in the form of credit, contracts, and subsidies. These subsidies are provided by the 
state to help key domestic firms compete with foreign MNCs, in an attempt to help them capture a 
dominant role in both the domestic economy and in export markets (McCarthy, 2012). For example, 
the 12th Five–Year Plan approved by the Government of China, in March of 2011, next generation 
information technology is identified as one of seven “strategic and emerging industries” for priority 
government support. It calls for increased governmental support through state–owned bank 
financing and credits at “preferential rates” from the China Export–Import Bank. The policy also 
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called for increases in export tax rebates and more use of export credit insurance by the industry 
(Accenture, 2012). The Chinese government is therefore playing the role of a private equity 
investor/venture capitalists by providing capital to help its domestic firms develop core 
technologies and acquire global technological ecosystem embeddedness Unfortunately, the exact 
amounts and governmental origins of this type of support are often not reported or disclosed, hence 
it is not possible to fully understand either the level or types of support being provided.  
Nevertheless, in line with this state–led policy program the state owned China Mobile and the 
privately owned, Huawei and ZTE have all recently been awarded a variety of forms of government 
support, including direct grants, preferential tax treatment and equity infusions in order to facilitate 
the development of their core technologies and global market expansion (McCarthy, 2012).   
In 2010, Huawei reported receiving RMB 433 million in unconditional government grants and 
RMB 545 million in grants that were conditional on completing certain research and development 
projects. In 2009, Huawei reported receiving $129 million in government grants. ZTE received 
RMB 471 million in government grants, contract penalty income, and other miscellaneous gains in 
2010, according to its annual report. In 2009, ZTE reported receiving $92 million in government 
subsidies, including grants, support for technology development, and tax subsidies. Neither 
company have disclosed the volume of government grants received in 2011 (Accenture, 2012).  
In addition, telecom equipment manufacturers that qualify as high–and new–technology enterprises 
are eligible for lower across–the–board tax rates. ZTE reports that numerous subsidiaries enjoy a 
50% reduction in their income tax rates due to this status – other subsidiaries have been granted 
temporary tax holidays based on this status or additional provincial and local tax incentives. China 
also refunds VAT taxes paid to companies in certain industries, including rebates on software 
procurement. ZTE reports receiving 1.9 billion RMB in such refunds and other tax subsidies in 
2011. While Huawei does not disclose its Chinese tax rate or the eligibility of any of its operations 
for preferential treatment, its effective tax rate for its global operations 2011 was 6.5%, far below 
the statutory rate in China of 25% (Accenture, 2012).  
Huawei and ZTE have also benefitted from direct equity infusions from the Government of China 
or have been supported by state–owned financial institutions. Huawei received an infusion of $5.8 
billion from its equity holders in 2009. The company is 99% held by the union of its employees. 
There is very little information about the true ownership structure of Huawei and the nature of its 
employees’ ownership of the company. However, in China, all unions must be part of the All China 
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Federation of Trade Unions, a public entity associated with the Communist Party. The equity 
infusion was equal to nearly 4% of the company’s sales revenue in 2009 (Graham, 2008).   
In 2008, ZTE issued 40 billion RMB in bonds cum warrants, which were guaranteed by the China 
Development Bank, a state–owned bank. The bonds, which bear an interest rate of 0.8%, have 
permitted the company to fund major capital investments. In addition to being backed by major 
state–owned banks, it appears that many of the major purchasers of the bonds are themselves state–
owned firms. The RMB 40 billion the company has been able to raise through bond insurance was 
thus directly supported by government guarantees and government purchases, resulting in a major 
government–backed infusion of funds to the company (McCarthy, 2012).  
Finally, as a government owned company, China Mobile’s push for LTE has received firm support 
from the government. A new policy directive by the MIIT says 3G and 4G will be made as the 
“twin engine” for telecom growth during 2011–15, and total investment will exceed RMB1 trillion 
($160bn), half of which will be used for LTE. Approximately 60% will be for network equipment 
purchase, 30% for construction and 10% testing and other auxiliary products (McCarthy, 2012).  
Huawei has asserted that both central and national government support has played a crucial role in 
the development of the company in its early stages. As Ren Zhengfei, the president of Huawei 
asserts: “Huawei was somewhat naive to choose telecom–equipment as its business domain in the 
beginning. Huawei was not prepared for such an intensified competition when the company was 
just established. The rivals were internationally renowned companies with assets valued at tens of 
billions of dollars. If there had been no government policy to protect (nationally owned companies), 
Huawei would no longer exist” (Xiao, 2002:127). 
This state–led approach to fostering high–technology development is currently a point of much 
contention in Europe and in the US who assert that it distorts the global market and provides 
Chinese domestic firms with an unfair trading advantage. For instance, in 2010, the EU initiated an 
investigation into subsidised imports of wireless wide area networking modems from China after 
receiving a complaint from Option N.V., a Belgian producer of such wireless modems. The 
complaint primarily targeted Huawei and ZTE, and stated that the Chinese exporters were able to 
flood the European market with low–priced products due to heavy subsidisation by the Chinese 
government. Following a preliminary investigation, public reports state that the EU was proposing 
significant duties of more than €30 for the imported Chinese modems, which normally only cost 
between €20 and €30 – highlighting how the extent of subsidisation was in the triple digits. Prior to 
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imposition of the duties, Option N.V. and Huawei entered into a “cooperative agreement,” which 
included Huawei paying €33 million to license some of Option’s software and Huawei purchasing 
Option’s subsidiary, M4S, for €8 million. In the wake of this agreement, and, “in the spirit of future 
collaboration”, Option then withdrew its complaints and the investigation was terminated 
(McCarthy, 2012).  
Public Procurement and Trading Technology for Market Access 
Ernst (2002) and Arhrens (2010) argue that government procurement contributes to innovation by 
bridging the finance gap, focusing on market signaling, lowering the risk of research and 
development and stimulating demand (Liu and Cheng, 2011). From 2006, China’s indigenous 
innovation strategy has used technology public procurement as one of the main drivers for 
indigenous innovation and Chinese domestic enterprises have taken on the task of incubating new 
technologies (Liu, 2012).   
Public procurement can also help promote innovation and accelerate the diffusion of innovative 
products and services in the economy. The size of the Chinese market, its dynamism and the 
important roles played by the central government and sub–national authorities in the Chinese 
economy point to the strong potential for promoting innovation via public demand. The volume of 
government procurement has been expanding rapidly, although, at about 2% of GDP, it is still far 
below the levels in more developed countries. The Chinese government has recognised this 
potential and attempts to make use of it. The Medium to Long Term Plan (MLP) for the 
Development of Science and Technology (S&T) for the first time assigns public demand an 
important role in economic development and the promotion of innovation. This represents a policy 
innovation since the Chinese government traditionally relied entirely on supply–side policies to 
promote technology development. The development and implementation of an innovation–oriented 
procurement policy is a demanding process in terms of the required expertise and the co–ordination 
of the government agencies involved. Innovation through public procurement cannot be “ordered” 
rather, it has to be the result of a sophisticated articulation of demand for innovative products or 
services and of a transparent competitive process (OECD, 2007).  
For example, Chinese Mobile  has recently awarded initial 4G contracts totally approximately 20 
billion yuan ($US3.2 billion), with Chinese firms securing more than half of the contracts and 
 foreign firms winning only about a third (Chinascope Financial, 2013). Shenzhen–based Huawei 
and ZTE have obtained approximately a 25 per cent stake each out of the total 4G procurement in 
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China Mobile’s tender in this round. European vendors Ericsson, Alcatel–Lucent SA, and Nokia 
Siemens Networks have all  obtained a share of around 10% each (Chinascope Financial, 2013).  
Relational Legitimacy Versus Forced Technology Transfers 
However, whilst the preceding policy and fiscal tools are utlised by many governments to help their 
domestic firms develop high–technology innovation capabilities; the problem for Chinese policy–
makers is that the idea of ‘forced technology transfer’ is consistently meet with international action 
and subsequent failure. Furthermore, without relational legitimacy and transparency membership in 
globalised technological ecosystems and access to foreign markets will be inhibited. Certainly, 
policy documents indicate that the Chinese bureaucratic infrastructures top–down industrial policy 
making style is becoming increasingly difficult to employ in an environment where the 
development of relational assets is a key perquisite required to facilitate successful network 
development, and as both domestic political associations and foreign multinationals exert a greater 
degree of influence over the decision making process. For example, as Scott Kennedy articulates, 
today, firms influence policy directly through the lobbying of regulators and indirectly through 
business associations and other intermediaries. The success of these firms is based on their 
ownership type, size, and technological sophistication (Kennedy, 2005).   
For example, in April 2010, the Chinese government was again forced to retreat from an aggressive 
policy attempt to force foreign firms to transfer R&D via alliances with Chinese domestic firms. 
The “Buy Chinese Policy” directives issued by the Chinese government in April 2009 sought to 
force foreign firms to transfer its R&D platforms via co–development and joint patent registration. 
The Buy China procurement policy directives, it was argued, will favor Chinese producers in six 
technology areas — computers, clean power, communication, office equipment, software and 
energy–efficient products. Companies were given just three weeks to apply to be treated as 
domestic suppliers, a status trade groups say few are likely to qualify for, even those such as 
General Electric Co. and Microsoft that have research and development centers in China (Chao, 
2010).  
U.S. companies appealed to former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner to make the procurement plan a priority in their annual Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue with Beijing. The procurement policy would create barriers to competition in 
the Chinese market for Americas most innovative companies, asserted a coalition of 19 American 
groups including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Software Alliance: “some 
companies would consider pulling out of China if they conclude the loss in sales will be too great, 
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U.S. and European trade groups say” (Chao, 2010). The government is China's biggest software 
buyer and a key customer for other technology. Losing that market might hurt companies including 
Microsoft Corp., Intel Corp. and Motorola Inc. Suppliers worry the rules could be extended to 
purchasing by major state–owned companies in power, telecoms and other fields. Furthermore, a 
separate coalition of 34 groups for technology companies and manufacturers in Europe, Japan, 
South Korea and Canada also has appealed to Beijing to reconsider. Indeed, it was asserted that: 
“some companies would consider pulling out of China if they conclude the loss in sales will be too 
great, U.S. and European trade groups say”. In April 2010 fearing protectionist reactions from the 
Obama administration, EU and foreign companies, China modified the plan to address the concerns 
of foreign firms and governments (Chao, 2010).  
What this outcome indicates is that the structural, networked and relational nature of the global 
knowledge economy means that the opportunities for high–technology up–scaling are increasingly 
reliant on a more open, quasi –market economic development strategy. As it is widely known the 
ability of MNCs to engage in locational flexibility bestows upon them a certain degree of 
asymmetrical bargaining power in that they can choose to de–invest in a location and move their 
resources and technologies to alternative locations. Moreover, the increased trade integration under 
globalisation that has taken place in recent times means that firms seeking advanced processing 
services could now choose to include the rapidly reforming economies of Vietnam or Cambodia as 
production locations as easily as they could choose to stay in China. This may help to explain the 
national leaderships concern about the future sustainability of China’s current growth patterns 
(Irwin Crookes, 2008).  
Certainly, the Chinese administration seems quite aware of the need for a revised more 
collaboratively orientated upgrading strategy. After all it is clearly obvious, that the previous policy 
programs such as FDI and neo-techno-nationalism had failed and the networked nature of the global 
knowledge economy demands a policy shift towards a more collaboratively oriented development 
plan. Indeed, the most recent Chinese policy directives do suggest a move away from ‘forced 
technology’ transfer policies, towards the development of a new more sophisticated technological 
up–scaling strategy that does not resort to techno–nationalism and instead focuses on the 
construction of policies that will serve to embed foreign firms in the Chinese economy via long 
term R&D collaborations and alliances between Chinese and foreign owned firms.   
The key to the successful implementation of this policy plan is the ability of the Chinese 
government to strategically facilitate and manage the growth of sets of collaborative alliances that 
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function to produce knowledge that is jointly owned and distributed by domestic and foreign firms. 
It also requires the Chinese government to think beyond the idea of domestically appropriated 
value. 
Alliance Capitalism and the Chinese Global Wireless Sector 
In order to participate in the development of the 4G ecosystem and gain core technology and market 
share the Chinese government has undergone a shift in its political agenda, technological focus and 
R&D expenditure allocations. In response to socio–technological changes in the global wireless 
sector, specifically the ways in which these technologies co–evolve and require interoperability, it 
has also sought to forge and reinforce far–reaching global alliances with foreign and domestic 
multinationals. By leveraging these new structures of state–led global alliance capitalism, Chinese 
state leaders have been able to facilitate the favorable insertion of its domestic firms and hence, its 
national economy into global production and innovation networks (Haberly, 2011). In these global 
innovation networks local assets are increasingly integrated into extra–territorial production 
systems, which allow foreign actors to assume part of the value creation of, and control over, a 
particular asset (Phelps, 2008, Phelps, 2007 cited in Haberly, 2011).  
Furthermore, in order to ensure global system embeddedness, technological convergence and global 
market share the Chinese state–led developmental policy in the sector has shifted from one of 
primarily promoting and protecting indigenous standards from foreign competition via regulatory 
mechanisms and the provision of R&D funding via a techno–nationalistic policy framework, to one 
that is also focused on global industry development and cooperation. This has involved the state its 
key agencies and China Mobile undertaking active coordination and negotiation with major 
stakeholders in the 4G TD–LTE sector in order to expand TD–LTE development globally, to 
promote collaborative breakthrough in key technologies and expand the membership of the industry 
supply chain. Indeed, the Chinese government has played a fundamental role in both the global 
construction and coordination of the TD–LTE full value chain itself. 
The government of China has sought to play a fundamental role in shaping the development of 
emerging technology platforms and collaborative socio–technological institutional models in the 
4G–LTE sector by acting as a key system integrator and network organiser at a global level. For 
example, China Mobile in a bid to both increase its innovation footprint in the global 4G–LTE 
global ecosystem and commercialisation processes, is engaged in collaborative behaviour at 
multiple levels, including inter–firm collaboration, strategic alliances, joint R&D development and 
the coordination of the emerging 4G–LTE network via its participation and management of global 
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initiatives such as the 3GPP. It has endeavoured to do this by constructing a global collaborative 
platform for the co–development of TDD and FDD standards and network devices in order to 
facilitate co–adaptive product development, value appropriation and ensure network embeddeness 
in the emerging 4G market. This involved the very quick development of anticipatory standards and 
a framework for the organisation of technological coordination and cooperation around the standard 
at a global level. The role of the Chinese state in facilitating and coordinating the development of 
the 4G TD–LTE ecosystem will be further examined in the next chapter. 
As it was established in preceding chapters no single organisation or territory alone possess the 
ability to gather alone the whole sets of complementary knowledge, competences and resources that 
are needed for achieving innovative technological innovation. This situation results in a strong 
interdependency between R&D actors and innovation processes. It raises, in turn, the need for 
designing and implementing varied cooperative tools (alliances, partnerships, networks) and 
contractual devices (co–funding, joint–ventures, consortia, private–public programs, etc.) that 
combine with more classical competitive instruments (costs and prices, product quality, marketing, 
etc.) in shaping the new dynamics of market competition and commercialisation and the broad 
diffusion of new developments. In order to participate in the contemporary global economy and its 
emergent production structures, supply chains, innovation chains and intellectual property regimes 
it has become increasingly necessary for the Chinese government to undergo a profound shift in 
political–economic focus. This is because in the contemporary global economy, comparative and 
competitive advantage is not a product of the creation of firms per see or national champions but 
instead by the creation of globally linked innovative learning environments and sector specific 
development. 
As can be seen from Table 5.1. there are actually more foreign firms involved the development of 
4G–TD than domestic ones and these foreign are directly linked to China Mobile which is the focal 
firm and network organiser. This suggests that the Chinese government and the state owned China 
Mobile have acquired the relational and organisational legitimacy that is necessary for alliance 
development and ecosystem coordination at both a domestic and a global level.   
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Table 5.1. List of the Key Participants in 4G – TDE Mobile Telecommunication Alliances in China 
Operators Group Alliance members Total 
China Mobile 
(TD–LTE) 
Chinese firms Agilent Technologies Inc., Datang, Datang 
Microelectronics Technology, HiSilicon 
Technologies, Huawei, Innofidei, Leadcore 
Technology, Potevio, ZTE 
9 
 Foreign firms Alcatel–Lucent, Apple, Asus, Ericsson, Google, 
HTC, Motorola, NSN, Samsung, Sony Ericsson, 
Spreadcom communications, St–Ericsson 
12 
Source: Kwak and Lee  and Chung, (2012). 
Indeed, intimately tied to the emergence of state–lead alliance capitalism in the Chinese 4G sector 
is the emergence of new sets of capabilities and institutional mechanisms designed to ensure the 
successful construction of a global market ecosystem and the development and coordination of 
appropriation tools to capture key 4G value chain rewards and benefits. These include: innovation 
chain value appropriation such as tax collection, high–tech job facilitation and R&D cluster 
building. Furthermore, a number of policy shifts are occurring in China’s overall regulatory 
framework which indicates that the Chinese government is moving towards the similar treatment of 
foreign and local firms. That is the central government is seeking to gradually eliminate 
discriminations against foreign companies in the area of operational rights as well as removing 
preferential taxation offered to these companies vis–a`–vis local counterparts. For example, by 
combining foreign and domestic business laws into a single piece of legislation (Moody, 2011). 
Moreover, recently, the MOST lifted the limits on foreign investment in research areas to encourage 
more overseas companies to build technical centers in China. Pilot programs for private capital into 
the telecommunication sector may be launched in September by the MIIT (July 26). Specifically, 
the plan targets emerging technologies as the focus of its partnering opportunities for foreign 
enterprises, allocating 18 billion, in R&D for eight emerging technologies sectors (Moody, 2011). 
That is the central government is seeking to gradually eliminate discriminations against foreign 
companies in the area of operational rights as well as removing preferential taxation offered to these 
companies vis–a`–vis local counterparts. For example, by combining foreign and domestic business 
laws into a single piece of legislation (Moody, 2011).  
For instance, as the former premier Wen Jiabao recently articulated:   
As active participants in China's economic development, reform and opening–up, multinational 
companies want to participate in the development of those industries....... have said on many 
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occasions that foreign–invested enterprises established in China in accordance with the law are 
Chinese companies. Their products are made–in–China products and their creation is Chinese 
creation. Foreign–invested enterprises in China should enjoy a fair, transparent and equal 
competition environment and we give them national treatment......To develop strategic emerging 
industries is an important measure we have taken to meet both China's immediate and long–
term needs. In developing those industries, we must be open to the outside world. We need to 
attract the participation of foreign companies, in particular their technology and talent. I wish to 
state in a serious manner that foreign–invested enterprises, when participating in the 
development of strategic emerging industries in China, will enjoy the same policy treatment as 
their Chinese counterparts (Jiabao. 2012).   
For instance a US executive with extensive operations in China recently stated that an official from 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Cooperation told him that the indigenous innovation policies 
don’t apply to his company because the government regards it as a Chinese company. The 
executive said his company felt no more discrimination selling products in China than in other 
nations, such as India, and that it has a fair opportunity to provide input on formation of standards. 
“Indigenous innovation has been bashed down and killed for now”, the executive said. “This is 
something we’ve taken off our list as something we have to focus on” (Wessner and Wolf, 2012).   
Furthermore, another U.S. executive said that a high–level official of MOST met with multinational 
representatives in June 2011 and explained that: “indigenous innovation is really about improving 
China’s ability to generate new ideas rather than displacing foreigners, and that China’s innovation 
system is open to multinationals. The MOST official also for the first time discussed ways in which 
foreign companies could participate in national government–funded research projects, an 
opportunity many multinationals have long sought” (Wessner and Wolf, 2012).   
For example, there are 5 core incentives offered by programs designed to spur on research and 
development. These incentives can be applied for by foreign invested China resident companies. 
They include 1), a reduced Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rate of 15% for high and new technology 
enterprises. In order to be eligible companies most own intellectual property for the key 
technologies of the products and fall under one of several key sectors including electronic 
information technology, new energy and energy conservation, high–technology services, and 
others. They must also engage in R&D and incur R&D expenses, and generate profits from high 
and new technology products. 2), a reduction in the CIT rate from 25 % to 15 % for three 
consecutive years and a super deduction – 150% deduction for eligible R&D expenditures. In order 
to be eligible they should design new products, formulate new technical procedures, develop new 
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skills, and have R&D expenses including but not limited to design fees, development and 
manufacturing costs of moulds and technical instruments, and appraisal and certification expenses. 
3), Tax concession for advanced technology service enterprises. In order to be eligible, the company 
should conduct work in at least one of the following advanced technology services: Information 
technology outsourcing (ITO), Business process outsourcing (BPO), Knowledge process 
outsourcing (KPO). 4), Custom duty and VAT exemptions/refunds for R&D equipment purchases. 
This incentive applies to certain R&D equipment purchases by qualified foreign–invested and 
domestic R&D centers and institutes. 5), Tax concessions on technology transfer (JLJ Group, 
2013).  
In order to gain access to the incentive program a number of leading multinational companies have 
adopted an “innovate with China” approach, which consists of launching R&D centers in China that 
focus on developing technologies for the Chinese market. General Electric, for example, established 
a Chinese R&D center that focuses on developing products in line with local market demand and 
stated government priorities, such as rural health care and sustainable development. Siemens has a 
similar center working on LED lighting products and low–cost medical equipment. Each product 
from these centers is tailored to the Chinese market and could potentially be sold in other 
developing markets. This approach serves to limit the exposure to intellectual–property risks to 
technologies or products developed in China. Certainly empirical research does indicate that foreign 
firms are now beginning to invest in China not just to access its cheap labor, but also to assess its 
increasingly abundant highly skilled human capital The OECD indicates that China is the second 
largest country in terms of the number of researchers produced. This has attracted a number of 
multinational forms focused on utilising this highly skilled human capital. For example, Ericsson, 
China has increased R&D investment over three consecutive years. Mobile technology is a key 
R&D strength of the Chinese. Alcatel does test in its 3G Reality center in Shanghai and 
NTTD0CoMo conducts 4G research in Beijing Lab. MNEs now need to adapt their products and 
services to local markets more than ever before, which often require extensive local knowledge 
(Kozhikode, 2009). A representative from Alcatel–Lucent asserted...To navigate China's highly 
competitive market, the firm has to stay agile and innovate. “For example, with China Mobile, we 
do what we call 'co–creation.' We asked them to participate with us at a very early stage of the 
development of a product.”...It is a different way of working together: more intense, but I think it 
pays off” (Alcatel–Lucent, 2012). 
Chinese Government Complicity in Intellectual Property Theft and Industrial 
Espionage  
Beyond Neo–Techno–Nationalism: An Introduction to China’s Emergent Third Way: 
Globalised Adaptive Ecology, Emergent Capabilities and Policy Instruments 
137 
In order for foreign firms to engage in R&D at both a basic and a collaborative level with Chinese 
domestic firms, China’s recent history of IP theft and state sponsored cyber espionage targeting 
intellectual assets and proprietary information will need to be urgently addressed. As it has been 
established in chapter 3, the Chinese nation is biggest conductor of IP theft in the world. For 
example, according to the IP Commission Report (Wortzel, 2013), China accounts for roughly 70% 
of international IP theft. The report asserts:  
the Chinese encourage IP theft and that both business and government entities engage in this practice. 
According to the U.S. National Counterintelligence Executive, Chinese actors are the world’s most active 
and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage obtaining trade secrets and continuing infringement of 
trademarks, copyrights, and patents. IP are stolen from American universities, national laboratories, 
private think tanks, and start-up companies, as well as from the major R&D centers of multinational 
companies (Wortzel, 2013). 
The report cites a number of recent examples including that of a American Superconductor 
Corporation that had its wind-energy software code stolen by a major customer in China resulting in 
it not only loosing that customer but also 90% of its stock value. Another case cited is a U.S. 
metallurgical company that lost technology to Chinese hackers which cost $1 billion and 20 years to 
develop. It has also been conjectured that there exits a direct correlation between the US industries 
that were compromised and those industries designated by China as strategic in their twelfth plan 
(2011-2015). This, it is argued, supports the assertion that such attacks are indeed state sponsored 
and the intention is to steal IP. Chinese cyber war poses a significant threat to the United States in 
terms of protecting IP, protecting critical infrastructure and maintain economic and technological 
superiority (Wortzel, 2013). 
However, it can be argued that as Chinese firms form more collaborative technological alliances 
with foreign firms and develop their own sophisticated IP in global innovation networks the 
Chinese government and its intellectual property regime and rights enforcement mechanisms will 
have a strong incentive to develop a more trans-territorial property protection regime that is 
designed to ensure Chinese participation is not comprised due the presence of state complicity in 
cyber hacking cases.  
 
 
Conclusion  
The need for states to engage in trans–territorial technological governance in order to facilitate the 
co–production of technological assets and shape the emergence and trajectory of technological 
ecosystems has significant implications for the developmental state and its associated 
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developmental capacities. Whereas before the state was engaged in strategic developmental projects 
designed to enhance the innovation and technological development of its own nation firms, in the 
new collaborative economy, the existence of critical ecosystem dependencies and more relational 
nature of contemporary soci–technolgical ecosystems means that it may also need to develop sets of 
capabilities that can also help to fund and facilitate the development of foreign ecosystem actors 
that are crucial to the effective functioning of the technological ecosystem. This may include fiscal, 
technological and regulatory support or international diplomacy such as standards and licensing 
negotiations. 
This emergence of new forms of national state–global governance in emerging technological 
ecosystems have been defined as being 'multi–scalar' or 'nodal in terms of spatiality and policy 
reach. These formulations too are essentially ecological concepts, thus the concept of ecology can 
be extended to apply also to governance, that is, the extended, multi–actor, multi–node, 'modular', 
network governance that is emerging globally (Salter, 2011). As Salter (2011) asserts:  
a key element in such strategies is the need for an awareness of the emergence of new 'sectors' 
and their steerage by nation states in interaction with transnational entities in the context of the 
global innovation landscape. In this context, a constructionist social theory perspective supports 
the insight that regulatory governance is one key driver that contributes to the defining of the 
boundaries of scientific and technological jurisdictions which can be supported, funded, 
structured, organised, standardised, contested and governed by the state. …..Novel, hybrid and 
combinatorial technologies present policy with the need to alter the boundaries between existing 
institutional arrangements and devise new administrative units. 
In the case of the global wireless sector the spatial and sectoral policy reach is framed around 
modular innovation and knowledge zones and the existence of sets of technologies that require 
interoperability and technological convergence to operate. From this theoretical perspective, it is a 
state's ability to respond to global opportunities and the frequently transnational nature of 
technological innovation, rather than the coherence of its inward looking policies that provides the 
key to enhancing its comparative position in the global knowledge economy and its associated 
technological ecosystems. That is: “successful geopolitical maneuvering by states is more likely to 
be characterised by the constructive use of permeable borders than the rigid application of 
sovereign jurisdiction” (Salter, 2011). 
Alliance capitalism from this perspective signals the diminishing importance of territorial economic 
policies in the 4G sector as the Chinese government endeavours to cultivate both public and private 
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allies in a bid to extend Chinese economic sovereignty globally and institutionally. That is the new 
forms of state–led global alliance capitalism take the form of complex combinations of multiple 
actors and firms linked to one another through dense overlapping networks of economic and 
political connections. Any economic activity occurring in these networks can be said to be 
embedded simultaneously in multiple states, through both territorial and non–territorial channels 
(Haberly. 2011).   
In the following chapter, I employ empirical based data to highlight how this new–alliance based 
high–technology developmental strategy is operating to successfully improve the positioning of 
Chinese domestic firms in global innovation and production networks in the wireless 
communications sector. I will also highlight how the Chinese developmental state as a strategic 
actor has developed new sets of trans–territorial policy instruments and modes of technological and 
economic diplomacy in order to facilitate and shape the ecosystem building alliances in the 4G–TD 
sector. I will argue that the success of this new gloablised alliance based programme provides 
strong evidence for the existence of strategic agency in the wireless technology sector. Specifically, 
it points to the way in which strategic agency can be achieved via collaborative ecosystem alliances, 
R&D expenditure, incentive programs and regulatory power. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 GLOBAL WIRELESS SECTOR 
“China Mobile has been committed to the converged development of TD–LTED and FDD, which 
will achieve the economy of scale and the wide support from global industry. With great effort from 
all partners, TD–LTE enters commercialisation and global deployment… Clearly this is not just a 
Chinese technology” 
(Wang Jianzhou: chairman of China Mobile) 
This chapter will be empirical in nature. It will focus on the global wireless sector in order to 
develop an empirical account that can highlight the emergence of ‘state–led’ alliance capitalism in 
China. It will focus on China’s global wireless sector, specifically, the positioning of Chinese 
domestic firms in global innovation and production networks and the occurrence, nature and 
number of strategic R&D and ecosystem building alliances that exists between Chinese and foreign 
firms in the sector. It will present empirical data relating to the increasing innovative capacity of 
key Chinese firms operating in the sector and highlight how these firms have managed to become 
firmly embedded in the contemporary and future global wireless sectors ecosystem through the 
development of innovative core technologies, the co–shaping of intellectual property standards and 
a focus on collaborative global innovation network development. Indeed, as this chapter will 
highlight, the shift from 3G to 4G technologies provides strong empirical evidence that Chinese 
firms that have adopted a collaborative, innovative based strategic development policy which views 
innovation as a global network approach rather than a techno–nationalistic one are becoming 
network leaders with increasing intellectual property portfolios and global market share in the 
sector. 
Methodology 
Because the global wireless sector itself is comprised of a long term and complex industrial chain, it 
was necessary to simplify the roles of key actors in the sector for analytical purposes. Conversely, I 
have adopted the industry categorisation set out by Hallikas et al (2005), which condenses the roles 
of the main network actors into 5 key categories. These are equipment providers (EPs), application 
providers (APs), service providers (SPs), content providers (CPs) and operators. The supply chain 
members outside the Information Communication Technology (ICT) industry include the regulator, 
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end user and intermediary. The major functions of these supply chain members are outlined below 
in Table  6.1. 
Table 6.1.  Categorisation of Wireless Communications Sector Ecosystem Members 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Supply Chain                          Functionality 
Ecosystem Members 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Within Wireless Sector                    
EP                                        Providing equipment: network infrastructure, 
                                             Handsets, etc. 
AP                                        Providing application: software etc. 
SP                                         Providing Service Platforms 
CP                                        Providing content: music, pictures, mobile games, etc. 
Operator                              The body that the government has authorised to own the basic infrastructure, 
                                            through which various services can be provided to end users. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Outside ICT Industry 
Regulator:                         The organisation that devises the various industrial regulations 
End User                           Ultimate Customers who consume the devices and various services 
Intermediacy                    Selling the handsets or SIM cards to the customers                                                            
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Hallikas, 2005 cited in Lei and Suojapelt and Hallikas and Tang, (2008). 
The empirical focus is here is primarily confined to the strategic innovation based behaviour and 
alliance data of equipment providers (EPs), service providers (SPs), operators, and regulators. 
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EP/APs are responsible for the development of new technologies within the ICT supply chain. 
Therefore, the mastery of the core technologies or standardisations is the most important value–
adding opportunity for EP/APs (Lei and Suojapelt and Hallikas and Tang, 2008). Huawei and ZTE 
both operate in this category. 
Network operators occupy a key position in the ecosystem precisely because they possess critical 
resources—mobile networks (Lei and Suojapelt and Hallikas and Tang, 2008). There are currently 
only three mobile network operators in China: China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom. 
Estimates suggest that mobile operators in China are 70% state–owned (Zhang and Prybutok, 
2005). This thesis will only examine the behaviour and policy directives of China Mobile. This is 
because China Mobile is the only Chinese operator allocated 4G Time-Division Long-Term 
Evolution (TD–LTED) spectrum licenses. As a direct result it is the role of China Mobile to 
facilitate network and ecosystem development in the sector around Long–Term Evolution Time–
Division Duplex technologies (TD–LTED).  
It is important to note that because the Chinese government is both the regulator and the owner of 
the three major telecommunication mobile network operators in China: China Mobile, China 
Unicom and China Telecom, it exercises central control over China telecommunications policy–
making. That is China’s telecommunication sector at the operator level is primarily state owned and 
directed. In China, MIIT is the official regulator of telecommunications and all information 
technology–related markets in China. The MIIT reports to the State Council. Although the MIIT 
has relinquished direct control of all–owned telecommunications operators and equipment 
manufacturers, it retains significant influence over the whole sector as most executives working in 
the sector have links with the MIIT. MIIT's functions include: developing a national telecom 
communications policy framework implementing sector regulation for manufacturing, production, 
service and software; planning public networks, including local, backbone and internet; regulating 
private networks; developing technical specifications and performance criteria for products used in 
the public networks; allocating frequencies for use in wireless services; approving new frequency 
spectrum and services; and developing postal and telecommunications service–charging policies. 
MIIT also represents China in signing relevant regional and international treaties for China/foreign 
co–operation. MIIT faces inherent conflicts of interest, as it seeks to foster the development of 
China’s telecom equipment industry and to oversee Chinese operators that are state–owned (Lei and 
Suojapelt and Hallikas and Tang, 2008). Table 6.2. provides an overview of the Chinese 
telecommunication regimes ownership structure before and after the 2008 reshuffling described in 
chapter 4.  
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Table 6.2. Comparison of the Telecom Regime 
 Before reform 1998 – 2008  After the 2008 reform 
Operator MPT Six telecom firms Three telecom firms 
Regulator MPT MII, NDRC, SASAC MIIT (Bureau of Telecoms                                                                                                                  
Management), NDRC, SASAC 
Owner Government SASAC and shareholders SASAC and shareholders 
Source: Yoe, (2009). 
The Chinese Government: Learning from the Failure of TD–SCDMA 
"One of the key lessons of TD–SCDMA is that, despite the power of China Mobile, they cannot 
create a global ecosystem on their own" 
(Tucker Grinnan, 2011) 
“We learn more from real experiments in the real economy than from the modern interpretations of 
experimental economics” 
(Swann, 2010) 
It has already been established in earlier chapters that the early development of policy directives in 
the Chinese information communication sector, involved concerted attempts by the Chinese 
government to curtail the dominance of foreign firms in the sector. It also sought to foster 
independent innovation in a bid to facilitate the movement of Chinese domestic firms up the sectors 
value chain. Specifically, this involved the issuing of distinctive standards for a range of third–
generation cellular telephony technologies in the ICT sector in China, specifically: TD–SCDMA 
and WAPI (Ran, 2011). 
Furthermore, as it has already been established, both of these standards meet with concerted foreign 
resistance. However, in an interesting and theoretically pertinent twist of fate both have become 
international standards – this time with the support of US and European companies who previously 
opposed them? The reasons for this switch are complex and numerous. Obviously, government 
procurement and the adoption of the standard by Chinese carrier’s means that it is the interest of 
foreign equipment makers to produce products that contain the standards in order to increase sales 
in the Chinese domestic market. However, TD–SCDMA, also failed to commercialise due to the 
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fact that it was an immature technology, provided inferior technologies in comparison to Wideband 
Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) and its use was limited to within China. As a 
consequence, despite its recognition as an international standard, TD–SCDMA was not universally 
embraced, due to a lack of available devices, early technical challenges and its failure to move away 
from the shadows of WCDMA (Ran, 2011, Ligang, 2011, Zhang, 2011, Ge, 2011, Feng, 2011, Yan, 
2006). 
Throughout this time–frame, incidences of regulatory control over network operators and foreign 
equipment manufactures is clearly evident. For example, with the development of TD–SCDMA, 
China Mobile, as a network operator, acted as a mediator between the network of firms that operate 
in the sector (Ligang, 2011). It sought to facilitate the building of the ecosystems architecture and 
ensure that the commercialisation of TD–SCDMA resulted in the development of innovative 
services and products. In this period China Mobile confronted with a lack of TD–SCDMA handsets 
in the market endeavored to force its foreign partners, Nokia and Motorola to produce TD–SCDMA 
products by threatening to withdraw market access. Thus, Nokia, HTC, Samsung and a number of 
local firms produced a number of TD–SCDMA handsets (Tsai, 2011). That is, the development of 
devices could not occur without political lobbing and economic coercion by the Chinese central 
government. 
Indeed, the only Chinese standards that have been successful have been those where the Chinese 
promoters have built broad alliance–based coalitions composed of both Chinese and foreign 
industry partners who could cooperate on product development and commercialisation. Thus, as 
outlined in earlier chapters, it can be argued, that one of the key lessons of WAPI and TD–SCDMA 
is that, in the contemporary networked economy it is not possible for Chinese policy–makers or 
Chinese domestic firms to insert themselves within or create a global wireless ecosystem without 
domestic and international collaboration.   
The fact that these technologies failed to successfully commercialise, coupled with an increasing 
awareness of the importance of global ecosystem development, and the need for collaborative R&D 
and intellectual property sharing has led to a shift in policy orientation by Chinese policymakers 
from a techno–nationalistic position to one more characterised by techno–globalism. As Mr. Chen 
Shanzhi, Vice President of Datang Telecom recently asserted: “TD has entered the pull of market 
period..... In the beginning of Twelfth Five–Year, we will prepare well for the commercialisation of 
TD as well as the industrialisation of 4G, and go globally in TD commercial processes. In the past 
we say technology patented, patent standardisation, standard industrialisation, industry 
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marketisation, today we must try our best to promote the market internationalisation” (Shanzi, 
2011). 
As this chapter will highlight the overarching result of this emergent policy position and the 
subsequent change in Chinese domestic firm behaviour has resulted in the development of standards 
that both anticipate and operate to define the future regulatory global infrastructure and market 
governance structure. It has involved the development of network and research alliances between 
Chinese domestic firms and foreign stake holders and actors. As a direct result, in this the round of 
ecosystem development, the Chinese state as a wireless technology ecosystem actor, and key 
Chinese domestic firms are well positioned to play a fundamental role in shaping the future 
regulatory and market dynamics in the 4G global wireless sector. 
4G 
4G, short for fourth–generation wireless communication systems, has engaged the attention of 
wireless operators, equipment makers, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), investors, and 
industry watchers around the world. 4G refers to the next generation of wireless technology that 
promises higher data rates and expanded multimedia services. “The transition from 3G to 4G will 
lead to a dramatic increase in data transmission speed from two megabits per second (mpbs) to 
1,000mbps. If 3G took mobile phones to the threshold of images and video, 4G will bring them into 
an era of the superhighway where downloading full–length films will require only seconds” 
(Cajian, 2009). 
At present, China has defined TD–LTE as one of the top priorities of the "Eleventh Five–Year 
Plan" in its key program of "Next–generation of Broadband Mobile Communication Network” (Ge, 
2011, Guo, 2011, Ligang, 2011, Zang, 2011, Feng, 2011, C114, 2010).  China Mobile owns 
2.3GHz and 2.6GHz TDD bands and is a leading promoter of TD–LTE (Min, 2011). Indeed, it has 
been conjectured that China will be the main driver for the deployment of the fourth–generation 
(4G) mobile telephone network in the Asia–Pacific region, and that there will be will be 126 million 
subscribers by 2015 with China being home to 58 million of them (Rajaraman,  2011) As Jaikishan 
Rajarmann, senior director of the GSM Association's Asia–Pacific branch argues: "We believe 2011 
will be a tipping point for the LTE industry, as 24 countries are about to build up LTE networks by 
the end of this year,.. there will be 4 million LTE subscribers globally by then...The 4G network 
will really take off in 2012, and by 2015, the number of users is expected to rise to 300 million 
across 55 countries” (Rajarmann, 2011). 
Global Wireless Sector 
146 
China Mobile Communication Corp, the parent of the Hong Kong–listed China Mobile Ltd, has 
engaged in pre–competitive market construction since 2007 to prepare for the rolling–out of 4G 
commercial services in China by adopting TD–LTE technology. (TD–LTE), also referred to as 
(LTE –TDD), is a mobile–telecommunications technology and standard that has been co–
developed, by Datang Telecom, China Mobile, Huawei, ZTE, Nokia Siemens networks, Alcatel 
Shanghai Bell, Qualcomm, ST–Ericsson, Leadcore and others (Motorola, 2010).  It is one of two 
variants of the 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology, the other being Frequency–Division 
Long–Term Evolution (FD–LTE or LTE FDD). Likewise, TD–LTE–Advanced is an LTE–
Advanced time–division variant, an evolutionary upgrade version of TD–LTE. TD–LTE Advanced 
can easily reach download speed of more than 150 megabytes per second, much faster than third–
generation (3G) TD–SCDMA technology. This upgraded version of TD–LTE, or TD–LTE–
Advanced, is now among the three international 4G standards accepted by the United Nations (UN) 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The other two are LTE–FDD and Worldwide 
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), which are dominated by Europe and the United 
States, respectively (Motorola, 2010). It has been estimated that TD–LTE and LTE–FDD will 
coexist with global share of 33% and 67% respectively (Goldman–Sachs, 2011). 
It is important to note here that TD–LTE is often wrongly described as a Chinese technology. In 
fact TD–LTE shares approximately 90% of its core technology with “mainstream” LTE–FDD 
(Grivolas, 2011). The differences between TDD and FDD are solely a physical layer manifestation 
and therefore invisible to higher layers (Motorola, 2010). As a result, there are no operational 
differences between the two modes in the system architecture. Indeed, the key advantage of the 
LTE ecosystem is the vast economy of scale gained through combining LTE FDD and TDD (TD–
LTE) in a standardised way. The 3GPP standard allows both devices and implementations to be 
simpler, a major factor in reducing cost for deploying a mobile broadband technology. Since other 
TDD based technologies, including TD–SDMA and WiMAX, also have a migration path to LTE, 
combining FDD and TDD makes the scale and economy of the LTE ecosystem very attractive to 
operators (Grivolas, 2011). 
Thus, with support from the Chinese central government, China Mobile developed a plan to 
capitalise on LTE network congestion, which is becoming an increasing problem as data traffic 
levels rise rapidly. Operating from the premise that TDD as an unpaired spectrum will trade at a 
significantly lower price per MHz/ as well as the fact that many countries throughout the world 
have large chunks of unpaired TDD spectrum available, both used and unused China Mobile, in a 
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clear example of institutional entrepreneurship and anticipatory governance, has sought 
technological leadership in the sector as a powerful network coordinator and ecosystem builder. 
It has endeavoured to do this by constructing a global collaborative platform for the co–
development of TDD and FDD standards and network devices in order to appropriate value and 
network embeddeness in the emerging 4G market. This involved the very quick development of 
anticipatory standards and a framework for the organisation of technological coordination and 
cooperation around the standard at a global level.  That is China Mobile has strategically sought to 
position LTE –TDD as the de facto global standard for mobile broadband – something most cellular 
operators would welcome for cost reasons. (Grivolas, 2011:1). As Wang Jianzhou, CEO of China 
Mobile recently asserted: “The development of mobile broadband highlights the unique flexible 
advantage of TDD spectrum ... China Mobile has been committed to the converged development of 
LTE–TDD and FDD, which will achieve the economy of scale and the wide support from global 
industry. With great effort from all partners, TD–LTE enters commercialisation and global 
deployment... Clearly this is not just a Chinese technology” (Jianzhou, 2011).   
Moreover, press releases, conference proceedings and policy documents further support the 
assertion that the Chinese government has adjusted its previous indigenous technology policy 
framework in order to adapt to the collaborative nature of contemporary technological ecosystems. 
For instance, Stephen Hire, director of marketing at testing and measurement company, Aeroflex 
Asia, speaking at the next–generation mobile broadband session at Communic Asia asserted that the 
Chinese government has applied lessons learned from its 3G standard (TD–SCDMA) on how to 
proceeded on the development and promotion of TD–LTE and redesigned it policy directives to 
incorporate the interests and ecosystem dependencies of foreign firms.  As Hire asserts: “One of the 
weaknesses of TD–SCDMA was that many saw it as too far separated from the core 3G technology, 
so there was very little international participation .....in contrast, TD–LTE is part of the global core 
LTE community......With limited participation, economies of scale around TD–SCDMA could not 
be achieved ... On the other hand, it was easier for manufacturers to develop for TD–LTE over the 
common chipset, and this reduced technical hurdles and lowered the barriers of entry for 
manufacturers...... The Chinese government's strong commitment to promote TD–LTE also played 
a part in providing incentives for foreign companies to invest in the technology...... For instance...... 
it channeled funds toward supporting government–sponsored organisations, such as the TD 
Industrial Alliance, to develop the TD–LTE ecosystem” (Hire cited in Qing, 2011, 20). In a similar 
vein Zhou Jianming, general manager of China Mobile's technology department speaking at the 4G 
World China Conference in Beijing asserts: “Indeed, the development and use of TD–LTE 
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advanced will be shaped largely by the market. Within China both TD–LTE and FD–LTE will be 
supported by Chinese government and international firms... China Mobile hopes consumers will be 
able to access both the TD–LTE network and the LTE–FDD network with the same 
handset...Convergence will provide a much bigger platform for TD–LTE technology" (Jianming, 
2011, Feng, 2011). 
This example serves to further support the argument that Chinese high–technology policy makers 
have moved beyond the idea of techno–nationalism and the assumption that the only way to achieve 
significant market share in the global wireless sector is via first mover status and indigenous 
standard ownership. Instead, China Mobile has sought to shape and construct a new technological 
ecosystem via collaborative alliances and network coordination. The overarching goal here was to 
enlarge the market itself by offering a niche product that exploits network congestion. It highlights 
how the Chinese government via the state owned China Mobile, is engaged in innovation ecosystem 
building alliances and the recruitment and development of other firms and system actors as a 
strategic way to ensure that critical infrastructure, regulatory standards and complementary 
technologies are developed and critical ecosystem dependencies addressed, in order to secure the 
successful globalised commercialisation of TD–LTE wireless technology. 
China’s Domestic Firms and Evidence of Innovation Capability 
Empirical data and interview transcripts indicate that two key Chinese domestic firms, Huawei and 
ZTE and the state owned China Mobile have become firmly embedded in the LTE–Advanced and 
TD–LTE global wireless ecosystem. All three firms are becoming network leaders, with a range of 
dynamic capabilities and collaborative network linkages and alliances.    
Acquiring innovation capability is used here to refer to improving the ability for innovation and 
self–developed technologies, which is in direct contrast to the strategies of imitating or assimilating 
obsolete technologies of more advanced countries. Also important is the capacity to produce 
knowledge in networks and create value from networks.  A true innovation network is defined by 
partners who collaboratively develop innovative intellectual property, then proliferate the 
innovation throughout the network and to the network members partners and customer ecosystems 
(Zutshi, 2009). This data will be presented in four subsections. These are alliance data and R&D 
expenditure, patent data, and market share. 
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Alliance Data and R&D Expenditure 
Evidence that Chinese domestic firms and the Chinese government are increasingly engaging in 
collaborative R&D, ecosystem building alliances and technological system shaping in order to 
become firmly embedded in global production and innovation networks can be drawn from recent 
data on R&D partnering. Three key types of alliances can be isolated for analysis: R&D alliances, 
standard alliances and market alliances. All Chinese firms examined engaged in a mix of all three 
alliance types; with varying forms and levels of inter–firm commitment. 
China Mobile 
China Mobile is the world’s largest telecom carrier by subscriber numbers. As of November 2011 
China Mobile had 638.89 million subscribers (Lo and Lewis, 2011).  As Table 6.3. highlights, in 
2011, China Mobile was cited as the number one telecommunication firm in the world by revenue. 
The Company ranked 10th in the Financial Times, Fortune Global 500. China Mobile’s position in 
Forbes Magazine’s, Global 2000 list rose from 55th to 38th place in 2011. The China Mobile brand 
was named one of “BRANDZTM Top 100 Most Powerful Brands” by Millward Brown and the 
Financial Times for the fifth consecutive year, and the brand value currently ranks 8th, topping all 
other telecommunications operators in the world (China Mobile, 2010). 
Table 6.3. Top 10 Global Telecommunications Firms in the World 2011 by Revenue 
Position Firm 
1 China Mobile 
2 Vodaphone 
3 Telefonica 
4 Ufone Gsm 
5 AT & T 
Global Wireless Sector 
150 
6 Telenor 
7 TeliaSonera 
8 Deutsche Telecom AG 
9 China Unicom 
10 France Telecom SA 
 
Source: Various Public Sources and Internet Databases 
As it has already been established, China Mobile as a network organiser has been responsible for 
stimulating innovation and overseeing the coordination of the Chinese wireless communications 4G 
sectors ecosystem.  In order to do this it is required to establish relationships with SPs, CPs and 
device manufacturers, as well as equipment and systems providers. China Mobile has asserted that 
its primary developmental strategy for the group is a focus on open platform operation and the 
adherence to cooperative and win–win principles (China Mobile, 2010). 
A key feature of China Mobile’s developing business model for the TD–LTE sector is the shift 
from an overt focus on the development of indigenous knowledge and standards development to 
one of global market maker and coordinator. This has resulted in an expanded role for China 
Mobile as an alliance facilitator and coordinator at a global level. One example of China Mobile’s 
changing business model and the Chinese government’s evolving high–technology development 
policy can be drawn from China Mobiles role in setting up the Global TD–LTE Initiative (GTI) 
which was launched in February 2011 by China Mobile, Bharti Airtel, Softbank Mobile, Vodafone, 
Clearwire, E–Plus, and Aero2. The organisation, which, as of December 2011, possessed 35 
members, primary goal is to focus on facilitating multilateral cooperation among members in an 
attempt to promote the fast development of TD–LTE technology, promote the convergence of TD–
LTE and FDD modes to maximise economies of scale, and the sharing of the ecosystem with other 
TDD technologies, such as the Japanese extended Global Platform (XGP) technology. That is, the 
GTI is designed to create value for stakeholders across the TD–LTE ecosystem, facilitate the early 
adoption of the technology and ensure the convergence and interoperability of TD–LTE and LTE–
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FDD. As the general manager of China Mobile Research Institute, Huang Xiaoqing asserts: 
“Operators worldwide are looking for a single standardised protocol” (Xiaoqing, 2011).   
Furthermore, China Mobile is also engaged in a network of R&D alliances with Sony Ericsson, 
Nokia Siemens, Huawei, ZTE, Datang, Alcatel–Lucent, SK Telecom, Apple, Google, Rhode & 
Schwarz, and Clearwire etc. in a bid to facilitate the production of network devices. To promote 
TD–LTE devices, the chairman of China Mobile, Wang Jianzhou states, that China Mobile will 
enhance cooperation with Taiwanese hardware partners, including HTC Corp, Foxconn Technology 
Group and MediaTek. (GTI, 2011). In 2011, two top Chinese and South Korean operators – China 
Mobile and SK Telecom (SKT) –forged closer links with a deal that will see them jointly develop 
technologies focusing on next–generation networks, device platforms, machine to machine services 
and the booming applications market. Moreover, China Mobile has established an open 
interoperability testing lab, with seven system vendors and six terminal chip vendors participants to 
date (Ayvazian, 2011:10). 
China Mobile has conducted extensive R&D lab and field trials and has been working closely with 
operator partners such as Vodaphone and Verizon and international organisations such as 3GPP, 
Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMN), LTE/SAI Trail initiative (LSTI), the Global System 
for Mobile Communications (GSM) and another key organisations and actors to promote LTE–
FDD/TDD convergence and synchronised development. Moreover, China Mobile is currently 
cooperating with test instrument manufacturers such as Rohde & Schwarz, Anite, Agilent, Anritsu 
in order to develop test cases. Cao Shumin, vice director of the Telecommunication Research 
Institution (TRI) which is a division of MIIT has recently emphasised the global nature of the  TD–
LTE standard, and the open and inclusive nature of the testing process asserting: “tests on the 
network are fully open...the test site at the MIIT institution has gathered not only domestic cell 
phone manufacturers but also multinational tycoons like Motorola, Ericsson, and Nokia Siemens 
Networks... But as the two technologies are based on the same LTE system, they are able to share 
R&D results and subscribers at a global level” (Shumin, 2011). China Mobile is also a member of 
key standards bodies and took a leading role in 36 industry standards development projects, 
participated in 63 projects and completed the establishment of 26 industry standards in 2010 (China 
Mobile, 2010). 
Indeed, China Mobile provides us with an interesting case of state–led alliance capitalism in China. 
For instance, as a state governed operator, China Mobile, highlights how a state can be successful at 
technological ecosystem building and market coordination and facilitation at a global level and 
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affirms the willingness of the Chinese central government to adapt its economic policy making 
towards a more collaborative alliance based model of technological development. Furthermore, it is 
also interesting to note that for first time China Mobile has engaged in an attempt to approach 
standardisation in a bottom–up fashion–from the market–rather than top–down–from the 
government (Ernst, 2010). In this way, it has been suggested, that we may be witnessing China 
Mobile’s first steps towards its accession as a global mobile operator. As the chairman of China 
Mobile asserts; “.....realise that new model is required the second opportunity is the industrial chain 
collaboration, which is more important than ever... I talked with U.S. AT & T's CEO yesterday, and 
we both feel that the most difficult for us today is not the technology, money, market, but how to 
adapt the changes of our business model and ecological chain, which is the biggest challenge to 
operators...this is the first time Chinese mobile communication industry can stand on the same 
starting line with peers in developed countries” (Sha, 2010). 
Huawei 
Founded in 1988, Huawei is a privately company that is owned directly by its employees. It is 
located in Shenzhen China and is currently the largest Chinese telecommunications equipment 
maker. Its core activities include building next generation telecommunications networks; providing 
operational and consulting services and equipment to enterprises; and manufacturing 
communications devices for consumer market (Huawei, 2011). 
Huawei has engaged in collaborative R&D and networking ecosystem development via a number of 
partnerships and alliance forms since its inception. In 2000, Huawei partnered with IBM in order to 
gain access to IBM’s network processes R&D technology centers (Ahrens, 2013). In 2003 Huawei, 
NBC and Mastushita (Panasonic) established a joint venture (JV) company, Cosmobile, to share 
smartphone technology. Later that year, NEC and Huawei opened the 3G Mobile Internet Open 
Laboratory to incubate 4G technologies (Ahrens, 2013). In March 2003, Huawei and 3Com 
Corporation formed a JV company, 3Com–Huawei (H3C), which focused on R&D production and 
the sales of data networking products.  In 2005, Huawei and Simenes formed a JV called TD Tech, 
which focused on the development of 3G and TD–SCDMA mobile communication technology 
products. The US$100 million investment gave the company a 49% stake in the venture, while 
Siemens held a 51% stake. In 2007, after Nokia and Siemens co–founded Nokia–Siemens Network, 
Siemens transferred all shares it held in TD Tech to Nokia Siemens Networks.  In 2007 Huawei and 
American security firm Symantec announced the formation of a JV company to develop security 
and storage solutions to market to telecommunications carriers. Huawei owns 51% of the new 
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company, named Huawei Symantec Inc. whilst Symantec owns the rest. In 2008, Huawei launched 
a JV with UK–based marine engineering company, Global Marine Systems, to deliver undersea 
network equipment and related services. Later that year, Huawei also established a JV with 
Telecom Venezuela, called Industrial Electronica Orinoquia, for research and development and the 
sale of telecommunications terminals. Telecom Venezuela holds a 65% stake while Huawei holds 
the remaining 35% stake. In October 2010, Sequans and Huawei entered into a partnership to 
develop and mature TD–LTED technology for the global marketplace. In 2010 Huawei set up a 
joint innovation center with Telenor in Pakistan. In 2011 Huawei has announced plans to set up a 
global research and development center for R&D in Italy and a joint innovation center with Bell 
Canada (Huawei, 2011). 
Huawei actively participates in standard alliances and has partnered with key international wireless 
standardisation organisations to drive technology development and the improvement of standards 
within the industry, including 3GPP, APT (Asia–Pacific Telecommunity), ARIB (Association of 
Radio Industries and Businesses), ETSI (European Telecommunication Standards Institute), IEEE 
(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), ITU 
(International Telecommunication Union), TIA (Telecommunication Industry Association) and 
WWRF (Wireless World Research Forum). Huawei currently holds significant roles within these 
organisations, with 83 key positions, from chairmen and board members to rapporteurs (Huawei, 
2011). 
Huawei has also sought to engage in a number of alliances to facilitate and develop market access. 
For example, it entered into a strategic cooperation alliance with Marconi by reselling each other’s 
products in their home countries (Huawei, 2011). 
ZTE 
ZTE Corporation (formerly Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation) is a Chinese 
multinational telecommunications equipment and systems company headquartered in Shenzhen, 
China. ZTE was founded in 1985 by a group of state owned enterprises, but operates as a “private–
operating” economic entity (Guo, 2005). As of 2011, ZTE is the second–largest Chinese telecom 
equipment maker and the world's fourth–largest mobile phone manufacturer (ZTE, 2011). 
ZTE has partnered with over 230 major carriers and distributors in more than 160 countries and 
regions around the world, and has strategic partnerships with 47 of the global top 50 carriers. In 
2011, ZTE applied for more international patents than any other company in the world (ZTE, 2011).  
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For example, ZTE has established strategic cooperation agreements with leading 
telecommunications giants such as Portugal Telecom, France Telecom, Alcatel, Ericsson and Nortel 
in NGN and mobile systems, with Hutchison in 3G, Orchard in marketing and content bundling and 
with Marconi in optical transmission systems (ZTE, 2011). In an example of collaborative platform 
development ZTE announced a strategic alliance with Intel in March 2013, which will see 
ZTE equip its upcoming smartphones with Intel's newest processor, the Atom Z2580.  This is not 
the first time that the two companies have cooperated on smartphone development. In August 2012, 
ZTE launched Grand X IN, the company’s first Intel–powered device. The android–based device 
became the best–selling smartphone in Austria. It has also had successful sales in Germany, Poland, 
Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Macedonia, Slovakia, Moldova, Greece, Sweden and Norway, and soon 
will also be offered in the French market. As Ao Wen, general manager of ZTE mobile devices in 
Europe articulates: “ZTE GRAND X IN” is the first flagship smartphone powered by Intel chips in 
Europe... Strong cooperation with Intel, we released the product successfully in Europe and thereby 
improve our in brand awareness in these important markets, and we look forward to continue to 
expand its cooperation with Intel to support the development of the resurgence in the high–end 
smart phone market, Intel is the strategic partners we have developed a new state–of–the–art mobile 
technology” (ZDNET, 2013). 
The company is an active member of more than 70 international standardisation organisations and 
forums. ZTE holds the position of Co–chairman in two Telecommunication Standardisation Sector 
(ITU–T) working groups and is the editor of a number of ITU–T standards including next–
generation network (NGN) and optical transmission and network security. As a member of the 3rd 
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), ZTE has edited three standards involving 3G radio access 
networks and terminal systems. The company is also a board member of the WiMAX Forum (ZTE, 
2011). In 2013, ZTE joined the Power Matters Alliance (PMA) to help facilitate the standardisation 
and convergence of wireless charging guidelines and products (Huang, 2013). It is also a member of 
the Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMN). NGMN is a mobile telecommunications 
association of mobile operators, vendors, manufacturers and research institute was formed in 2006. 
It was founded by major mobile operators as an open forum to evaluate candidate technologies to 
develop a common view of solutions for the next evolution of wireless networks. Its objective is to 
ensure the successful commercial launch of future mobile broadband networks through a roadmap 
for technology and friendly user trials and ecosystem convergence (NGMN, 2006). 
ZTE is actively cooperating with various parties in the TD–LTE ecosystem. The company 
collaborates on Interoperability Tests (IOT) with mainstream chipset providers such as Qualcomm, 
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Innofidei, Altair, Sequans and ST–Ericsson (ZTE, 2011). It also works to promote the development 
of the TD–LTE platform and standards. In October 2009, ZTE aligned up with Innofidei to 
successfully demonstrate the industry’s first multi–vendor TD–LTE high–definition video service at 
the ITU Telecom World 2010 conference in Geneva. At the end of 2010, ZTE was the first in the 
industry to launch Qualcomm chipset based TD–LTE terminals and achieved a download rate of 
nearly 100Mbps (ZTE, 2011). 
R&D Expenditure 
A growing body of research indicates that a firms level of R&D expenditure is a key determinant of 
its innovative capacity and ability to gain market share. In terms of R&D expenditures, patents, and 
venture capital investment, the sector exceeds other industries by a significant margin (OECD, 
2009). Furthermore, as well as a commitment to high levels of R&D expenditure contemporary 
firms operating in the global wireless sector need to establish and maintain both domestic and 
global R&D networks that allow for research collaboration and knowledge exchange. Evidence 
gathered by this thesis indicates that China Mobile, Huawei and ZTE have all firmly established 
global R&D networks and high rates of global R&D embeddedness. 
Table 6.4. shows a more detailed investigation of the R&D expenditure of selected companies. 
Domestic leading firms, such as Huawei and ZTE, generally spent over 10% of revenue in R&D in 
2010 This level is comparable to the international R&D spending in the telecom–equipment 
industry, i.e. from10% to 20%. Furthermore, Huawei, and ZTE both achieved an ‘R&D staff/total 
employment’ ratio of over 40%. 
Table 6.4. R&D Expenditure in Billions of Selected Companies 2010 
 Expenses As per cent of net sales 
Ericsson 29.9 14.7 
Alcatel-Lucent (French) 2.6 15.6 
Qualcomm 2.5 23 
Nokia Siemens 27 16.5 
Cisco 5.2 13.6 
Huawei 16.5 8.9 
ZTE 7.0 10.1 
Source: Company Annual Reports and Various Public Sources 
All three Chinese companies have set up joint R&D labs with foreign firms in order to secure global 
R&D embeddedness, access to global markets and localised knowledge content. As of December 
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2011, Huawei Technologies has established a total of 20 joint R&D labs with; Texas Instruments, 
Motorola, IBM, Intel, Agere Systems, SunMicrosystems, Altera, Qualcomm, Infineon and 
Microsoft, Telenor, Intel, Agere, Microsoft, NEC and Bell Canada (Huawei, 2011). "We have 
established more than 20 joint innovation centers with global leading operators and now lead the 
strong development of the LTE industry by transforming advanced technologies into customers 
competitiveness and success in business" (Huawei, 2011). 
ZTE has established 15 R&D centers and institutes across North America, Europe and Asia. The 
company has also established joint laboratory partnerships with Texas Instruments, Intel, Agere 
Systems, HHNEC, IBM, Microsoft (China), Qualcomm, Huahong NEC and Tsinghua University. 
The company has undertaken technological research alliance projects with 50 academic institutions 
throughout China, where ZTE is also a fully–fledged member of the China Communications 
Standardisation Association (CCSA) (ZTE, 2011). 
In 2009 China Mobile announced plans to establish a research and development facility in Silicon 
Valley: “This is the first overseas research and development facility that China Mobile has set up. 
The president of China Mobile's Institute of Research, Huang Xiaoqing, told the news site that it 
sees most of its revenue today coming from voice services, but the company recognises that data 
services are the future. And it's looking to Silicon Valley for innovation” (China Mobile, 2011). 
Foreign Firms as Strategic Insiders 
Furthermore, there are a number of indications that the Chinese government is not just funding the 
innovation programs of its domestic firms. Instead, it is also funding research collaboration between 
its domestic firms and foreign MNCs. Hence, the strategic policy directives of the Chinese 
government are now beginning to extend beyond the boundaries of its domestic firms. For instance, 
several interviewees noted that the Chinese government has aggressively funded efforts to promote 
collaboration between Chinese universities and industrial enterprises, including foreign firms. 
Taking advantage of this, many Western firms have been able to supplement their own research 
efforts by encouraging Chinese engineering and science professors to undertake R&D related to the 
needs of Western companies, with most of the costs being underwritten by the Chinese taxpayer 
(Moody, 2011, Ran, 2011, Ligang, 2011, Zhang, 2011, Ge, 2011, Feng, 2011). 
Some analysts believe that the multinationals working on research in China have the potential to 
create a fusion which can drive technological development. As Arding Hsu, senior vice–president 
of German electronics and engineering company Siemens, which has major R&D facilities in 
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China, articulates: "China is an ideal place for fusion innovation to thrive. On the one hand, China's 
fast–growing market is characterised by massive and diverse needs... "On the other hand, the long 
history and brilliant culture of this country have accumulated a lot of interesting knowledge" 
(Moody, 2011). Chuang Ching of Alcatel–Lucent Shanghai Bell also emphasises that government 
support of R&D investment is attractive for multinationals: “The government is also keen to offer 
incentives for foreign companies to set up R&D bases in the country as part of its 12th Five–Year 
Plan (2011–2015)...The government's Five–Year Plan is focused on innovation and a very 
important part of that is incentives to encourage research and development investment not just for 
domestic but for multinational companies too, relating to costs and business tax incentives to set up 
research and development centers” (Ching cited in Moody, 2011). 
Furthermore, foreign firms are increasingly deciding to conduct innovative R&D research in China 
with more than 41% of R&D centers focused on the ICT industry. For example, there are now 
1,200 foreign multinational R&D centers in China, representing a $12.8 billion investment. Indeed, 
of the 2,400 patents awarded to telecommunications giant Alcatel–Lucent in 2010, 280 came from 
China, 11.75 % of the global total. Chuang Ching, executive vice–president of product and research 
and development of Alcatel–Lucent Shanghai Bell, said China was at the forefront of the 
company’s research and development efforts: "China has a rich talent pool and our workforce is 
very young, dynamic, highly motivated and able to meet challenging targets, he said. Foreign 
multinationals increasingly see China as the land of invention” (Ching cited in Moody, 2011). 
Patent Data 
One measure of strength in innovation capability, R&D output and the ownership of core 
intellectual property can be measured by patent filing. The filing and ownership of patents is often 
cited as a measure for a knowledge–based economy and a barometer to judge the spread of 
innovation–based companies in each country (Guanzhou Lilon Consulting and Services Co Ltd, 
2011). 
A patent is an exclusive right to exploit (make, use, sell, or import) an invention over a limited 
period of time (20 years from filing) within the country where the application is made. Patents are 
granted for inventions which are novel, inventive (non–obvious) and have an industrial application 
(useful) (Tabarrok, 2002). Essential patents are important here; these are patents which disclose and 
claim one or more inventions that are required to practice a given industry standard (Updegrove, 
2007). Mobile phone IPR licensing significantly includes patents that are “essential” to implement 
various standards including GSM, Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), High Speed Packet 
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Access (HSPA) and LTE. Those are patents that are core to the 4G technology standard LTE and 
TD–LTE are currently viewed as among the most valuable intellectual property in the mobile 
industry, due to the fact, that most major wireless operators around the world are building out LTE 
networks (Mallinson, 2011). 
As globalisation has increased technology–based competition, the key to competitive success is a 
broad portfolio of ‘essential patents’ which are necessary to produce any product that meets the 
specifications defined in the standard. It is important to note here that the current ownership of LTE 
essential patents is highly contested and no consensus exits on who exactly owns key patents in the 
sector. Certainly, any analysis of patent data is faced with a number of methodological problems 
that are widely discussed in the literature. Indeed, valuing patents is not as simple as counting the 
number of patents a company has. Deciding which patents are “essential” is equally complicated. 
Misek argues that patents can be subject to special conditions that affect their worth, such as cross 
licensing agreements, foreign ownership and asset transfer restrictions. (Misek, 2011). Indeed, it is 
interesting and pertinent to note that different studies conducted to establish essential patent 
ownership in the sector have produced varying results even when a similar methodological 
framework was employed. For example, research conducted by Nokia and Jeffery on patent 
ownership found that the proportion of patents judged essential by different researchers varied by 
more than a factor of ten (Mallinso, 2011). Certainly, it is not possible to independently determine 
the ownership of essential patents. Hence, the only credible medium for establishing the ownership 
and distribution of essential patents is to have primary information of the cross–licensing that 
companies are signing and the actual patents involved. Even then, a complete picture of patent 
ownership in the sector can take years to evolve as litigation involving patent ownership is the only 
legal way to verify a companys claim to ownership (Mallinso, 2011). 
As the Figure 6.1. indicates both Huawei and ZTE are capturing an increasing share of LTE 
essential patents with intellectual property databases indicating that Huawei and ZTE owned 8% 
and 7% of LTE essential patents respectively as of November 2011. InterDigital is the leading 
holder of essential patents in LTE, with its Patent Holdings arm controlling 13% and its Technology 
unit 11%. Next comes Qualcomm with 13%, Nokia and Samsung on 9% each, Ericsson and 
Huawei on 8%, ZTE at 7%, LG, with 6%, and NTT DoCoMo with 5%, while the remaining 11% is 
held by 'others' (ETSI IPR Online Database, 2010). 
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Figure 6.1 - LTE Essential patent Ownership 2010 
 
Source: ETSI IPR Online Database (2010). 
Furthermore, as Figure 6.2. highlights in 2011 both Huawei and ZTE are listed in the top 10 list of 
international patent application filers with ZTE Corporation filing 1,863 patents and Huawei 1,528 
patents resulting in a  rank of second and fourth respectively (ETSI IPR online Database, 2010). 
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Figure 6.2 - Leading Corporate Patent Filers 2010 
 
Source: ETSI IPR online Database, (2010). 
Whilst the exact number of contracts and essential patents awarded to Huawei and ZTE are a matter 
of contention, both ZTE and Huawei assert that their commitment to R&D has played a significant 
role in their increasing ownership of essential LTE patents.  As a ZTE representative articulates in 
this statement: “The Company’s share of LTE essential patents is a result of ZTE's continuous R&D 
investment into LTE related key technologies since 2004... It said it would commit more R&D 
resources to accumulate essential patents and adopt a proactive approach in improving 4G and 
developing 4G+ standards. With LTE essential patents being evenly distributed among different 
vendors, we believe that it will be helpful to provide a comparatively healthy and balanced IPR 
licensing environment for the development of the 4G industry...Furthermore, the firm aims to 
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continue to file or acquire patents and increase its share of the evolving list of LTE essential IPR to 
10% by 2012” (ZTE, 2011). 
In a similar fashion, Huawei has emphasised how its commitment to investing in R&D to create 
competitive products and solutions is the reason behind its accession to a tier one global 
telecommunications firm. For example, Leo Sun, chief executive of Huawei France, who is in 
charge of Huawei’s European development strategy, asserts that: “Huawei will rely largely on its 
cutting edge in R&D to help achieve its goals... “We have more than 18,000 patents and almost 50 
% of our employees are dedicated for R&D. In other words, we have the biggest R&D force in the 
world. Thanks to that innovation, we can maintain our global leading edge in innovative 
technology” (Sun, 2011).   
Market Share 
“You have to be a leader, not a follower...timing is everything?" 
(Huang Xiaoqing, 2011) 
Another important indicator of a firm’s innovative capacity is market share. The translation of 
patent ownership to that of market share is a key indicator of the overall success and innovative 
capacity of a company. Certainly, it is well documented in the literature that without the 
commercialisation of technology no value can be captured and R&D investment is lost (Ernst, 
2003).  Furthermore, it is important to note here that the long–term development of market share 
and value capturing is not only driven by price but also by technology competition and factors such 
as speed to market and intellectual property protection. 
Furthermore, the presence of an imitation lag, i.e. it will take time and costs for a follower to absorb 
superior technology and apply it to manufacturing processes, is one important strategic pathway  
that can be adopted by innovative firms intent on acquiring and sustaining market share. Under 
these conditions, new or advanced products integrating superior technologies will form oligopolistic 
markets, at least temporarily, before the followers catch up (Nehausler and Frietsch and Schubert 
and Blind, 2011). Therefore, firms developing new products integrating superior technology will 
dominate the markets for these products, not only resulting in high market shares but also allowing 
them to (at least temporarily) reap above–normal profits as a result of market power. This 
argumentation is also empirically supported. Some empirical evidence, for example, comes from a 
study by Hendricks and Singhal, 1997 cited in Nehausler and Frietsch and Schubert and Blind, 
(2011), who showed, that delaying the introduction of new products decreases the market value of 
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the firm. Certainly, significant penalties for firms seem to exist for not introducing new products on 
time. 
Press releases, company statements and secondary texts and articles, clearly indicate that China 
Mobile, Huawei and ZTE all clearly understand the importance of market speed and the need to 
engage in intellectual property rights protection in order to secure market share and capture the 
benefits of the emerging 4G ecosystem. For example, in an article entitled: The Great Leap 
Forward: How the World’s Largest Operator Aims to Jump One Generation, China Mobile’s 
research units general manger, Bill Huang asserts that: “telecom vendors are not moving fast 
enough to develop products for the 4G ecosystem” (Huang cited in Thoren and Harvard, 2011). 
Moreover, Huawei’s vice president of wireless marketing, Lars Bondelind, recently asserted, that 
the company possesses a three–month to six–month lead over its closest rivals Ericsson and Nokia 
Siemens (NSN): “Let’s put it this way; we have a cost advantage because of our R&D base in 
China, which is 35,000–40,000 engineers. That is a big advantage... But, today, we are three–to–six 
months ahead of most of our competitors in all areas. We are competing with Ericsson and NSN on 
features and functions and technology. And they are playing catch–up” (Bondelind, cited in Sun, 
2011). In a similar vein ZTE has articulated its intention to become one of the top three global 
wireless equipment providers globally. As Xu Ming, vice–president of wireless services for ZTE 
told Reuters that: "We want to be in the top three in terms of revenues and market share”. Xu also 
stated that international expansion was a major priority for the company: “Our strategy for the 
wireless business in the past 10 years has been to gain critical mass in China, and then we expanded 
into emerging markets like Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Now we are bringing that push into 
developed markets like Europe...Xu stated that he was confident that ZTE could make its goal of 
reaching the top three. The trend is very clear. If you look at Alcatel Lucent or Nokia Siemens 
Networks, their growth rate is flat or shrinking, and even market leader Ericsson has a slow growth 
rate. For ZTE, if we can continue to grow at the very rapid rates that we have seen in recent years, 
we will soon take over one of the major vendors in terms of revenues" (Xu cited in Weissberger, 
2011). 
China Mobile is one of the most aggressive operators when it comes to pushing for the 
commercialisation of TD–LTE technology. With the approval of MIIT to conduct large–scale 
testing of TD–LTE technology, China Mobile has tapped vendors such as Ericsson, Alcatel–Lucent 
(NYSE:ALU) and Nokia Siemens Networks to deploy various pieces of the network in seven large 
Chinese cities. The six cities are: Shanghai, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and 
Xiamen. China Mobile said in a statement that the upcoming large–scale tests are aimed at 
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exploring the commercial potential of the technology, and to provide impetus for international 
telecom carriers to adopt and deploy the new network. As the chairman of China Mobile recently 
conjectured: “We are targeting commercialisation next year, not in five years......... So you see: 4G 
is not being pushed by the vendors, like 3G was. 4G is being pushed by the carriers. LTE is the only 
standard in the industry where, if you have a product, people will buy it right away. It’s the reverse 
of how things used to be, and very interesting. LTE is being developed fast, but not fast enough” 
(Huang cited in Thoren and Harvard, 2011). It has been estimated that the market for LT–TDD 
handsets, equipment and semiconductors will total $98 billion from 2012 to 2016 (Goldman Sachs, 
2011). 
Indeed, TD–LTE is currently being widely adopted by the vendor community as well as operators.  
According to Thorsten Robrecht, head of LTE Radio Access Product Management at Nokia 
Siemens Networks, TD–LTE has emerged as a solution with a far wider range of potential 
applications than was first expected. “TD–LTE is really a global LTE solution, I’m very sure about 
this,” he says. “It has evolved so much over recent months and now I’m seeing it appearing in all 
sorts of countries.” While the standard has been incubated in China, Robrecht says, the earliest 
deployments are more likely to come from elsewhere. He reports significant activity in Japan as 
well as India and Russia—and even some customers considering it in Australia” (Nokia Siemens, 
2011). 
Moreover, whilst China Mobile, and hence, the Chinese government is certainly the primary 
operator driving TD–LTE, the technology has now achieved global momentum, “China Mobile 
with its half a billion subscribers can clearly define a market segment on its own. However, it is the 
interest from other major markets – such as Russia, Japan, India and the US – that has put TD–LTE 
on every operator’s plan...Currently, overseas operators from dozen countries and regions in 
Europe, America and Asia have begun their TD–LTE cooperation with China, and many of them 
plan to start trial network construction in 2010 and even to deploy commercial networks” (C114, 
2010). For example, in June 2010, Qualcomm won India’s 2.3GHz Broadband Wireless Access 
(BWA) spectrum auction for TDD development in four regions of the country. Furthermore, 
Qualcomm has promised to set up a JV to build an LTE network. This indicates that Qualcomm has 
TD–LTE in its strategic development plan. Mobile operators in the U.S. including AT&T, Verizon, 
and America Mobil have also promised to support TD– LTE. Leading operators in Japan and Korea 
have also played an active role in promoting TD–LTE. Other operators with WiMAX, Personal 
Handyphone System PHS (1900–1920MHz), and TD–SCDMA will also choose TD– LTE as their 
migration path (Min, 2011). 
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Consequently, it can be argued, that China Mobile is becoming a global leader in the sector and has 
acquired the necessary networking capabilities and relational legitimacy to play a key role in 
shaping the TD–LTE ecosystem.  As it has already been established system shapers and ecosystem 
coordinators play a key role in the contemporary socio–technological system by ensuring system 
convergence and interoperability via the coordination of large sets of system actors. The 
overarching result here is that the state itself is linked to the technological ecosystem via a dense 
array of deterritorialised or partially deterritorialised alliances with public and private sectors actors. 
As China Mobiles chairman Wang Jianzhou, asserts: “TD–LTE technology has opened up a "global 
market" for the company. The next important step for China Mobile is to converge TD–LTE 
technology with the other mainstream 4G technology – LTE FDD,...Convergence will provide a 
much bigger platform for TD–LTE technology” (Jianzhou, 2011). 
Both Huawei and ZTE have also been successful in securing significant market share in the global 
wireless sector in recent years.  As Table 6.5. indicates both Huawei and ZTE are now ranked in the 
Top 5 Telecommunications Vendors in the World by Revenue, with Huawei in second place with 
15.4 billion and ZTE in fifth place with 5.8 billion (OECD Information Technology Database, 
2011).   
Table 6.5. Top 5 Communications Equipment and Systems Firms 2011 by Revenue 
USD millions in current price 
Firm Country Revenue 2010 
Ericsson Sweden 30 billion 
Huawei                               China 28  billion 
Alcatel–Lucent                                         France 21.4 billion 
Nokia Siemens Finland 12.7  billion 
ZTE China 10.6 billion 
Source: OECD Information Technology Database. 
Note: Firms are ranked by 2011 total revenues. 
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Huawei has customers in 130 countries and sells equipment to 45 of the world's top 50 telecom 
operators, and had $28 billion in revenue in 2011. It is ranked at number 352 on the Global Fortune 
500 list. Huawei has continued to increase its market share in global markets. For example, Huawei 
was awarded 36% of LTE kit tenders in 2010 (Mobile News, 2010). This is estimated to be twice 
the number so far secured by Ericsson at 16% (Mobile News, 2010). NSN also acquired 16%, 
Alcatel Lucent 14% and others 18%. With sales projected to grow another 10% this year, it has 
been suggested that Huawei will soon surpass Sweden's Ericsson and assume the position as the 
worlds No. 1. manufacturer of communications equipment (Mobile News, 2010). 
It is important to note here that this increase in market share is not just derived from domestic sales. 
For example, in 2012 Huawei had total sales of 220,198 CNY. Of this 73,579 CNY was derived 
from the Chinese domestic market, 37,359 34 CNY from the Asia Pacific, 31,846 CNY from 
America and 77,414 CNY from Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) (Huawei, 2012). 
Hence, it can be seen that a significant proportion of Huawei’s market share was derived from 
increasing global market share as opposed to domestic sources.  
ZTE is also experiencing significant growth in the LTE market. In first half 2011, ZTE’s new LTE 
contracts exceeded its total number of LTE contracts for all of 2010. For example, ZTE has won 28 
contracts for LTE commercial application and has deployed test networks in cooperation with more 
than 90 operators across the globe. To date, over 100,000 ZTE LTE terminal units have been 
ordered worldwide. The terminals, which are purchased by global high–end operators, contribute to 
the commercialisation of LTE technology (Min, 2011). 
Moreover, in 2012, ZTE reported that of total sales revenue RMB39.56 billion was derived from 
the domestic market, accounting for 47.0% of total sales whilst RMB44.66 billion was derived from 
the international market, accounting for 53.0% of the group’s overall sales revenue (ZTE, 2012). 
Conversely, it can be seen, that ZTE like Huawei is deriving more sales revenue from the global 
market than the domestic market.  
Furthermore, at the end of September, ZTE and Huawei both announced that they would build the 
TD–LTE network for Japan’s Softbank. This network will cover 90% of the population in Japan 
and will be the largest TD–LTE project across the world (C114, 2011). Before this project, ZTE and 
Huawei have built the first large–scale LTE TDD/FDD commercial network together for Hi3G. In 
October 2011, ZTE and Huawei also announced that they will build India’s first TD–LTE 
commercial network for Bharti Airtel – India’s largest mobile carrier. Moreover it has been 
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estimated that ZTE will account for 35 % of TD–LTE equipment supplies worldwide. Forecast 
released by Goldman Sachs, indicate that the total global TD–LTE CAPEX could reach US$15bn to 
US$20bn in 2012–2014 with more than 40 million subscribers (Goldman Sachs, 2011). Conversely, 
it can be seen that these firms are securing significant market share in the 4G sector and are firmly 
embedded in both the 4G ecosystem research and development process as well as being at the 
forefront of its commercialisation rollout. 
Thus, it can be argued that China Mobiles adoption of a more collaborative business model that is 
focused around the idea of ecosystem and network building at a global level has proved to be an 
effective developmental model that has helped to embed it in the 4G market infrastructure at an 
early stage of the sectors development. Furthermore, these recent cooperative linkages via strategic 
alliances in the Chinese wireless communications sector suggest that the Chinese government is 
moving beyond its policy of building national domestic champions to one of state–lead alliance 
capitalism, where the key policy goals are designed to facilitate global cooperation, ecosystem 
alliance building and the co–development and trans–territorial appropriation of technological assets 
and knowledge. 
State–led alliance capitalism from this perspective represents a strategic state response by the 
Chinese government to utilise recent changes in the contemporary socio–technical environment in 
order to enhance its comparative advantage in high–technology markets. Specifically, it is a trans–
territorial developmental approach that addresses the need to address critical ecosystem 
dependencies via collaborative R&D and regulatory decision making process at an early state in a 
technologies development. As this thesis has sought to highlight, in the contemporary global 
wireless sector  the development of standards, intellectual property assets and compatible ecosystem 
products begins at an early state in the developmental process and is increasingly defined by 
alliance–based collaborative processes in order to ensure system convergence and interoperability. 
For the Chinese developmental state in the global wireless sector this involved it playing an early 
role in the standardisation process and in facilitating the recruitment of alliance members for the 4G 
TD–LTE ecosystem.  
In order to achieve its high–technology developmental goals the Chinese state leveraged the power 
of network coordination and its increasing global relational and regulatory capacity in order to 
motivate a large number of system participates to make significant investments in the 4G TD–LTE 
technology and accelerate the development of the ecosystem itself and the associated 
commercialisation processes. In this way new techno–economic alliances have been made between 
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the Chinese developmental state and foreign firms and important technological, economic and 
political linkages to the global economy have been forged.  
This has not been a simple linear process. Instead it has involved a process of policy 
experimentation and adaptive learning. This can be seen manifest in the way in which the Chinese 
government has continuously adjusted its policy prescriptions in response to socio–technological 
system barriers and opportunities in the wireless technology sector. In this way the Chinese state as 
a set of bounded rational actors have engaged in a new round of capability building, new policy 
tools and methods of strategic global economic diplomacy that are highly responsive to socio–
technological systems change. In many ways the strategic agency employed by the Chinese state 
corresponds to the behaviour exhibited by GNSs. As argued in chapter 4, GNSs endeavour to shape 
the capabilities of the business sector and society itself and its associative markets (O’Rian, 2000: 
166). This involves the building of local and global network capabilities and innovation systems. 
However, whilst the GNS actively engages in technological and social systems shaping, the 
interventionist Chinese state and its unique form of state capitalism has gone a step further and has 
been actively engaged, via the state owned China Mobile, not just in the shaping of the socio–
technological system but in the construction of the technological ecosystem itself and its associated 
regulatory environment. This form of developmental state is defined not just by its system shaping 
abilities but by its ability to acquire significant ecosystem power and regulatory capacity in the 
contemporary socio–technological system.  
Chinese Government Support and Technological Development in the 
Global Wireless Sector 
It is important to emphasise at this point that an assessment of Huawei and ZTE’s patenting activity 
and increasing market share correlates with governmental increases in R&D funding, tax 
concessions and Science and Technology policy directives. Specifically, the 863, 973 and Torch 
programs that were initiated in the late 1980s and 1990s and the Medium to Long-term Plans for 
Science and technology first initiated in 2006 are all key governmental policy programs designed to 
accelerate the Science and Technology development of the nation. Furthermore, the fact that the 
telecommunications sector in which Huawei and ZT operate was declared by the Chinese 
government to be a strategically important has afforded promising companies operating in the 
sector significant governmental support. Indeed, since the mid-1980s, the governments industrial 
policy in the sector has facilitated a transformation of the network from a creaking, thinly spread 
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system to a world-class utility that rivals some of the world's most advanced countries (Harwit, 
2007). 
For examples, as can be seen from graph 6.3. before 2001 Huawei and ZTE engaged in little patent 
activity. From 2002 this begins to change with moderate amounts of patent activity being conducted 
by Huawei. Moreover, it is not until 2004-5 that we see a sharp increase in the patenting activity of 
both firms.  
Figure 6.3. Huawei and ZTE US Patent Application Filings Since 2001 
 
Source: Shah, (2012). 
It can be conjectured that this increase in patenting activity reflects the Chinese government’s 
commitment in the period to accelerate the science and technology development process. For 
example, since 1998 the Chinese government tripled its financial support for higher education and 
universities committed to basic and applied research. As a direct result the number of students 
quintupled, from 1 million in 1997 to 5.5 million in 2007. Moreover, since the early 1990s China’s 
domestic science and engineering doctorate awards have increased 10 fold –to approximately 21000 
in 2006 (Ernst, 2011). What is important to emphasise at this point is that this increase in highly 
trained students provided both Huawei and ZTE with a capable labor force capable of engaging in 
the development of patents and products for the global wireless sector. Indeed, the capacity to 
innovate is directly tied to the quality of the labor force. As Toner asserts: “When more skilled 
labor exits, the market for skill-complementary technologies is larger. More of these technologies 
will thus be invented and they will be complementary to skills promoting faster upgrading of the 
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productivity of skill workers.” That is: “an increase in the supply of skills can generate skill biased 
technical change” (Toner, 2011).  
Thus, it can be argued that the Chinese government’s strategic industrial policy agenda in the sector 
has played an important role in increasing the technological capacities and the internationalisation 
process of Chinese telecommunications companies and hence their increasing patent numbers and 
global market share. This assertion, it can be argued, can be substantiated by the correlations that 
exist between firms such as Huawei and ZTE’s increasing global success and innovative capacity 
and the industrial policy directives issued by the Chinese government that have defined the sector 
for the past 25 years.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have sought to highlight how the Chinese government and its leading domestic 
firms have adjusted to the necessity of global technological embeddedness and the innovation 
imperatives that define the global wireless sector. I have illustrated how new forms of collaborative 
relationships between Chinese domestic and foreign firms, multilateral institutions and the Chinese 
government in the sector are conspiring to expand the territorial scope and behaviour of both the 
firm and the state. From this theoretical perspective alliance capitalism, as a form of global 
economic organisation and form of embedded structural and relational interdependence is 
facilitating the institutional transformation and behaviour of all actors in the sector, as they are 
compelled to collaborate at a global level to develop core technologies and embed themselves in the 
global wireless sectors ecosystem and commercialisation process. 
Furthermore, in this chapter I have illustrated how the interests of Chinese firms and TNCs have 
become structurally and relationally interlinked in a way that affords the Chinese government and 
its lead domestic firms more bargaining power and increased rights and patterns of participation in 
the sector. Indeed, the capacity of the government of China to respond to foreign concerns in a way 
that has allowed them to develop its domestic wireless sector, whilst also satisfying the interest of 
the many actors involved in the global wireless sector, presents us with an interesting case of 
‘international political and economic bargaining and policy adjustment’ as well as a frame of 
reference to examine the actual processes associated with Chinese policymaking in a globalised 
economic context. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I have sought to highlight how socio–technological systems change and the advent of 
a more collaborative economy in the global wireless sector has created new sets of system pressures 
and developmental opportunities for the Chinese government and its domestic high–technology 
firms operating in the global wireless sector. Specifically, I have argued, that the concepts of 
‘convergence’ and ‘interoperability’ are key structural change drivers that have facilitated the 
development of new sets of critical ecosystem dependencies that require technological actors to 
engage in collaborative alliance–based behaviour in order to ensure technological ecosystem 
convergence and facilitate the development of high–technology assets and products. 
These alliances, it has been argued, are not just designed to appropriate complementary assets and 
resources as earlier alliance forms did, but are instead are designed to facilitate the development of 
other key ecosystem actors in a bid to ensure that critical infrastructure, regulatory standards and 
complementary technologies are developed before a technology goes to market. I have termed these 
new alliance forms; innovation ecosystem building alliances. The primary goal of such alliances, it 
has been asserted is to anticipate future market and ecosystem requirements and to utlise this 
information in order to construct a critical network of interdependent alliance partners that are 
focused on achieving technological ‘convergence’ and 'interoperability’ in the sector. . 
I have also highlighted how the Chinese developmental state has adopted a highly adaptive 
globalised response to the emergence of this more collaborative alliance based socio–technological 
system. The empirical focus has been on the 3G and 4G wireless technology sector. I have argued 
that after the failure of FDI and techno–nationalism as developmental strategies for the 
development of 3G technologies, the Chinese government has undergone a shift in its technological 
development agenda, R&D allocations and regulatory and relational policy tools. Essentially, in 
order to participate in the development of the 4G technological ecosystem it has endeavoured to 
forge and reinforce R&D, organisational and regulatory alliances with foreign firms and global 
regulatory actors. Furthermore, I have argued that this state–led, alliance–based developmental 
strategy in the 4G technology sector has been highly successful and has resulted in the favourable 
insertion of Chinese domestic firms, and hence, China’s economy into global innovation and 
production networks in the sector.  
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Empirical Findings 
The empirical findings of this thesis support the key theoretical assertions pertaining to the 
emergence of alliance capitalism in the global wireless sector and the ability of the Chinese 
government and its key domestic firms to employ ‘strategic agency’ and ‘ecosystem shaping’ policy 
tools in order to successfully ensure both the technological up-scaling of Chinese domestic firms 
operating in the sector and their embedment in key wireless technology ecosystems globally. 
Firstly, empirical data directly related to China Mobile, specifically, China Mobile’s role in the 
development of 4G TD–LTE ecosystem, and its associated alliance structures via the development 
of anticipatory standards and the setting up the Global TD–LTE Initiative (GTI), clearly indicates 
that China Mobile has been highly successful in facilitating the construction of a global 
collaborative platform for the co–development of TDD and FDD standards and the development of 
a trans-territorial ecosystem for the organisation of technological coordination and cooperation 
around the standard at a global level. Evidence that China Mobile has successfully positioned itself 
as a key network organiser and socio-technological systems shaper in the global wireless sector is 
also supported by the large number of firms willing to join the ecosystem and develop the necessary 
technologies and products required for system convergence and interoperability.  
Secondly, as this thesis highlighted in chapter six, R&D, patent, alliance and market share data, 
indicate that Chinese domestic firms are highly adaptive fast followers that are achieving significant 
global market share in the 4G wireless sector as both ecosystem builders and network organisers via 
the development of new technological platforms, markets and collaborative alliance structures.  
Thirdly, this thesis has provided empirical data to support the assertion that the Chinese 
developmental state operating in the contemporary wireless technology sector engaged not just in 
fixing market failures, but rather also in the active creation of markets for the new technologies via 
the provision of an opportunity space for both foreign and domestic firms. This has involved the 
Chinese state providing trans-territorial development funding and governance based on ecosystem 
development needs rather than domestic capacity enhancement or national pillar innovation goals. 
These changes in sectoral funding and the trans-territorial extension of Chinese governance in the 
sector via standard making bodies and globalised technological development networks and 
knowledge zones indicate that socio–technical system change is indeed impacting on the strategic 
planning and agency of the Chinese governments, its key domestic firms and international 
ecosystem partners. Specifically, this thesis has highlighted how Chinese policymakers in the sector 
are responding to this socio-technological systems change by developing important sets of new state 
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policy tools and capabilities such as ecosystem shaping, network organisation, technological co–
development, trans-territorial development funding and system embeddedness 
Theoretical Review and Implications 
The central theoretical focus of this thesis has been on the emergence of alliance capitalism as an 
important new form of economic organisation with a specific theoretical focus on the role of the 
Chinese developmental state in both facilitating and governing the parameters of global 
technological alliances in the wireless sector. It has been argued that alliance capitalism, as a new 
form of global economic organisation and form of embedded structural and relational 
interdependence is encouraging the institutional transformation and behaviour of all actors in the 
sector, as they collaborate to develop core technologies and embed themselves in the global 
wireless sectors ecosystem and commercialisation processes. Certainly, the fact that technological 
innovation and product development in the contemporary knowledge economy occurs in globally 
and organisationally dispersed innovation networks have significant implications for Chinese 
technology developmental policy and governance structures. What needs to be emphasised here is 
that because these technologies are created and developed in contemporary innovation networks 
that are increasingly defined by economic space instead of political geography they partly transcend 
national or geographical governance structures. 
Hence, as this thesis has highlighted in order to operate effectively operate in this changing soci-
technological environment the government of China has initiated a strategic shift away from ideas 
of indigenous technological development and national sectoral pillars to a socio–technical 
development strategy that is informed by the concept of ‘globalised adaptive ecology'. ‘Globalised 
adaptive ecology’ has been used in this thesis to refer to strategic policy responses that combines 
both state agency/intervention and developmental planning with the need to gather, co–create and 
appropriate technological knowledge and assets from multiple states and technological knowledge 
zones.  
In this thesis, I have argued, that the idea of ‘globalised adaptive ecology’ and ‘structural socio–
technical system shaping’ is an important theoretical medium from which to analyse the adaptive 
behaviour of the Chinese government and Chinese firms and their ability to operate and compete in 
multiple technological domains and system levels. Specifically, I have conjectured that key 
analytical concepts such as: co–evolution, alliance capitalism, self–organisation, complex adaptive 
ecology, dynamic structural change, knowledge coordination, experimental trial and error learning, 
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strategic system shaping, actor agency and trans–territorial multilevel governance all need to be 
incorporated into contemporary theoretical analyses.  
I have also conjectured that in order to understand exactly technology facilitates and shapes the 
emergence of socio–technological systems and how exactly these large scale global technological 
and knowledge systems are being politically, economically, social and scientifically shaped and 
organised at the national, global and sub–national level we need to comprehend how the system 
itself functions and the key variables that encapsulates its evolution, development and governance. 
Theoretically, this requires us to examine and frame our analyses with a framework capable of 
understanding how complex adaptive systems contribute to technological evolution and socio–
technological systems development 
Furthermore, as this thesis has highlighted, competition in this emerging environment has shifted 
from one that is focused on intellectual property monopolisation and market power to one of 
ecosystem membership and embeddedness. This is because in order to participate in the global 
networks and sectoral systems that comprise the contemporary socio–technical system in the 
wireless sector, actors need to develop technological innovations that possess the ability to 
converge or interact with other firms. Furthermore, the ability to ensure ‘convergence’ and 
‘interoperability’ is highly dependent on the capacity of firms to access globally dispersed scientific 
and technical knowledge sources and generate long–term networked relational ties with other 
system actors.  
The Chinese state has played a key focal role in the coordination of such collaborative processes as 
a network organiser and system integrator. By helping to both facilitate the insertion of its domestic 
firms into the 4G global innovation ecosystem and by also actively constructing a niche 
technological ecosystem by developing its own technological standard (4G TD–LTE) that could 
converge with other standards in the sector and recruiting members to populate and develop 
technological assets for the new ecosystem the Chinese government has, for the first time, acted not 
just as a system shaper but also as a system maker. It has done this by integrating international firms 
into its domestic economy and innovation platforms, and by offering a range of incentives designed 
to encourage the development of a complex network of extra–territorial linkages that could 
facilitate the development of globalised technological niches and ensure the interoperability and 
openness of key emerging innovation platforms and their associated technologies. In this way the 
Chinese state has ensured the technological advancement of its domestic firms as well as the ability 
to appropriate technological rents from multiple globalised sources. The emergence of collaborative 
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global innovation in key high technology sectors means that very different policy capacities are 
required compared to when policy objectives were solely centered on the idea of indigenous 
technology and the idea of building national champions.  This is because the states territorial 
jurisdiction over knowledge is becoming less important than its capacity to access and organise 
complex networks of collaborative and dispersed innovation processes. Thus, relational and 
globalised regulatory capacities have become important strategic policy tools that the Chinese 
developmental state has utilised in order to facilitate technological alliances between foreign and 
domestic firms in order to appropriate value from emerging high–technology ecosystems.  
In this dynamic and highly competitive environment, development strategy is no longer a matter of 
positioning a fixed set of activities along a neo–classical industrial model, the value chain. Instead, 
successful companies and state actors are endeavouring not just to add value, but also to co–
develop and reinvent value. For the state, its role in the creation of economic growth is becoming 
increasingly dependent on its ability create an ecosystem of firms that transcend the territorial 
boundaries of the state. Essentially, for the Chinese developmental state it is essentially a third way 
whereby the states strategic control over the globalisation process is modified in a way that still 
allows it a certain degree of control over the developmental process itself, but in which the 
existence of critical globalised ecosystem dependencies and the interests of global firms are actually 
integrated into the Chinese developmental strategy. Hence, the goal of successful high–technology 
governance in a contemporary context is not to control the socio–technical environment and 
appropriate nationally controlled intellectual property assets or to focus on the protection and 
development of nationally developed sectors. Rather it is to enable and adapt, and partially shape 
via collaborative coordination the emerging socio–technological environment. Conversely, the 
ability to self–organise, adapt and develop generative extra–territorial relationships is an important 
system capacity required by the current socio–technical system.  
In order to achieve these key developmental goals new state interventionist policy tools have 
emerged that are designed to address the increasing need for the state to play a role in funding long–
term risk capital to help facilitate the development of technologies with long time–frames high 
technology sectors such as the global wireless sector. From this theoretical perspective state 
intervention is a key perquisite for successful high-technology up-scaling. Indeed, for the Chinese 
developmental state operating in the global wireless sector, strategic agency has been derived from 
its ability to engage in a new round of capability building and develop new policy tools and 
methods of strategic global engagement that are highly responsive to socio–technological systems 
change. I have argued in this thesis that the strategic agency employed by the Chinese state 
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corresponds to the strategic behaviour exhibited by GNSs. GNSs have emerged in response to the 
emergence of a more collaborative global economy and primarily endeavour to link domestic and 
foreign actors together in a way that facilitates the co–production and appropriation of technological 
assets (O’Rian, 2000: 166). The GNS developmental state asserts Sean O’Rian is defined precisely 
by “its ability to create and animate Post–Fordist networks of production and innovation and 
international networks of capital and to link them together in ways which promote local and 
national development” (O’Rian, 2000:166). This requires a fundamental shift in government policy 
directives from commanding specific outcomes to creating and maintaining new markets and a 
move away from top–down policy development to steering and negotiating its intentions with 
partners in both the domestic private sector as well as in the international sphere (Jessop, 1997:96). 
In accordance with the central theoretical precepts expounded by the GNS, the Chinese state has 
targeted strategic investments to facilitate research and development and alliance participation 
between its domestic and foreign firms. In this manner the Chinese state has sought to build both 
local and global network capabilities. However, the Chinese developmental state differs in a 
number of ways from the GNS. Firstly, it has endeavoured to enhance its strategic agency by not 
just actively engaging in technological and social systems shaping. It has also sought to use its 
state–owned firms to facilitate the construction of the 4G TD–LTE technological ecosystem itself 
and its associated regulatory environment. I have argued that this form of developmental state is 
defined not just by its system shaping abilities but also by its ability to acquire significant 
ecosystem power and regulatory capacity in the contemporary socio–technological system. Indeed, 
the Chinese developmental state provides us with an interesting model of a state–led developmental 
strategy that poses a serious challenge to technological and economic discourse as it is currently 
framed. State–led alliance capitalism certainly presents a challenge to the developmental agenda as 
defined by Western nations, offering a developmental path to be emulated by other developing 
nations. It provides us with an interesting and important model for examining how technological 
and economic power relations will play out in the near future and forces us to conceptualise markets 
in a more dynamic way incorporating into our analysis new configurations of ecosystem power and 
interests and models of technological development.  
However, current theoretical approaches used to understand Chinese high–technology development 
are primarily framed around China’s latecomer status and failed techno–nationalistic policy 
programme and do not take in to account recent policy modifications and socio-technological 
adjustment strategies being devised by the Chinese government. Specifically, the literature fails to 
adequately address the way in which recent policy directives are increasingly framed by an 
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acknowledgement by Chinese government leaders, that the way in which global innovation works 
and the need to address critical ecosystem dependencies requires a shift towards a more trans–
territorial collaborative socio–technological developmental plan. Indeed, alliance capitalism and the 
co–production of technological assets that it entails has fundamental implications, not just for the 
Chinese state and its domestic firms, but also for the global high–technology system itself, and its 
system of intellectual property rights, and its relational networks and modes of value appropriation. 
Hence, researchers need to begin to explore exactly what types of relational and regulatory 
capacities are emerging? What does this mean for intellectual property rights and value 
appropriations measures? What role does the state and its SOEs have in advancing not just the high 
technology up–scaling of its own national firms but the up–scaling of foreign firms when the 
primary focus has shifted from one of building national champions to one of trans–territorial 
technological ecosystem development?  
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A – Chinese Firm Questions 
1. It is well known that, foreign companies manage virtually all intellectual property and 
account for 85% of the country’s technology exports. Do you feel that ‘Wintelism’ as it has 
been termed is inhibiting the technological advancement of your firm in the wireless sector, 
specifically in the development of 3G and 4G technologies? 
2. Do you feel that your firm has developed a dependence on transnational capital and 
technology? 
3. Is your firm currently engaged in any attempts to develop indigenous standards and 
technology platforms in the 3G and 4G wireless sector? 
4. Does your firm engage in horisontal collaboration with domestic counterparts in the wireless 
sector? 
5. How important is it for your firm to forge collaborative relationships with the Beijing and its 
regulatory institutions in order ensure the successful functioning and development of your 
firm? 
6. Are you currently engaged in any alliance or collaborative activity with a foreign firm? 
7. If so how many foreign firms are you collaborating with? What is the exact nature of these 
relationships and are these collaborations short or long term in duration? 
8. What is the exact nature of these collaborations and do you expect these collaborative 
activities to result in your firm assuming either sole or joint ownership over propeterial 
intellectual property in the 3G or 4g wireless sector? 
9. How strategically important is it for your firm to establish long term relational assets and 
network connections globally in order to embed itself in global R&D networks in the 
wireless sector. That is does your from consider relational assets global network ties and 
collaborative capacity to be important your firms future developmental success? 
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10. Could you please give me your understanding of a strategic alliance? What do you consider 
to be the most important assets that your firm can gain when engaged in a strategic alliance 
with a Chinese firm? 
11. Do you feel that your alignment with foreign firms and the need to develop a global market 
strategic and the need to gain access to codified technology conflict with the strategic 
developmental goals and interests articulated by Beijing? 
12. Do you feel that Beijing's attempt to define the boundaries of the wireless sectors market 
construction and market access has served to define the overarching path of your company’s 
development or that you have a degree of interdependence in defining the parameters of 
your firms development strategy? 
13. Are you members of any trans–national business alliance? If so what are your objectives for 
joining this type of alliance and what does its entail? 
14. How much of your Firms budget is devoted to R&D? 
15. What role does the development of anticipatory standards and pre–competitive market 
construction play in your in the strategic development of your firms technological assets? 
That is what percentage of your firms budget is allocated to “primary,” “radical” or “first 
generation” R&D? 
16. It has been suggested that the concept of R&D is being replaced the idea of Concept and 
Develop (C&D) that is ‘connect and develop’? How much of your current budget is 
allocated to C&D? 
17. It has recently ben asserted that due to the complexity of the knowledge economy and the 
need for collaborative R&D and product development at a global level the ‘network’ is 
replacing the firm as the dominant actor in the globalised, knowledge–based economy.  Do 
you agree or disagree with this assertion? 
18. Do you think that a networked global knowledge economy will/is resulting in the 
development of reciprocal interdependence between foreign and domestic firms at a global 
level? 
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Appendix B – Firm Questions Foreign  
1. It is well known that current global innovation networks are controlled by lead firms 
(‘flagships’) primarily from the West that dominate control over network resources, 
technology and decision–making. How do you think this economic and technological 
concentration impacts on Chinese firms wishing to develop an indigenous innovative 
technology base? 
2. The recent Indigenous innovation Product Accreditation Program indicates that Beijing is 
attempting to redirect foreign FDI in the manufacturing sector towards the R&D sector and 
facilitate competition and cooperation between Chinese and foreign firms.  Do you think 
these policy directives represents an attempt by Beijing to embed technological advanced 
foreign firms into the Chinese economy? 
3. How do you feel these strategic changes will impact on your firm?. Do you think Beijing 
has formulated a “calculative,” macro–strategy to and is using the size of its domestic 
market as a strategic tool to pressure foreign firms to transfer leading–edge technologies to 
Chinese firms, which can then use them to complement and accelerate national economic 
development?  
4. Do you believe that exchanging technology for market access in China poses significant 
risks for foreign firms operating in China? That is are you creating future competitors? 
Could you please outline these risks and any strategies that you utilise or that could be 
utilised to minimise this problem now, and in the future? 
5. Beijing has recently announced its intentions to pursue a leading role in the development 
and marketisation of 4G wireless technology. In order to achieve this, the country has 
recently developed its own technological standards such as TD–SCDMA. It has also 
launched a number of government–sponsored research projects on 4G. Do you feel 
obligated to adopt Chinese made standards and develop new product lines compatible or 
interoperable with new or expected PRC standards in order to ensure future access to china/s 
domestic market? 
6. As you are probably aware Beijing's attempts to appropriate the lock–in effects associated 
with technological standards ownership and the comparative advantages that it is thought to 
confer, has met with fierce international resistance.  As a result Beijing has sought to modify 
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it’s policy framework with one that is more receptive to a more open market focus and 
which emphasises the need to meet the requirements of the international regulatory 
environment. Within the wireless sector this new policy framework focuses on the 
development of pre–competitive R&D, anticipatory standards and technological alliances 
with foreign firms. Zhang Yansheng, director of the Institute for International Economic 
Research under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has asserted 
that Beijing prefers strategic alliances multinationals willing to establish R&D centers in 
China? 
7. Do you currently have R&D centers in China?  
8. Could you please outline the organisational, managerial and key goals of these R&D 
centers? 
9. How does the management of your R&D facilities in  China differ from those at home? Do 
you feel obligated to set them up or is it a necessarily part of your long term plan for 
accessing and gaining share of the Chinese market via the adaption of products for the local 
market? 
10. If you do not currently have R&D centers in China do you have plans to open R&D centers 
in China in the near or long term future? 
11. Are you willing to share a greater proportion of your firms profits, technological knowledge, 
organisational structures and network connections with Chinese firms now or in the future? 
12. Could you please give me your understanding of a strategic alliance? What do you consider 
to be the most important assets that your firm can gain when engaged in a strategic alliance 
with a Chinese firm? 
13. How strategically important is it for your firm to establish long term relational assets and 
network connections globally in order to embed itself in  global R&D and innovation 
networks in the wireless sector. That is does your from consider relational assets and 
collaborative capacity to be important your firms future developmental success within the 
Chinese domestic market globally? 
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14. What role does the development of anticipatory standards and pre–competitive market 
construction play in your in the strategic development of your firms technological assets, 
specifically those related to 3G and 4G wireless technology? 
15. How much of your firms budget is devoted to R&D designed to develop 3G and 4G 
technology sector? 
16. How much of your firms budget is devoted to collaborative R&D with Chinese firms 
working to develop 3G and 4G wireless technology? 
17. It has been suggested that the concept of R&D is being replaced the idea of Concept and 
Develop (C&D) that is ‘connect and develop’. How much of your current budget is 
allocated to C & D? 
18. Does the networked nature of the contemporary global economy mean that all firms will 
need to work together in a more collaborative fashion to construct and share wireless 
technology and its future standards in order to ensure seamless interoperability in the sector? 
19. It is clear that western markets are highly saturated and driven by replacement demand and 
that as a direct result the Chinese domestic market has significant market potential for 
foreign firms. What are your key motives/goals objectives for entering into an alliance/s 
with Chinese state owned or private firms in the wireless sector? 
20. How important is it for you as a foreign firm in China to forge collaborative relationships 
with the Chinese state and its regulatory institutions in order ensure the successful 
functioning of your firm in China? 
21. How does your interaction with a state owned Chinese firm differ from that of a privately 
owned firm such as Huawei? 
22. What strategies, avenues do you use when bargaining and negotiating terms of access with 
the Chines government? 
23. Are you members of any trans–national business alliance? If so what are your objectives for 
joining this type of alliance and what does its entail? 
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24. The last decade has witnessed substantial growth in the talent pools of emerging 
economies—especially in Asia. Because salaries make up a significant proportion of the 
cost of R&D, is the availability of highly skilled human resources at lower cost an important 
factor in your decision to relocate your R&D in China? 
25. It has recently ben asserted that due to the complexity of the knowledge economy and the 
need for collaborative R&D and product development at a global level the ‘network’ is 
replacing the firm as the dominant actor in the globalised, knowledge–based economy.  Do 
you agree or disagree with this assertion? 
26. Do you think that a networked global knowledge economy will/is resulting in the 
development of reciprocal interdependence between foreign and domestic firms at a global 
level? 
 
 
Appendix C – Government/Ministerial/Academic Questions 
1. Recent policy directives such as those contained in the 2006, 15 year “Medium–to Long 
Term Plan for the development of Science and Technology” and the Indigenous innovation 
Product Accreditation Program indicate that Beijing wants to develop an innovative 
indigenous knowledge economy. What is your understanding of Beijing’s key development 
objectives here? 
2. It is well known that current global innovation networks are controlled by lead firms 
(‘flagships’) primarily from the West that dominate control over network resources and 
decision–making. How do you think this economic and technological concentration impacts 
on Chinese firms wishing to develop an indigenous innovative technology base? 
3. The recent Indigenous innovation Product Accreditation Program indicates that Beijing is 
attempting to redirect foreign FDI in the manufacturing sector towards the R&D sector and 
facilitate competition and cooperation between Chinese and foreign firms.  Do you think 
these policy directives represents an attempt by Beijing to embed technological advanced 
foreign firms into the Chinese economy? 
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4. The Indigenous innovation Product Accreditation Program did contain some rather 
stringent policy directives (the government has now modified these requirements due to 
international political lobbying). For example, that foreign companies patent technologies in 
China and adopt Chinese standards if they want to sell in the Chinese market. Another 
provision requires companies to pay Chinese employees at least 2 per cent of profit derived 
from their inventions in China unless the employees explicitly waive that right. This 
emphasis on indigenous innovation and what some are calling forced technology transfer 
has raised concerns over the rise of “techno–nationalism” or “neo–techno–nationalism” in 
China and the future economic openness of China as well as the protection of foreign 
intellectual property in China. Do you think these concerns are legitimate? 
5. The international response to these plans was swift and coordinated and Beijing has now 
modified these requirements due to international political lobbying. Has Beijing been forced 
to become more receptive to the needs of international regulatory regimes and global 
economic actors in order to participate in the emerging global knowledge economy? 
6. If so how exactly has this impacted on Beijing's indigenous development plans? 
7. It has been argued that the network is replacing the firm as the dominant actor in the 
increasingly globalised, knowledge–based economy” It has also been suggested that in order 
to build an innovative technologically advanced knowledge economy and due to the 
globalised nature of contemporary R&D that few if any products are developed in a single 
territory and that China is most likely to achieve technological and organisational upgrading 
by participating in these networks. From this perspective, in order to effectively participate 
in the networked global innovation economy strategic state reposes are required in the areas 
of resource and knowledge management, domestic and international level barging and 
alliance construction and the development of collaborative governance mechanisms.  Do 
you agree with this observation? 
8. It has been argued that it is via the development of embedded relational ties with key 
stakeholders that firms can position themselves in the global economy in a way that allows 
them to gain access to innovative technological information in a bid to gain access to assets 
that have been intellectually and politically codified. E.g. copyrighted ideas, trademarks, 
patents and cutting edge design. This often requires the development of relational assets 
designed to facilitate the access of firms to the knowledge assets and co–ordination 
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mechanisms of established lead firms. Does Beijing consider the development of sets of 
relational assets as important? If so what strategic relational policy instruments is Beijing 
developing to can help facilitate foreign and domestic technological collaboration? 
9. To what extent do you think that Beijing consider pre–competitive market construction, 
standards development and embedding of Chinese firms in the future organisation of the 
global innovation and technological architecture important for the future development of the 
Chinese knowledge economy? 
10. Do you think that Beijing has been pressured by international economic actors to conform to 
a specific model of global economic and technological development that could negatively 
impact on its future technological development and its position in the global knowledge 
economy? 
11. Could you outline the key policy instruments and governance mechanisms if any that 
Beijing is developing in order to manage/facilitate the necessary relational, regularity and 
structural assets and institutional forms required for successful collaborative network 
development and alliance management in a global context? 
12. What role do you think the state has in organising, governing and coordinating such 
networks? Do you think this role will change in the near future? If so how? 
13. Do you think the overarching result of greater technological and innovative collaboration 
will be the development of hybrid firms that contains both Chinese and foreign owners? 
14. Do you feel that the state losses a degree of control over its domestic firms when they form 
alliances with foreign firms and become integrated into global production and innovation 
networks? Does Beijing have any policy directive designed to minimise this or allow for the 
greater appropriation of technological and financial rents from both domestic and foreign 
firms operating in China? 
15. My thesis is focusing on the 3g and 4g wireless sector as a case study. This is a sector that is 
becoming increasingly defined by collaborative international R&D. Do you think that the 
movement to 3 and 4G provides the Chinese government with a window of opportunity to 
be involved in the development of platform architecture, collaborative development and 
market construction? That is what role exactly do you envisage for Beijing and domestic 
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Chinese firms in the development of innovation based wireless technology such as 3G and 
4G wireless technology? 
16. Recent cooperative linkages via strategic alliances in the Chinese wireless communications 
sector suggest that China is moving beyond its policy of building national domestic 
champions to one of global cooperation and competition. Instead of being confined to the 
government bureaucracy, the decision–making process has become more receptive to the 
lobbying of business leaders, sectoral and regional interests, and to some extent 
transnational business groups. Do you agree with this observation? 
17. Do you feel this is a sector specific occurrence? That is do different sectors require different 
global management strategies and levels of interdependence and global embedenesss? 
18. It has  been suggested that a multilevel bargaining and lobbying apparatus is arising at a 
global level that is comprised of a complex network of supra–national regulatory institutions 
and a network of multi–stake holders that are both domestic and international in nature. Do 
you agree with the assertion? 
19. How has Beijing's political and economic bargaining strategies been impacted or modified 
in response? 
20. Do you think that Beijing is developing new transnational political, diplomatic and 
economic development strategies and regulatory institutions in response? 
21. Do you think that a global governance gap is emerging as a direct result of the emerging 
structure of the global knowledge/innovation economy? 
22. Do you consider that the increasing need for alliances and network positioning in the global 
economy requires the institutional and political modification of the current international 
trading system? 
 
